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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The issue of traumatic brain injuries in athletics has garnered increased attention over the 
past decade.  Mass concussion litigation has led to judgments and settlements totaling more than 
a billion dollars.  Meanwhile, numerous policies at all levels of athletics have been adopted over 
this short period of time in an effort to reduce the risks of these types of injuries.  The attention 
this issue has gained is well deserved.  Traumatic brain injuries, including concussions, pose a 
great danger to athletes at all levels and can lead to very serious, long-term health consequences.  
This dissertation seeks to shed further light on the issue of concussions in athletics.  
Chapter 1 focuses on state youth concussion laws.  This chapter presents the first 
empirical study on how these laws influence high school participation in athletics.  This chapter 
also adds to the growing literature that examines how these laws affect the reporting of 
concussions, while exploring how these laws impact the reporting of concussions differently 
across sports.  I find that youth concussion laws lead to decreased participation in certain sports 
often linked to concussions.  However, there is no evidence of substitution from these sports into 
others.  I also find that these laws increase the reporting of concussions, but only for some sports, 
despite the universal applicability of the laws.  
 Chapter 2 explores the steps taken to reduce risk and provide compensation for traumatic 
brain injuries in football.  This chapter examines four risk-management systems—market forces, 
tort liability, regulation, and insurance—that can be used to address the concussion issue.  With 
the goals of creating proper incentives for an optimal level of risk and compensation, I present an 
argument for which of these systems are best used for each level of football—professional, 
college, and youth.  In doing so, I explain how such systems could operate in practice at each of 
these levels. 
 x 
 Chapter 3 studies how commitment and payment schemes impact risk aversion.  This 
chapter uses an incentivized experiment in which participants play a multi-stage game in which 
they must decide how many rounds they wish to play before walking away.  Good outcomes lead 
to additional compensation, while bad outcomes result in a loss of prior gains.  In this way, I 
analogize the experiment to the issues of concussions in athletics, which can lead to major, 
irreversible effects.  I find that individuals are more risk seeking when faced with an upfront 
commitment and increasing payment structure. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF STATE YOUTH CONCUSSION LAWS ON  
ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION AND REPORTED CONCUSSIONS 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Imagine a fall day in October as you watch your thirteen-year-old son play in his junior 
high football game.  Towards the end of the first half, your son makes a tough tackle and his 
head slams hard into the ground.  He grabs his head and looks to be in some pain.  The official 
takes notice and calls timeout.  Your son sits out the remaining three plays of the half.  Always 
wanting to be part of the action, your son feels good enough to return at the start of the second 
half.  The remainder of the game goes on as usual.  Suddenly, your son collapses on the field and 
must be airlifted to a nearby medical center where he must undergo emergency life-saving 
surgery.  Doctors are required to remove the skull from each side of his brain in order to reduce 
the building pressure.   
This story sounds like a nightmare, but unfortunately, it was reality for Victor and 
Mercedes Lystedt and their son, Zackery.  Zack spent the next seven days on a ventilator and 
was in a coma for a total of three months.  It would be nine months until Zack could speak, 
thirteen months until he was able to move his limbs, and nearly two years until his feeding tube 
could be removed.  The effects of this horrific injury are still present in its aftermath.  Physically, 
the right side of Zack’s body drags and his speech is slow and slightly slurred.  Mentally, his 
short-term memory has been severely affected, making it difficult to learn.  It is likely that Zack 
will need a lifetime of assistance.  While Zack will never be able to live a normal life, he took it 
upon himself to fight so that other young athletes do not suffer a similar fate (Booth 2011; 
Clarridge 2009; Haas 2016; Mickool 2013). 
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The Lystedts, along with their attorney, began leading the charge to enact legislation 
focused on “return to play” (Clarridge 2009).  “Return to play” refers to the specific protocol that 
must be followed before an athlete can return to a game or practice after having suffered a 
concussion.  The Lystedts’ effort was rewarded in May 2009, when the state of Washington 
passed the Zackery Lystedt Law, becoming the first comprehensive state law aimed at addressing 
the issue of youth concussions.  Zack and his family continue to educate others about severe 
brain injuries and ensure that coaches, trainers, parents, and athletes know how to identify 
concussions and treat them properly. 
Youth concussions in athletics are still very much an issue of great concern and while 
laws like the Zackery Lystedt Law now exist in every state, the effect of these laws deserve 
further study.  This paper is the first to study the impact of state youth concussion laws on high 
school participation in various athletics.  This chapter also adds to the literature examining the 
impact of youth concussion laws on the reporting of concussions, while using a dataset not 
previously used to study this topic.  
The results reveal that the adoption of a state youth concussion law decreases 
participation in football and hockey—two sports perceived to be closely linked to concussions.  
This suggests that these laws reinforce such perceptions.  Interestingly, there does not seem to be 
a substitution effect.  Participation in other sports does not increase as a result of these laws; it 
does not appear that the individuals who stop participating in football and hockey are joining 
other sports instead.  This is potentially concerning, given the many benefits of participating in 
youth athletics.  Given this result, policymakers should consider providing other means by which 
individuals can still obtain these types of benefits.  
  3 
I find that these laws improve the reporting of concussions.  This result seems to be 
driven primarily by football and girls soccer.  This may make sense from a benefit-cost 
perspective, since both football and girls soccer have relatively high rates of concussions as 
compared to other sports.  Therefore, it would be efficient for schools to spend their limited 
resources focusing on these sports; however, whether schools are actually allocating resources in 
this manner is unknown.  Furthermore, the fact that the reporting of concussions in other sports is 
unchanged by these laws may be concerning due to the fact that these laws are supposed to apply 
to all sports.  State legislators may wish to consider amending their respective laws to better 
address the sports that do not see increased reporting.      
Section II of this chapter provides a brief background of concussions, highlighting the 
prevalence of these injuries among the youth.  Section II also discusses the different attempts that 
have been made to reduce concussions and provides a literature review of both qualitative and 
empirical studies related to youth concussion laws.  Sections III and IV discuss the data and 
empirical strategy used to study the impact of these laws on participation and reported 
concussions.  Section V provides a brief summary of the results, while Section VI offers further 
discussion of the results and their implications.  Section VII concludes and provides suggestions 
for future research. 
 
II.  Background 
 
A.  Concussions in Youth Athletics 
 
Roughly 500,000 children each year visit emergency rooms for traumatic brain injuries 
(TBIs), 80-90% of which are classified as concussions (Weill Cornell 2017).1  These injuries are, 
                                                
1 Concussions are often classified as a subset of traumatic brain injuries and considered to be one type of 
mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI).  However, it is worth noting that researchers often use different 
definitions when discussing concussions, and only now is a consensus building in the biomedical 
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in fact, the leading cause of emergency room visits among adolescents.  The intensity, length of 
symptoms, and length of recovery differ on an individual level.  For some people, the symptoms 
of concussions may last just days; while for others, they may last weeks or even months.  Length 
of recovery depends on a variety of factors, including age.  For the most part, recovery is slower 
among older adults, young children, and teenagers, than that of other age groups.  Those with a 
history of prior concussions may also take longer to recover if they have additional concussions 
(Weill Cornell). 
Concussions are caused when the brain is shaken inside the skull due to a blow to the 
head or body, a fall, or other incident (Mayo Clinic; Medline Plus; WebMD).  It is no surprise 
then that contact sports, such as football, are a large source of youth concussions in the United 
States.  In fact, sports are the second-leading cause of traumatic injuries among youth, trailing 
only motor vehicle accidents (Lowrey 2015).  While people may think this issue is almost 
exclusively driven by tackle football, this is incorrect.  Sports like lacrosse and girls soccer also 
have high incident rates for concussions.2   Even girls basketball, a sport not commonly 
associated with concussions, has incident rates close to these other sports.3  This could partially 
be due to the fact that females are more prone to concussions and require longer recovery time 
than their male counterparts (Kwon 2017; Snyder 2015). 
More concerning than the commonplace of these injuries among our youth is the 
frequency at which these athletes are putting themselves at risk to sustain multiple concussions.  
One study found that 30.8 percent of concussed athletes return to play after a concussion 
                                                                                                                                                       
community as to how concussions should be defined. Seymour (2013) and Sharp and Jenkins (2015), 
among others, note that the use of the terms traumatic brain injury and concussion have been applied 
inconsistently in the past. 
2 Tackle football players sustain 11.2 concussions per 10,000 athletic exposures.  Lacrosse players and 
girls soccer players suffer 6.9 and 6.7 concussions per 10,000 athletic exposures, respectively (Brody 
2015). 
3 Girls basketball players suffer 5.6 concussions per 10,000 athletic exposures (Brody 2015). 
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(Lowrey and Morain 2014).  There are several reasons why an athlete might return to play in this 
situation—he or she might not want to risk losing playing time, the athlete might not think the 
injury is serious enough to require medical attention, or he or she might feel pressure to play so 
as to not let his or her team down by sitting out.  The risks of sustaining another concussion 
become much higher after an individual has already been concussed.  An individual can sustain a 
second concussion from a lesser impact than would generally be required to produce the first 
concussion.  Once a high school athlete has suffered one concussion, the risk of him or her 
sustaining another concussion in that same season increases by a factor of three (Straus 2013). 
These repeat concussions pose more potential harm than a single, isolated concussion.  
Repeat concussions over time can result in serious permanent brain damage or even death.  The 
opportunity for repeat concussions in a sport such as football is a very real one, where collisions 
are at the very soul of the game.  One example of the hazards surrounding repeat concussions is 
second impact syndrome (SIS), a severe condition brought on by a repeat concussion in which 
the brain swells rapidly causing intracranial pressure and severe brain damage, all of which can 
happen in a number of minutes.  In many cases, such rapid brain swelling is fatal.  Repeat 
concussions occurring over an extended period of time can have cumulative effects on the brain, 
resulting in neurological and cognitive defects.  These types of concussions have recently 
received widespread publicity due to some of the new evidence demonstrating the widespread 
occurrence of these injuries among former players of the National Football League (NFL).  In 
particular, these repetitive concussions have been linked to Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy 
(CTE), a degenerative condition associated with dementia, difficulty controlling impulsive 
behavior, impaired judgment, depression, and other physical difficulties.  However, CTE is just 
  6 
one condition on a long list linked to repetitive head trauma,4 and NFL players are not the only 
ones susceptible to the long-term consequences of concussions.  Several studies have 
demonstrated other prolonged effects of concussions.  These include deficits in attention, 
concentration, memory, and judgment.  As a result, much of policy addressing the youth 
concussion problem has focused on preventing repetitive concussions. 
B.  Attempts to Reduce Youth Concussions 
 
A variety of measures have been taken in efforts to reduce the incidence of concussions.  
One focus has been on improving equipment worn by athletes in sports frequently plagued by 
concussions.  The producers of football helmets are constantly searching for ways to improve 
their product and make athletes safer.  One startup company, Vicis, has even borrowed the 
crumple-zone concept from the auto industry while developing its helmet prototype.5  Special 
headbands for soccer are now being sold, with companies suggesting that they reduce the 
likelihood of concussions caused by the heading of a soccer ball.  Numerous governing bodies 
have implemented programs in hopes of reducing concussions in youth sports.  One such 
program, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s Heads Up Concussion in Youth Sports 
initiative, provides information to coaches, parents, and athletes regarding concussions.  USA 
Football, a youth and high school football organization, later developed their own program, 
financed by the NFL, with the goal of making the game of football safer through proper fitting of 
equipment, concussion awareness, and the teaching of proper tackling techniques.  Governing 
bodies of high school state football throughout the country have even introduced policies that 
limit the amount of full-contact drills that athletes may be subjected to throughout a week of 
                                                
4  Concussions have also been linked to other degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease, 
Parkinson’s disease, and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). 
5 One of these helmets costs $1,500, which is much more expensive than the typical helmet on the market 
(Gruley and Robison 2016).  Notre Dame will become the first team to use these helmets for the majority 
of its football roster beginning in the 2018 season (Lemire 2017). 
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practice.6  Finally, state legislatures have sought to address the concussion problem by enacting 
comprehensive sports-related concussion laws. 
In 2009, Washington became the first state to enact a law focused on decreasing the 
prevalence of sports-related traumatic brain injuries among youths.  This law, named the Zackery 
Lystedt Law after the middle school football player described previously who suffered a severe 
brain injury after returning to play after an earlier concussion, became a model for other states 
wishing to enact their own version of this initiative.  The Washington law has three main 
features: (i) education of athletes, parents, and coaches; (ii) immediate removal from play of a 
concussed athlete; and (iii) medical clearance before allowing the athlete to return to play (WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.190).  Soon after Washington enacted its law, several other states 
followed suit.  Over the years, more states continued to adopt such laws, and now all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia have some sort of comprehensive youth sports concussion safety 
law.  Figure 1 demonstrates the adoption of these laws over time.   
Most state laws are similar and are typically structured around the same three features as 
in the Washington law.  However, there does exist quite a few subtle differences between some 
of the laws.  For example, many state laws require that coaches are not only provided with 
information regarding concussions, but also require that they undergo formal training in the 
recognition and management of concussions in order to remain certified.  States requiring that 
parents and athletes be informed of the risks of concussions also differ substantially as to how 
they ensure such education occurs.  Washington and other states require that both the athlete and 
a parent or guardian sign and return an information sheet before the student is allowed to 
participate in athletics, while other states, such as Wyoming, simply require that the information 
                                                
6 The South Carolina High School League limits full-contract drills to 90 minutes per week (Robinson 
2016).  The state of Ohio has instructed schools to limit full contact in practice to 30 minutes per day and 
60 minutes total per week (McCrabb 2015). 
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be made available to parents.  In addition, some states with existing laws have modified their 
statutes over the years in hopes of making these laws more effective.  Common modifications 
include expanding coverage, clarifying existing requirements, tightening existing requirements, 
and adding provisions aimed at primary prevention. 
C.  Commentary Regarding Youth Concussion Laws 
 
 Comprehensive policies directed at sports-related youth concussions have been in effect 
for less than a decade.  As a result, large portions of the literature are non-empirical and instead 
seek to explore potential weaknesses of these laws and suggest remedies to strengthen their 
effectiveness.  Amberg (2012) considers different provisions of state laws.  The specific 
provisions of these laws vary state by state and many state laws go further than the original 
Washington statute.  Similar to other scholars who have examined these laws, Amberg warns 
that these laws may be ineffective due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms or penalties for 
noncompliance.  While recognizing that cost is a concern, Amberg stresses the need for both 
baseline testing and the presence of medical professionals on the sidelines of athletic events. 
 Brandwein (2013) details the science of concussions, the history of concussions in 
athletics, and examines the role of this legislation in limiting the effects of concussions on youth 
athletes.  Brandwein argues that the primary goal of sports-related concussion legislation should 
be to eliminate deaths and injuries caused by secondary impact syndrome.  This is because, 
Brandwein reasons, such secondary concussions are preventable.  Subordinate to this goal is the 
reduction in the total number of concussions and the spreading of awareness and education to 
those involved in youth sports.  He argues that the existence of strict protocols that must be 
followed once an athlete has suffered a concussion before allowing that athlete to return to 
competition or practice, more commonly known as “return to play” rules, would act as a restraint 
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on players, coaches, and parents who might otherwise be driven by competitive urges to have the 
athlete return to play before it is appropriate. 
Brandwein contends that the current state laws suffer from four main weaknesses: (i) 
language that is too general; (ii) informed consent and education requirements that are too vague; 
(iii) limits in the scope of the statute; and (iv) a lack of funding to monitor and enforce these laws.  
General language, it is argued, could allow the law to be followed without achieving its 
purposes; many of the education requirements do not ensure that the appropriate information is 
provided in a way that leads parents to seriously consider it.  In terms of scope, many of the state 
laws only apply to public school systems.  Finally, Brandwein argues that funding is a major 
shortcoming of these laws because these laws add fiscal burdens to schools and do little to ensure 
that they are enforced.  Enforcement is especially doubtful considering that most of these laws 
contain immunity provisions. 
 Harvey (2013) provides a useful description of state laws enacted through the end of 
2012.  Harvey creates a comprehensive data set of the different state law features, including 
return to play clearance provisions, concussion awareness requirements, and potential liability.  
Harvey finds that most states establish a minimum 24-hour period of removal from play, despite 
the lack of scientific agreement as to what is the optimal removal time frame.  This is just one 
example of where there may be a disjoint between the state law requirements and current 
scientific knowledge and practice.  In addition, this highlights the potential drawbacks of a one-
size-fits-all approach taken by these laws.  Harvey also finds that a large number of state laws do 
not require that clearance be provided by an individual trained in concussion awareness, which 
he finds to be troubling.  Harvey also expresses concern regarding the educational requirements 
in these laws, which he finds to vary widely between states but lack any evidence of efficacy.  
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Finally, Harvey notes that states differ greatly in their approach to liability waivers and concedes 
that he has no basis for judging whether waivers would lead to more or less concussions. 
D.  Empirical Studies Regarding Youth Concussion Laws 
 
Lowrey and Morain (2014) are the first to provide a national, empirical examination 
regarding the implementation of sports-based concussion laws.  They do so through interviews 
with the individuals actually in charge of administering these laws—representatives from state 
departments of health and education, as well as state athletic associations.  The authors 
conducted a total of 36 interviews in 35 of the 42 states that had laws in place as of December 31, 
2012.  The interviews focused on implementation, evaluation, and enforcement of the concussion 
laws.  State respondents expressed several challenges concerning these laws.  Some expressed 
uncertainty as to the scope and coverage of these laws.  Several respondents reported difficulties 
in determining who was qualified to make return to play assessments.  Some felt that only those 
with neurological training should be allowed to make these evaluations, while others believed 
that team physicians and athletic trainers should also be allowed to make such evaluations.  
Another common complaint was the lack of formal enforcement or penalties to ensure 
compliance.  While some respondents did reference some sports-related penalties for non-
compliance, several noted the lack of liability provisions in these statutes, and added that liability 
could serve as an additional deterrent.  Respondents also suggested stricter education 
requirements beyond simply providing coaches, parents, and athletes with informational 
handouts. 
 Chrisman et al. (2014) focus on the impact of education requirements in Washington’s 
Zackery Lystedt Law.  The law requires the state athletic association to “inform and educate 
coaches, youth athletes, and their parents and/or guardians of the nature and risk of concussion.”  
  11 
In addition, this information sheet must be signed and returned by the athlete and his or her 
parent prior to participating in athletics.  The authors surveyed high school coaches, athletes, and 
parents three years after the passage of the act.  Their study showed that coaches received more 
education than athletes and parents.  One explanation given was that the law was written so as to 
give immunity to schools that follow the coach education guidelines, thus giving them incentive 
to ensure their coaches received the required education and training.  On the other hand, many of 
the athletes and a majority of the parents admitted to only signing the required form and did not 
utilize any further education.  
 Gibson et al. (2015) sought to measure the effect of concussion laws on health care 
utilization rates.  The authors used emergency department data on commercially insured children 
aged 12 to 18 from January 1, 2006 through June 30, 2009.  They found that this legislation has 
led to an increase in health care utilization, but acknowledged that the overall increase can also 
be credited to increased awareness and attention due to heightened media attention.  Overall, the 
authors attributed a 10% increase in health care utilization for concussions to the implementation 
of concussion legislation. 
 Yang et al. (2017) examined the trends of new and recurrent concussions suffered by 
high school athletes using data from High School Reporting Injury Online (RIO).  The authors 
found that the reporting of new concussions increased for a period of 3.8 years after the 
enactment of youth concussion laws.  They also found that the reporting of recurrent concussions 
appeared to increase for a brief period after the enactment of concussion legislation and then 
declined significantly 2.6 years after enactment of the laws.  One limitation of this study 
recognized by the authors is that the data may have suffered from sample selection issues.  To 
participate in the surveillance study, schools must have had a certified athletic trainer.  The 
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schools willing to participate in the study were likely to be most compliant with state concussion 
laws and, therefore, may not have provided an accurate representation of how these laws 
impacted schools across the nation.  
 Previous literature has examined the impact of youth concussion laws on things such as 
concussion knowledge and the reporting of concussions.  The impact of these laws on athletic 
participation across different sports, however, has yet to be studied.  In the following sections, I 
describe the data and methods used to perform the first known national, empirical study 
measuring the impact of sports-related concussion legislation on high school athletic 
participation.  I also add to the increasing literature that seeks to measure the impact of these 
laws on reported concussions.  While the primary goal of these laws may be to prevent repeat 
concussions, the detection and reporting of concussions is instrumental in achieving this goal.  
Reporting a concussion allows for proper medical treatment and reduces the risk of an athlete 
returning to competition before it is safe to do so.  As explained in the subsequent section, the 
dataset I use to examine reported concussions does not suffer from some of the same limitations 
as previous research.  Namely, it is not limited to injuries involving insurance claims, as in 
Gibson et al. (2015), nor does it rely on a specific sub-sample of schools that are willing to 
participate in surveillance, as in Yang et al. (2017).  The data in my study also span a larger time 
period (2002–2016).7 
 
III.  Data  
 
A.  State Laws: LawAtlas 
 
 The data on state youth concussion laws were collected from LawAtlas, which is a 
publicly available website that presents law data, showing how laws differ over time and across 
                                                
7 Gibson et al. (2015) used data from 2006–2012.  Yang et al. (2017) used data from 2005–2015. 
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jurisdictions.  The website gives detailed information regarding the various provisions of youth 
concussion laws, indicates when each of the laws went into effect, and provides links to and 
citations of the state laws.  The types of provisions documented by LawAtlas include whether the 
law specifically addresses youth sport concussions, whether an athlete suspected with a 
concussion must be removed from play, whether the law specifies requirements for a return-to-
play policy, whether coaches must undergo training, whether an information sheet regarding 
TBIs must be distributed and/or signed by parents and/or student athletes, and whether the law 
explicitly addresses liability.  As states have updated their laws over time, certain provisions 
included in their laws have also changed.  These changes are reflected in this dataset, as most 
states have several effective dates to reflect the various versions of their law.  These data were 
consistent with data published by The Network for Public Health Law.  I also corroborated the 
information from these sources with my own search of state laws using Westlaw.  
B.  Participation: National Federation of State High School Associations (NFHS) 
 
 The National Federation of State High School Associations (NFHS) is an organization for 
high school athletic and performing arts activities.  The association is comprised of 50 member 
state associations and the District of Columbia.  Among other things, the NFHS publishes data 
on high school participation in athletics and other activities.  These data are collected from the 
state high school athletic associations that comprise the NFHS.  The participation data are 
published annually by the NFHS and are the best source of information available on high school 
sports participation.  I was able to obtain state-level participation data for 13 different sports, 
seven boys sports and six girls sports.  The sports include baseball, boys and girls basketball, 
boys and girls cross country, football, boys and girls hockey, boys and girls soccer, softball, and 
  14 
boys and girls track.  The data span from the 2002-2003 school year through the 2016-2017 
school year, amounting to 15 years worth of data.  
 To link the participation with the law data, it is important to know the start date of each 
sport season in each state.  I was able to collect this data from calendars found on the websites of 
the high school athletic associations for each state.  I then linked these dates with the state law 
data in order to determine which version of the state’s law was in effect at the start date of each 
sport for each state.  This ensured that the appropriate version of the law would be applied.8  
C.  Concussion: National Electronic Injury Surveillance Survey (NEISS) 
 
 The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) is a database that collects 
patient information from a national probability sample of hospitals in the United States.  A 
hospital sample weight is included in the data so that national estimates can be accurately 
developed.  For each of the representative hospitals, every emergency visit involving an injury 
associated with consumer products is collected.  The Consumer Product Safety Commission 
maintains this database.  Some of the variables contained in this database are date, product, 
gender, age, diagnosis, disposition, and locale. 
 As one of the diagnoses in this data set is concussion, I am able to code up the injuries as 
either being a concussion or a non-concussion injury.  The product code includes several sports 
that are of interest—baseball, basketball, football, hockey, soccer, softball, and track.  The 
disposition variable allows me to observe whether the individual was treated and released or if 
the injury was more serious and he or she was instead hospitalized.  The location variable allows 
me to distinguish whether the injury took place at school, on the sports field, or at some other 
location.  I use data between 2002-2016 so that I am able to match the participation data with this 
                                                
8 This would otherwise have been problematic if the state law happened to become effective during the 
middle of the school year.  
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injury data.  I also limit my research to individuals between the ages of 12 and 18.  This is the 
age group used by those studying youth sports concussion laws, as these laws apply to middle 
school and high school athletes.  Table 1 shows the number of concussions and the percent of 
concussions relative to the total number of injuries for each of the sports analyzed. 
 Figure 2 shows the number of reported concussions per 10,000 participants for all sports.  
Figure 3 depicts the same information, but only for football.  The raw data show a rise in the 
number of reported concussions after the first youth concussion law became effective in 2009.  
One may also notice that the rise in reported concussions actually first starts to appear a few 
years earlier, in 2007.  This could be due to the fact that this is about the time that these laws 
entered the public debate and the concussion issue started garnering more attention.  In fact, the 
injury that spurred the proposal of the first of these laws—the one suffered by Zackery Lystedt—
occurred in October 2016.  It was not until after this that youth concussion laws received any 
consideration. 
 
IV.  Empirical Strategy 
 
 A.  Participation 
 
 I first test the impact of state youth concussion laws on participation in high school 
athletics.  The equation below shows the basic regression used for this analysis. 
 Ln(Participationx,y) = α0 + β1Lawx,y + β2Statex + β3Timey + εx,y   (1) 
Ln(Participationx,y) is the natural logarithm of the number of athletes participating in a particular 
sport in state x at time y.  Under this specification, each sport was analyzed separately.  Lawx,y is 
a dummy variable equal to one if there was any law addressing concussions in place at the start 
of the particular sport season for that state.  Statex is a vector of state identifier variables that 
accounts for state-specific trends.  Timey is a yearly linear time trend variable that accounts for 
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any national trends that may exist, such as the change in media attention that concussions have 
garnered.  While the time and state variables should already control for changes in youth 
population that may be occurring over this period, I also conduct my analysis using participation 
rates in order to more explicitly control for this possibility.  The results for these regressions are 
contained in Tables A–2 and A–3 in the Appendix. 
 If the state laws impact how individuals perceive the risks associated with concussions, 
which is arguably one of the goals of these laws,9 one would expect an impact on the number of 
individuals participating in certain sports to be impacted by the introduction of one of these laws.  
Theoretically, individuals could have been overestimating or underestimating the risks related to 
concussions prior to the state laws.  If individuals were previously overestimating the risks, one 
would expect the laws to increase participation for sports associated with concussions.  On the 
other hand, if individuals were previously underestimating the risks related to concussions, the 
laws should decrease participation.  It seems much more likely that individuals were 
underestimating, rather than overestimating, the risks relating to concussions prior to these state 
laws.  Otherwise, it seems unlikely that state legislatures would see a need to introduce such laws.  
Therefore, I predict that these laws will decrease participation for certain sports or, in other 
words, I predict β1 < 0 for sports like football to which these laws usually draw attention. 
 I predict to see such an effect for only certain sports—those that are perceived as being 
most linked to concussions.  Therefore, I would expect to see the laws lead to a decrease in 
participation for sports like football and hockey, but have no impact on other sports not thought 
to be linked to concussions, such as track.  It is also possible that these laws could increase 
participation for certain sports due to individuals substituting one risky sport in favor of another 
                                                
9 Unfortunately, explicit goals are rarely found in the text of these laws.  However, education, including 
information about the risks associated with concussions, is often seen as an important aspect of these laws.  
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less risky sport.  For example, both football and cross country take place during the fall sports 
season.  Due to these laws, individuals may decide to stop playing football, and instead, join 
cross country.  To gain a better understanding of the impact of these laws on specific sports and 
to explore this substitution story, I use a difference-in-differences strategy shown in Equation (2) 
below.  The difference-in-differences methodology can be used in instances in which outcomes 
are observable for both a treatment group and a control group at two or more different time 
periods, where at least one of the time periods is after a “treatment” has occurred.  The 
methodology works by comparing the outcomes of the two groups before and after the treatment 
has occurred.  Such method removes potential biases that could result from permanent 
differences between the two groups or from certain time trends. 
Ln(Participationx,y) = α0 + β1Lawx,y + β2Footballx,y + β3(Law × Football)x,y +        
β4Statex + β5Timey + εx,y   (2) 
 
 Using this differences-in-differences strategy allows me to account for any unobservable 
trends that may exist among the different sports.  The Participation, Law, State, and Time 
variables are the same as in Equation (1).  Football is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
observation is for football and equal to zero if the observation is for the other sport being 
compared.  This variable accounts for the fact that football has much more participation than 
other sports.  The variable of interest is the interaction term, Law × Football.  I choose to use 
football as the comparison sport because these laws are most often associated with football and 
so it is most interesting to see how these laws affect football as compared to each of the other 
male sports.  I compare football to each of the male sports separately, which amounts to six 
estimations. 10   As discussed previously, I would expect these laws to impact football 
                                                
10 I choose to only compare football to male sports so as to eliminate the possibility of differences 
attributable to gender that could obscure the results. 
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participation, but not necessarily have the same effect on participation of the other sports.  
Therefore, I predict β3 < 0. 
 B.  Reported Concussions 
 
 I next test the impact of the laws on reported concussions.  Equation (3) below shows the 
specification used to do so.  
 Concussion = α0 + β1Portion of Athletes Covered by Law + β2Time + ε   (3) 
Unfortunately, the NEISS does not provide state-level data.  Instead, the data is to be used for 
national estimates.  Therefore, it is not possible to use a law variable in the same manner for 
which it was used for the participation analysis.  One possible solution is to simply use a dummy 
variable to indicate the post-law period as any point in time after the first state law became 
effective.  However, this does not account for the fact that different states gradually adopted 
these laws over a period of five years. 
Instead, I choose to create the variable Portion of Athletes Covered by Law. 11  This 
variable is the percentage of high school participants that are covered under a youth concussion 
law for that particular sport at the time of the injury.  This construction was possible due to the 
availability of state-level data on participation and data on the dates in which the laws went into 
effect.  This construction controls for the fact that certain states are much larger than others and 
will have more participants.  Time is a yearly linear time trend variable (the same as used in the 
prior regressions). 
Concussion is a dummy variable equal to one if the injury suffered was a concussion and 
equal to zero if the injury was something other than a concussion.  The results of this regression, 
therefore, indicate how the laws affect the relative proportion of reported injuries that are 
                                                
11 As a robustness check, I also conduct the analysis using a post-law dummy variable as done in prior 
studies.  The results of this regression are shown in Table A–1. 
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concussions (as compared to other injuries).  One would expect these laws to possibly affect the 
reporting of concussions in at least a couple of ways.  First, these laws are expected to educate 
individuals about the risks of concussions.  Such education may prompt individuals to seek 
treatment for concussions that they may not have otherwise before the enactment of such laws.  
Second, certain provisions contained in these laws are aimed at improving the identification of 
concussion-related symptoms, which would directly impact the percentage of concussions that 
get reported.  Thus, I predict these laws to increase the reporting of concussions.  In other words, 
I expect β1 > 0. 
 Similar to the participation analysis, I also estimate a difference-in-differences model that 
compares the injuries suffered in football to the injuries suffered in each of the other male 
sports.12  The equation for this difference-in-differences estimation is shown below. 
Concussion = α0 + β1Portion of Athletes Covered by Law + β2Football Injury + 
β3(Portion of Athletes Covered by Law × Football Injury) + β4Time + ε   (4) 
 
Football Injury is a dummy variable equal to one if the injury is football-related and equal to 
zero if the injury was related to the comparison sport.  The state youth concussion laws are 
supposed to apply universally to all sports.  However, as previously argued, it is likely that such 
laws will tend to be emphasized more in football, which garners the most attention, than in other 
sports.  Therefore, it is interesting to learn how these laws have affected reported concussions 
suffered in football as compared to concussions suffered in other sports. 
 The availability of data regarding the location of the injury creates an opportunity for 
further meaningful examination.  The youth concussion laws are targeted at middle schools and 
high schools and the organized athletics that these schools oversee.  Therefore, we would expect 
the laws to impact only those concussions which occur at these locations and not elsewhere.  
                                                
12 This leads to a total of five estimations.  Unlike the participation data, the NEISS does not report 
injuries specific to cross country, so the comparison with this sport is not possible. 
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This type of scenario is ideal for a difference-in-differences approach, which accounts for pre-
policy trends by using a comparison group that is experiencing the same trends, but is not 
exposed to the policy change.  Here, the group exposed to the policy change is injuries occurring 
at school or the sports field and the comparison group is those injuries that occur elsewhere.  The 
regression used for this analysis is shown below. 
Concussion = α0 + β1Portion of Athletes Covered by Law + β2School or Sport Field + 
β3(Portion of Athletes Covered by Law × School or Sports Field) + β4Time + ε   (5) 
 
By using this specification, I am also able to account for any unobservable differences in 
concussions for these two types of locations.  School or Sports Field is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the injury occurred at school or at a sport’s field or arena.  It is equal to zero if the injury 
occurred elsewhere, such as at home, on a street or highway, or at some other location.  If these 
laws have an impact on reported concussions, we would expect the interaction term, β3, to be 
significant and positive.  I predict that these laws have increased the reporting of concussions 
(i.e., β3 > 0). 
 
V.   Results 
 
 A.  Participation 
 
 As shown in Table 2, state youth concussion laws decrease participation in football and 
hockey.  For football, these laws decrease participation by 5.0%.  This result is in line with my 
earlier prediction.  As football attracts the most attention with regards to concussions and safety, 
it is often perceived that the enactment of these laws is to address issues with football.  Therefore, 
much of the debate and discussion surrounding the enactment of youth concussion laws often 
gets linked to football. 
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Hockey is similar to football in that both sports are often associated with concussions; 
however, the effect of the laws is even larger for hockey participation than for football 
participation.  These laws decrease participation by 8.8% for boys hockey and 22.5% for girls 
hockey.  The effects for hockey are quite large, but this could be due to the fact that hockey has a 
relatively small number of total participants.  Hockey is also different from many sports in that, 
depending on the state, a large portion of high school aged hockey players participate in club 
leagues instead of high school sanctioned leagues.  The participation data used in my study does 
not account for these other participants, so any conclusions to be drawn from this analysis with 
regards to hockey should be limited with this in mind.  
There is no evidence of any substitution effect.  One might believe that with participation 
decreasing in football as a result of these laws, the athletes no longer participating in football 
may instead decide to join another sport.  There is no indication that this is happening, as these 
laws do not impact participation for cross country, the other fall season sport.  In fact, I do not 
find a statistically significant effect of these laws on participation for any sports other than 
football and hockey.   
The results for the difference-in-differences analysis shown in Table 3 are in line with the 
results from Table 2.  These results are negative and significant for baseball, cross country, 
soccer, and track—corroborating the assertion that the youth sports concussion laws have 
reduced participation in football, but have not had an impact on most other sports.  The results 
for hockey are insignificant, indicating that the laws have not impacted football participation 
significantly differently from how they have impacted hockey participation, as suggested from 
the results in Table 2.  The results are also insignificant for basketball.  This could be due to the 
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fact that basketball is a “cut” sport, with only a limited number of spots available for participants.  
Therefore, one would not expect participation to vary as much for basketball. 
 B.  Reported Concussions 
 
 The results from the estimation of Equation (3) suggest that the impact of youth 
concussion laws on reported concussions differs based on the sport.13  These laws have improved 
the reporting of concussions for both football and girls soccer.  The results are significant and 
negative for girls hockey, which would indicate that these laws have decreased the reporting of 
concussions.  This result is surprising, but with so few states offering girls hockey, a small 
number of reported injuries could greatly impact the results.  No statistically significant effect 
was found for any of the other sports.  The positive effect of these laws for reported concussions 
in football and girls soccer is in line with expectations.  One of the purposes of these laws is that 
concussions will be better detected and athletes suffering concussions may receive the 
appropriate medical attention.  However, these laws apply to all sports, so it is noteworthy that 
this effect is only found for these two sports. 
 As shown in Table 5, the interaction term for the estimation of Equation (4) is positive 
and significant for baseball, basketball, soccer, and track.  This implies that the state youth 
concussion laws impact football significantly more than the other sports.  This is consistent with 
the results from Table 4.  The interaction term in the hockey comparison is negative and 
significant.  This actually suggests that the laws improve the reporting of concussions 
significantly more for hockey than for football.  This result is unexpected, as one would 
                                                
13 As previously stated, the analysis with respect to reported concussions is constrained by the fact that the 
NEISS provides national estimates, rather than state-level data.  Therefore, I am unable to control for the 
adoption of laws by each state in the same straightforward manner (i.e., using a dummy variable for when 
a state had a law in place and state identifier variables) as when examining the impact of the laws on 
participation.  Instead, I construct a variable that controls for the portion of high school participants that 
are covered by a youth concussion law. 
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anticipate the laws to have a similar impact on each of the two sports—both sports being 
commonly associated with concussions and equally likely to receive attention from these laws.  
 Table 6 presents what is perhaps the most convincing evidence that the state youth 
concussion laws have increased the reporting of concussions.  If the laws contribute to an 
increase in the reporting of concussions, then one would expect that reported concussions should 
increase for injuries occurring at school or on the sports field, and not for injuries occurring 
elsewhere.  This is because the laws only apply to schools and their management of concussions.  
The interaction term from the difference-in-differences regression is significant and positive.  
This supports the claim that the laws are improving the reporting of concussions, rather than the 
effect being driven solely by some other factor, such as the national media attention to 
concussions.   
 
VI.  Discussion 
 
 While it is not surprising that the laws lead to less participation in football and hockey, 
the impact of the laws was at least theoretically ambiguous.  On the one hand, the laws could 
signal to parents and athletes that concussions are a serious issue that must be taken more 
seriously than before.  A natural corollary of this is that these laws would increase the perceived 
risks of sports like football and hockey.  On the other hand, the whole motivation behind these 
laws is to make participation in sports safer when it comes to concussions.  The laws add more 
rigorous requirements that are supposed to increase the medical attention given to athletes and 
decrease the risk of secondary concussions.  With this in mind, parents and athletes could also 
view the laws as making sports like football and hockey safer, thereby lowering the perceived 
risks of such sports.  It appears the former possibility is dominant, as the laws lead to less 
participation in football and hockey. 
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 It also appears that less participation in football and hockey did not lead to more 
participation in other sports.  In other words, there is no evidence that the individuals choosing to 
no longer participate in these sports are deciding to join other sports instead.  This is potentially 
concerning, as participating in youth athletics provides many benefits.  Research has found 
athletic participation to have not only physical benefits, such as decreased obesity, but also 
psychological and social health benefits for youth (Eime et al. 2013).  Participation in youth 
sports increases individuals’ emotional control and exploration.  It also leads to positive 
relationships with coaches and friends.  Participation in a team sport, such as football, is also 
thought to provide a unique bonding experience not found in individual sports due to the social 
nature of participation. 
 Losing the various health benefits of athletic participation is therefore a potential perverse 
effect of youth concussion laws.  However, the results from this study alone are not enough to 
decisively conclude that this issue exists.  It could be that individuals who are choosing to no 
longer compete in football or hockey are joining other extracurricular activities.  As the data used 
in this study only contain information on athletic participation and not other extracurricular 
participation, one cannot conclude that individuals are not gaining health benefits from other 
extracurricular activities, which they may be instead joining.  Even if students are losing the 
health benefits of athletic participation entirely, it may be completely rational.  For some students, 
it may be utility maximizing to stop participating in certain sports.  From a cost-benefit 
perspective, the results of this chapter indicate that certain students may find the costs of 
potential injury outweigh the health benefits associated with athletic participation.  
 On average, the results indicate that the laws have had their intended effect of increasing 
the reporting of concussions.  However, given the results for the individual sports, it appears that 
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this result is driven mainly by football and girls soccer, despite the fact that the laws universally 
apply to all sports.  This could be due to a couple of different reasons.  First, both football and 
girls soccer are sports with relatively high rates of concussions.  It could be that because of this 
fact, these sports garnered more attention with the enactment of youth concussion laws.  
However, this does not explain why the laws did not lead to an increase in reported concussions 
for hockey—a sport that also has a very high relative rate of concussions.  
Another possible reason is that schools simply do not have the resources to devote 
attention to all sports when it comes to concussion detection and management.  Some entities 
have even recognized such limitations.  For example, the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic 
Association only requires that medical personnel be in attendance for football and ice hockey 
games during the regular season.  Sports like baseball, basketball, field hockey, lacrosse, soccer, 
softball, and volleyball are only required to have medical personnel present during tournaments 
at the end of their seasons (Thompson 2016).  States such as Massachusetts may feel the cost of 
having medical personnel attend some of the lower risk sporting events is not worth the benefit 
of the potential reduction in concussions suffered by athletes in those sports, as concussions in 
such sports are infrequent to begin with.  Whether states are actually engaging in this cost-benefit 
analysis, however, is unknown. 
Finally, the nature of the game itself in football, as compared to other sports, is another 
possible explanation for why these laws have improved the reporting of concussions in football 
and not other sports.  In football, hundreds, if not thousands, of collisions occur in every practice 
and game.  The commonplace of collisions makes it less likely that any one collision in 
particular will stand out and more likely that a concussion symptom go unnoticed.  Conversely, 
in other sports, collisions are far less frequent and are therefore more likely to be noticed and 
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examined.  Therefore, it would make sense that youth concussion laws would have a greater 
impact on football, where concussions are more easily hidden, than on other sports in which 
concussions are inherently easier to detect.    
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
 This chapter examined one attempt to deal with the issue of youth concussions—state-
level youth concussion legislation.  This chapter is the first to study how these laws have 
impacted participation in various high school athletics.  It also adds to the expanding literature 
that has attempted to study how these laws have impacted the reporting of concussions, which 
can be seen as one potential measure of the effectiveness of the laws.  
 The results indicate that youth concussion laws have led to a decrease in high school 
participation for football and hockey.  Seemingly, this is because these sports are most often 
associated with concussions, and individuals treat the youth concussion laws as a signal that 
these sports are much more dangerous than previously thought.  However, more research in this 
area must be conducted to fully understand the reason behind these decisions.   
For instance, it would be worthwhile to determine how people’s perceptions of the risks 
associated with sports like football changed after the laws.  It would also be interesting to 
examine whether the risk perceptions of parents and athletes is close to the actual incidence rates 
of concussions across different sports.  Some studies have tested people’s knowledge of 
concussion symptoms,14 but literature regarding knowledge of incidence rates of concussions 
across sports is nonexistent.  If the youth concussion laws improve the accuracy of the perception 
of the risks of suffering concussions, this is a cause for celebration.  If instead, these laws lead to 
                                                
14 Chrisman et al. (2014) study the education of coaches, athletes, and parents before and after these laws 
in the state of Washington.  Wallace et al. (2017) show that high school athletes with access to an athletic 
trainer have better knowledge of concussion symptoms. 
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overestimating the likelihood of suffering a concussion, then these laws may lead to over-
deterrence.  Future research could explore this question. 
There is no evidence that individuals are substituting participation in football and hockey 
for participation in other sports.  This could be concerning due to the health benefits of athletic 
participation.  However, as explained previously, it cannot be determined whether individuals are 
instead joining non-athletic extracurricular activities, which may include their own health 
benefits.  More research is needed to determine what activities, if any, students are choosing to 
participate in as a replacement. 
 The results also suggest that youth concussion laws increase the reporting of concussions, 
which is consistent with existing literature.  However, this result is not consistent across sports 
and seems to be driven mainly by football and girls soccer.  One explanation proposed earlier is 
that schools have limited resources and must choose which sports on which to focus their efforts.  
Future research could explore this possibility and look to conduct a benefit-cost analysis with 
respect to the resources contributed to concussion management and how this translates into the 
detection and prevention of concussions.   
 Finally, future research could look more specifically at the particular provisions 
contained in these state laws, as they vary by state.  Such examination is probably better suited 
for regional or state-level analysis, as the wide variety of language used in these laws makes 
national studies problematic.15  Research such as this would be of great use to policymakers 
trying to ensure that their respective law is as effective as possible.  Corresponding such 
examination into the effectiveness of specific provisions should be an evaluation of the potential 
                                                
15 A somewhat crude attempt was made to account for the various provisions contained in the laws.  This 
was done by characterizing laws as “strong” or “weak” based on the types of provisions contained in the 
state’s law.  Table A–2 shows how strong and weak laws impact participation, while Table A–3 shows 
how they impact the reporting of concussions.   
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costs for each of these provisions so that a proper benefit-cost analysis can eventually be 
conducted.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Concussions by Sport (NEISS Data 2002-2016) 
		   Unweighted Weighted 
		   Concussions Total Injuries Percentage Percentage 
Bo
ys
 S
po
rts
 
Football 7,937 113,325 7.00% 6.37% 
Baseball 875 22,655 3.86% 3.06% 
Basketball 2,256 93,861 2.40% 2.04% 
Hockey 947 9,391 10.08% 7.09% 
Soccer 1,617 26,660 6.07% 5.06% 
Track 83 3,712 2.24% 1.93% 
            
G
irl
s S
po
rts
 Softball 700 13,785 5.08% 3.80% 
Basketball 1,404 30,113 4.66% 3.78% 
Hockey 109 1,145 9.52% 6.34% 
Soccer 1,696 21,389 7.93% 6.63% 
Track 51 4,139 1.23% 0.83% 
Note: While cross country was studied with regards to participation, the NEISS does not have a 
code specific to cross country and so no concussion data was available. 
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Table 2: Log of Participation in High School Athletics 
         Boys Sports 
  Football Baseball Basketball Cross Country Hockey Soccer Track 
Law Addresses TBIs − 0.050*** 0.004 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.088*** 0.011 − 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) (0.015) 
Time 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.000 0.028*** 0.007** 0.021*** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 7.510*** 6.439*** 7.704*** 6.757*** 6.417*** 6.689*** 6.936*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) (0.030) 
        Observations 765 720 765 765 225 754 764 
R-squared 0.991 0.990 0.989 0.980 0.984 0.981 0.990 
F 1563 1403 1180 666.6 818.0 711.5 1355 
        Girls Sports 
    Softball Basketball Cross Country Hockey Soccer Track 
Law Addresses TBIs 
 
− 0.001 0.003 − 0.002 − 0.225** − 0.006 − 0.003 
 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.021) (0.086) (0.022) (0.019) 
Time 
 
0.003 − 0.006*** 0.028*** 0.054*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 
 
6.408*** 7.561*** 6.463*** 4.444*** 6.658*** 6.701*** 
 
 
(0.033) (0.030) (0.043) (0.095) (0.043) (0.037) 
        Observations 
 
727 765 765 165 754 764 
R-squared 
 
0.988 0.988 0.981 0.945 0.980 0.985 
F   1077 1128 692.4 199.7 662.8 900.7 
The dependent variable is Ln(Participation).  The law variable is a dummy for whether a state has a youth concussion law in effective at the start of the 
sport's season.  Time is a yearly time trend variable.  State dummy variables are also included, but not shown.  The data include any state offering the 
respective sport for the 2002-2003 to 2016-2017 school years.  Sample weights are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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Table 3: Log of Participation Difference-in-Differences Regression Comparing Football to Other Male Sports 
         Baseball Basketball Cross Country Hockey Soccer Track 
              
Law × Football − 0.059*** − 0.003 − 0.220*** − 0.035 − 0.175*** − 0.102*** 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.042) (0.029) (0.018) 
Law Addresses TBIs 0.013 − 0.019 0.084*** − 0.019 0.067** 0.014 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.046) (0.030) (0.018) 
Football 0.792*** 0.591*** 1.613*** 1.844*** 1.081*** 0.672*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.030) (0.018) (0.011) 
Time 0.006*** 0.003* 0.018*** 0.006* 0.014*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 6.581*** 7.314*** 6.327*** 6.037*** 6.562*** 6.885*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.043) (0.056) (0.054) (0.032) 
       Observations 1,485 1,530 1,530 990 1,519 1,529 
R-squared 0.976 0.972 0.972 0.962 0.949 0.978 
F 1055 955.9 963.5 437.5 506.9 1234 
The dependent variable is Ln(Participation).  The interaction term is equal to one if a law was in place and the observation relates to football 
participation.  The law variable is a dummy for whether a state has a youth concussion law in effective at the start of the sport's season.  Football 
is a dummy variable whether the observation was for Football (and not the comparison sports).  Time is a yearly time trend variable.  State 
dummy variables are also included, but not shown.  For each column, only data for football and comparison sport are used.  The data span the 
2002-2003 to 2016-2017 school years.  Sample weights are included.  Standard errors in are parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Reported Concussions Relative to Other Injuries 
       Boys Sports 
  Football Baseball Basketball Hockey Soccer Track 
       Portion of Participants Covered by Law 0.023*** 0.000 0.006* 0.031* − 0.004 − 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.017) (0.009) (0.015) 
Time 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 0.014*** 0.001 − 0.001 0.023 0.022** − 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) 
       Observations 113,325 22,655 93,861 9,391 26,660 3,712 
R-squared 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.001 0.001 
F 249.9 25.07 97.52 26.36 11.39 1.110 
       Girls Sports 
   Softball Basketball Hockey Soccer Track 
              
Portion of Participants Covered by Law 
 
0.005 0.005 − 0.083** 0.031*** 0.002 
 
 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.042) (0.010) (0.009) 
Time 
 
0.003*** 0.004*** 0.009** 0.003*** 0.001 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 
 
− 0.008 − 0.014** − 0.016 0.017* − 0.002 
 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.040) (0.010) (0.011) 
       Observations 
 
13,785 30,113 1,145 21,389 4,139 
R-squared 
 
0.007 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.002 
F   32.99 91.11 2.064 56.96 2.147 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the injury reported is a concussion and equal to zero if a non-concussion.  The variable of interest 
is the portion of participants that are covered by the law (number of participants in state with law in effect / total participants).  Time is a yearly time trend 
variable.  The data span from 2002 to 2016.  Sample weights are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Reported Concussions Differences-in-Differences Regression Comparing Football to Other Male Sports 
        Baseball Basketball Hockey Soccer Track 
            
Football × Portion Covered by Law 0.033*** 0.041*** − 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.061*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) 
Portion of Participants Covered by Law 0.004 0.001 0.065*** − 0.000 − 0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) 
Football 0.019*** 0.031*** − 0.020*** − 0.000 0.026*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) 
Time 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant − 0.008* − 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.011*** − 0.016*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
      Observations 135,980 207,186 122,716 139,985 117,037 
R-squared 0.015 0.023 0.015 0.012 0.014 
F 507.0 1193 466.8 415.5 418.2 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the injury reported is a concussion and equal to zero if a non-concussion.  The second 
variable is the portion of participants in a state with a youth concussion law, and the third variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the injury 
was related to football and equal to zero if the injury was related to the comparison sport.  The first variable is the interaction of the two.  Time is 
a yearly time trend variable.  For each column, only data for football and comparison sport are used.  The data span the 2002-2003 to 2016-2017 
school years.  Sample weights are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Reported Concussions Differences-in-Differences Regression           
Comparing Location of Injury 
    
Location (School or Sports Field) × Portion Covered by Law 0.019*** 
 
(0.004) 
Portion of Participants Covered by Law − 0.005 
 
(0.005) 
Injury Occurred at School or at a Sports Field 0.020*** 
 
(0.001) 
Time 0.003*** 
 
(0.000) 
Constant − 0.014*** 
 
(0.003) 
  Observations 279,095 
R-squared 0.008 
F 369.6 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the injury reported is a concussion and equal to 
zero if a non-concussion.  The second variable is the portion of participants in a state with a youth 
concussion law and the third variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the injury occurred at school or at a 
sports field.  The first variable is the interaction of the two.  Time is a yearly time trend variable.  The data 
span from 2002 to 2016.  Sample weights are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
Table A–1: Reported Concussions Relative to Other Injuries (Single Law Dummy) 
       Boys Sports 
  Football Baseball Basketball Hockey Soccer Track 
       Post Law 0.012*** − 0.002 0.006** 0.028** − 0.003 − 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) 
Time 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 0.005 − 0.001 − 0.001 0.021 0.023*** − 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) 
       Observations 113,325 22,655 93,861 9,391 26,660 3,712 
R-squared 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.001 
F 261.9 22.86 100.7 28.35 10.98 0.945 
       Girls Sports 
   Softball Basketball Hockey Soccer Track               
Post Law 
 
0.000 0.003 − 0.006 0.012 − 0.002 
 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.037) (0.008) (0.007) 
Time 
 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 
 
− 0.012 − 0.016*** 0.049 − 0.000 − 0.006 
 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.037) (0.010) (0.010) 
      Observations 
 
13,785 30,113 1,145 21,389 4,139 
R-squared 
 
0.007 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.002 
F   31.68 85.89 0.140 58.99 2.024 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the injury reported is a concussion and equal to zero if a non-concussion.  The post law variable 
is a dummy equal to one if the injury occurred after July 1, 2009 (the date the first youth concussion law became effective).  Time is a yearly time trend 
variable.  The data span from 2002 to 2016.  Sample weights are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A–2: Participation Rate in High School Athletics (per 10,000 youth) 
        Boys Sports 
  Football Baseball Basketball Cross Country Hockey Soccer Track 
Law Addresses TBIs − 16.465** 6.908* 7.546 4.492* − 3.363 9.629** − 1.688 
 (7.940) (3.915) (4.723) (2.604) (2.608) (4.138) (4.037) 
Time 4.965*** 1.762*** − 0.239 3.942*** 0.922*** 4.254*** 5.783*** 
 (0.875) (0.417) (0.522) (0.287) (0.289) (0.457) (0.448) 
Constant 414.988*** 138.525*** 518.944*** 222.069*** 141.027*** 186.935*** 228.965*** 
 (15.876) (7.817) (9.345) (5.206) (3.032) (8.123) (7.943) 
        Observations 750 705 750 750 210 739 749 
R-squared 0.929 0.930 0.963 0.885 0.977 0.919 0.969 
F 179.9 181.9 354.6 105.0 541.5 153.8 423.4 
        Girls Sports 
    Softball Basketball Cross Country Hockey Soccer Track 
Law Addresses TBIs 
 
4.883 5.436 3.465 − 4.097* 5.317 2.917 
 
 
(3.653) (4.040) (2.397) (2.419) (3.598) (3.773) 
Time 
 
0.571 − 1.723*** 3.266*** 1.438*** 3.680*** 3.923*** 
 
 
(0.406) (0.447) (0.264) (0.287) (0.397) (0.419) 
Constant 
 
140.000*** 441.462*** 161.198*** 19.380*** 185.250*** 180.579*** 
 
 
(7.076) (7.995) (4.793) (2.676) (7.066) (7.424) 
        Observations 
 
712 750 750 165 739 749 
R-squared 
 
0.916 0.962 0.877 0.954 0.926 0.958 
F   147.4 349.8 97.27 241.6 169.7 314.8 
The dependent variable is the participation rate, which is equal to the number of participants in the sport for that state divided by the number of 14, 15, 16, and 
17 year-olds in that state.  The law variable is a dummy for whether a state has a youth concussion law in effective at the start of the sport's season.  Time is a 
yearly time trend variable.  State dummy variables are also included, but not shown.  The data include any state offering the respective sport for the 2002-2003 
to 2016-2017 school years.  Sample weights are included. Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A–3: Participation Rate Difference-in-Differences Regression Comparing Football to Other Male Sports 
         Baseball Basketball Cross Country Hockey Soccer Track 
              
Law × Football − 13.760 4.481 − 24.786** 5.634 − 33.240** − 30.592*** 
 
(10.644) (9.648) (11.099) (13.016) (13.691) (8.829) 
Law Addresses TBIs 7.586 -4.315 6.406 -16.662 14.970 7.983 
 
(10.836) (9.956) (11.433) (13.996) (14.116) (9.131) 
Football 355.061*** 278.955*** 529.806*** 494.439*** 435.744*** 312.708*** 
 
(6.329) (5.900) (6.757) (9.133) (8.374) (5.424) 
Time 2.902*** 2.151** 4.453*** 3.961*** 4.311*** 5.210*** 
 
(1.002) (0.963) (1.101) (1.063) (1.366) (0.886) 
Constant 101.087*** 328.788*** 53.626*** 24.399 84.712*** 166.026*** 
 
(18.832) (17.611) (20.269) (16.695) (24.961) (16.136) 
       Observations 1,455 1,500 1,500 960 1,495 1,499 
R-squared 0.854 0.862 0.887 0.931 0.782 0.886 
F 155.0 170.1 213.3 230.9 97.75 211.3 
The dependent variable is the participation rate, which is equal to the number of participants in the sport for that state divided by the number of 14, 
15, 16, and 17 year-olds in that state.  The interaction term is equal to one if a law was in place and the observation relates to football participation.  
The law variable is a dummy for whether a state has a youth concussion law in effective at the start of the sport's season.  Football is a dummy 
variable whether the observation was for Football (and not the comparison sports).  Time is a yearly time trend variable.  State dummy variables are 
also included, but not shown.  For each column, only data for football and comparison sport are used.  The data span the 2002-2003 to 2016-2017 
school years.  Sample weights are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A–4: Log of Participation in High School Athletics (Strength of Law) 
        Boys Sports 
  Football Baseball Basketball Cross Country Hockey Soccer Track 
Strong Law − 0.069*** 0.003 0.010 − 0.031 − 0.087*** 0.009 − 0.037** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025) (0.017) 
Weak Law − 0.035** 0.006 − 0.011 0.019 − 0.090** 0.013 − 0.009 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.016) 
Time 0.008*** 0.006*** − 0.000 0.029*** 0.007** 0.021*** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 7.503*** 6.439*** 7.709*** 6.746*** 6.418*** 6.688*** 6.930*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.043) (0.035) (0.043) (0.030) 
        Observations 765 720 765 765 225 754 764 
R-squared 0.991 0.990 0.989 0.980 0.984 0.981 0.990 
F 1543 1373 1159 657.7 766.2 697.1 1334 
        Girls Sports 
    Softball Basketball Cross Country Hockey Soccer Track 
Strong Law 
 
0.033* 0.012 − 0.031 − 0.331*** − 0.034 0.007 
 
 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.025) (0.094) (0.026) (0.022) 
Weak Law 
 
− 0.026 -0.003 0.019 − 0.083 0.013 − 0.011 
 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.101) (0.024) (0.020) 
Time 
 
0.002 − 0.006*** 0.029*** 0.056*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 
 
6.422*** 7.565*** 6.746*** 4.375*** 6.647*** 6.705*** 
 
 
(0.033) (0.030) (0.043) (0.098) (0.044) (0.037) 
        Observations 
 
727 765 765 165 754 764 
R-squared 
 
0.988 0.988 0.980 0.947 0.980 0.985 
F   1071 1106 657.7 192.7 653.2 883.5 
The dependent variable is Ln(Participation).  The omitted law variable is if a state had no law at all in effect.  Time is a yearly time trend variable.  State 
dummy variables are also included, but not shown.  The data include any state offering the respective sport for the 2002-2003 to 2016-2017 school 
years.  Sample weights are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A–5: Reported Concussions Relative to Other Injuries (Strength of Law) 
       Boys Sports 
  Football Baseball Basketball Hockey Soccer Track 
Portion of Participants Covered by Strong Law 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.065* − 0.026* 0.022 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.007) (0.039) (0.016) (0.037) 
Portion of Participants Covered by Weak Law 0.050*** − 0.002 0.012 − 0.036 0.027 − 0.057 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.010) (0.075) (0.021) (0.047) 
Time 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003* 0.002*** 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 0.014*** 0.001 − 0.001 0.025* 0.020** − 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) 
 
      Observations 113,325 22,655 93,861 9,391 26,660 3,712 
R-squared 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.002 0.002 
F 176.1 16.97 69.35 18.00 8.910 0.846 
       Girls Sports 
    Softball Basketball Hockey Soccer Track 
Portion of Participants Covered by Strong Law 
 
0.025 0.010 − 0.065 0.003 0.022 
 
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.054) (0.023) (0.019) 
Portion of Participants Covered by Weak Law 
 
− 0.024 − 0.002 − 0.162 0.068** − 0.026 
 
 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.182) (0.032) (0.026) 
Time 
 
0.003*** 0.004*** 0.009** 0.003*** 0.001 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 
 
− 0.007 − 0.014** − 0.018 0.015 − 0.000 
 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.041) (0.010) (0.010) 
       Observations 
 
13,785 30,113 1,145 21,389 4,139 
R-squared 
 
0.007 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.002 
F   23.12 64.96 1.390 40.86 1.444 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the injury reported is a concussion and equal to zero if a non-concussion.  The variables of 
interest are the portion of participants that are covered by a strong or weak law.  Time is a yearly time trend variable.  The data span from 2002 to 2016.  
Sample weights are included.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 2:  TOWARD OPTIMAL RISK AND COMPENSATION FOR CONCUSSIONS IN 
PROFESSIONAL, COLLEGE, AND YOUTH FOOTBALL 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 Over one hundred years ago, an intervention by President Theodore Roosevelt may have 
saved the sport of football.  Between the years of 1900 and 1905, at least 45 individuals died 
while playing football.  Many schools had begun abandoning their football programs.  In 1905, 
President Roosevelt, an avid football fan, invited coaches from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton to 
the White House for a private meeting.  In that year alone, 18 people had died while playing 
football and another 150 or more had been injured.  President Roosevelt sought to encourage a 
change to the game of football to make the sport safer.  The meeting apparently worked, as 
Harvard’s coach, Bill Reid, organized a new rulemaking committee.  The committee developed a 
total of 19 new rules that were implemented in the 1906 season.  The forward pass was legalized, 
the first-down distance changed from five yards to ten, a neutral zone between the offense and 
defense was created, and dangerous mass formations were banned (Dayen 2014; Klein 2012; 
Zezima 2014).   
 The sport of football once again finds itself in the middle of a major safety crisis.  The 
link between football and long-term brain injury now threatens the popularity of the sport, and 
even the existence of the sport itself, as a decrease in participation at the youth levels has already 
begun.  Some may argue that this threat warrants the type of drastic rule changes made under the 
Theodore Roosevelt presidency.  Others may question whether anything needs to be done at all.  
After all, athletes have to deal with other sorts of injuries all the time, some of them career-
ending.  A question one might ask is why should brain injuries be dealt with any differently? One 
would argue that because traumatic brain injuries impact one’s cognitive ability, they deserve 
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special attention.  As one doctor has stated, “Our brain is really who we are. In this society, in 
this time, if your brain has been altered, you have been fundamentally altered.”16 
In this chapter, I explore four risk-management systems with the goal of establishing an 
optimal system for dealing with concussions at each level of football.  The four systems that are 
often recognized as being available when it comes to managing job-related risks to health and 
safety are (i) market forces, (ii) tort liability, (iii) government regulation, and (iv) insurance.  The 
costs and benefits of each system are unique and differ depending on the situation.  Therefore, it 
is not necessarily the case that one tool will be best in all situations.  This chapter will 
demonstrate that, by using a combination of these risk-management tools, it is possible to move 
toward more optimal levels of risk and compensation for each level of football.   
I conclude that a market-based approach is most important at the professional level.  This 
approach would rely heavily on the ability of the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) to negotiate 
certain terms in the next collective bargaining agreement (CBA).  Such negotiations could lead 
to better incentives regarding risk and compensation, including guaranteed contracts, new 
concussion protocol provisions, and a workers’ compensation system self-insured by the NFL.  I 
contend that federal regulation, with oversight from the Department of Education, is the best 
arrangement for the college level.  The NCAA has shown that it and its member institutions are 
incapable of effective self-regulation and that it is time for government involvement.  A market-
based approach is not possible at this level because players have virtually no power, and tort 
liability is futile due to the sovereign immunity of public universities.  Finally, I maintain that the 
current system of state-level legislation is the best system for youth football.  Major changes to 
the current regulations are required if the risks regarding traumatic brain injuries are to be 
properly managed.  For instance, rather than focusing exclusively on detection of concussion 
                                                
16 This statement was given during an interview with Dr. Paul Butler. (Brownfield 2012).  
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symptoms, it is important that state legislatures consider ways in which all concussions can be 
reduced, and not solely concentrate on repeat concussions. 
Section II of this chapter provides a general overview of concussions, their associated 
harms, and their link to athletics, especially football.  The next three sections examine each of 
the three different levels of football—professional (Section III), college (Section IV), and youth 
(Section V).  For each of these sections, the applicable concussion litigation is discussed and the 
schemes currently in place to manage concussion risks are analyzed and critiqued.  In each of 
these sections, new schemes are also recommended.  I do not claim that the proposed schemes 
would result in complete optimality; however, implementing the recommended schemes should 
move each level of football closer to generating efficient levels of risk and compensation.  
Section VI summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
 
II.  The Concussion Crisis: A Brief Background 
 
A concussion is a type of traumatic brain injury that results from rapid acceleration or 
deceleration of the brain within the skull.  This movement causes brain tissue to change shape, 
damaging brain cells (Concussion Legacy Foundation).  The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) estimates individuals suffer roughly 3.8 million concussions every year.  
Organized athletics is a large contributor to this statistic.  Sports are, in fact, the second leading 
cause of concussions among individuals 15 to 24 years old, falling only behind motor vehicle 
accidents (Gessel et al. 2007; Weisel and Kingdollar 2016).  The NCAA’s Injury Surveillance 
System has estimated that nearly 30,000 of its athletes suffered concussions from the years 2004 
to 2009.  Football had the highest number of concussions, with a reported 16,277 athletes 
suffering concussions during this time (Axon 2013). 
  51 
Not only are such injuries common in athletics, they also often go unreported.  One 
survey concluded that 20% to 50% of concussions in college football, hockey, soccer, and rugby 
go unreported (Weisel and Kingdollar 2016).  Underreporting can occur for a variety of reasons.  
Often individuals, such as parents, coaches, teachers, and trainers, fail to recognize the signs of 
concussions.  Athletes themselves may also go to lengths to hide their own concussions in fear of 
losing playing time, letting the team down, or simply because they do not realize the seriousness 
of their injury. 
Despite the relatively recent public attention given to the link between concussions and 
football, evidence of such a relationship has been around for decades.  In 1952, the first study 
considering the link between athletic concussions and football players was published in the New 
England Journal of Medicine.17   In 1982, The Wall Street Journal published an article detailing 
the cognitive impairments that are a product of concussions, and thus became one of the first 
examples of the mainstream media taking notice of the issue (Michael 2015).  In 1984, 
neuropsychologist Jeff Barth and others began research on brain injuries and football players at 
the University of Virginia.  He found that players who had suffered a concussion had more 
difficulty completing the same cognitive test that had been given to them prior to having suffered 
the concussion.  Players also reported headaches, nausea, dizziness, and memory loss after 
having experienced a concussion (Michael 2015). 
The concern over concussions gained momentum in the NFL during the 1994 season.  In 
a shocking move, Chicago Bears running back Merril Hoge retired at the age of 29 due to 
concussions.  That same year three quarterbacks—Troy Aikman, Chris Miller, and Vinny 
Testaverde—were knocked out of their games on the same week due to concussions.  These 
                                                
17 Thorndike, Augustus. 1952. “Serious Recurrent Injuries of Athletes: Contraindications to Further 
Competitive Participation.” New England Journal of Medicine 247(15): 554–56. 
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events led to concussions being discussed more in the mainstream media.  Soon after these 
events, ESPN presented a documentary highlighting the struggles of former players, including 
Hoge, who had suffered serious brain injuries.  At the same time, The New York Times published 
a piece, which called the concussion crisis “a tragedy” (Michael 2015). 
 Concussions present the risk of both drastic short-term effects and serious long-term 
harm.  Drastic short-term harm can occur when an individual returns to activity before his or her 
concussion symptoms have subsided.  If an individual incurs a repeat concussion over this time 
period, he or she may suffer serious permanent brain damage, such as second impact syndrome 
(SIS).  SIS is a severe condition brought on by a repeat concussion in which the brain swells 
rapidly causing intracranial pressure, severe brain damage, and often death.  The second type of 
harm associated with concussions is that associated with repeated, long-term sublethal brain 
trauma.  This type of trauma can lead to chronic traumatic encephalopathy, or CTE.  CTE has 
been defined as a brain-damaging condition resulting in “memory loss, behavioral and 
personality changes, speech abnormalities, depression, Parkinson’s disease, and Alzheimer’s 
disease” (Grey, Marchant, and Tyszka 2015).  Often times, the symptoms of CTE do not 
manifest until several years or decades after the injury. 
 CTE gained notoriety in 2005 when Dr. Bennet Omalu, Allegheny (PA) County medical 
examiner, published a study regarding the autopsy he had performed on former Pittsburgh 
Steeler and Hall of Fame center, “Iron” Mike Webster.  Omalu concluded that Webster suffered 
from CTE as a result of repeated head trauma he had sustained from his football career.  
However, it was not that CTE was an entirely new disease at this time.  It was also not the first 
evidence of a link between CTE and athletics.  As early as the 1920s, CTE was described as 
“punch drunk syndrome” and was found in boxers, jockeys, and wrestlers who had experienced 
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multiple blows to the head.  Dr. Omalu’s work, however, was the first to ever link the disease to 
the sport of football.  Dr. Omalu’s findings would later serve as ammunition for former football 
professional football players in their lawsuit against the NFL.  
 
III.  Professional Football 
 
In the past, a market-based approach failed players at the professional level, in part 
because the NFL withheld information as to the risks of concussions.  This led to a class action 
lawsuit, which concluded in a settlement valued at roughly $1 billion.  While the NFL has 
enacted several new policies that should improve the way in which risks are managed, more is 
needed to insure that efficient incentives exist with regards to risk and compensation.  In this 
section, I ultimately conclude that market forces provide a viable tool to manage risks and 
compensation.  This tool relies on the NFLPA demanding certain measures be taken in order to 
alleviate any concerns regarding asymmetric information that was an issue in the past.  I argue 
that a workers’ compensation system that is self-insured by the NFL should also be introduced to 
deal with certain gaps that may exist if relying solely on market forces.  Table 1 denotes the pros 
and cons of each of the four potential systems that could be used to influence incentives related 
to risks and compensation and illustrates that a mix of market forces and workers’ compensation 
insurance is ideal for professional football. 
 A.  Concussion Litigation and Settlements 
 
The basis of the concussion litigation at the professional level was built upon years and 
years of deception and misrepresentations by the NFL.  Since the NFL first began formally 
considering the subject of concussions, when it established the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
(MTBI) committee in 1994, it downplayed concerns, referring to concussions as a “pack 
journalism issue” (Ezell 2013).  Over the years, the league continued to deny any link between 
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long-term brain damage and football.  The league repeatedly rejected guidelines recommended 
by experts in the health field, published papers hoping to discredit other research, and called for 
the retraction of research that linked football to brain damage (Coates 2013; Ezell 2013).  In 
2009, Congress got involved, when the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the subject 
of concussions and the NFL.  Perhaps the most memorable moment of the hearing was when Rep. 
Linda Sanchez (D-Calif.) analogized the NFL’s response to the concussion issue to big tobacco 
in the 1990s and that industry’s handling of the link between smoking and health issues (Hanna 
and Kain 2010; Michael 2015).  Former players, feeling they had been misled and mistreated by 
the league, soon moved the debate from the court of public opinion into the actual courtroom. 
At one point, the NFL was facing a series of lawsuits that involved over 5,000 of its 
former players or their families.  In 2012, these suits were consolidated and brought before the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The causes of action brought by the 
players included negligent misrepresentation, fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent hiring and 
retention, and wrongful death.  At its most basic, the players argument was that the league knew 
(or reasonably should have known) that repeated head impacts suffered while playing NFL 
football were likely to expose them to the risk of neurodegenerative disorders and diseases, 
including CTE.  The players claimed that by the NFL voluntarily choosing to study the issue of 
traumatic brain injuries, it assumed a duty to advise the players of the heightened risk, and by not 
doing so the, NFL willfully concealed information and misled players as to this risk.  Such 
behavior recklessly endangered the players (Michael 2015).   
 Following the hearing on the NFL’s motion to dismiss, Judge Brody ordered the parties 
to mediation (Telis 2014).  This presented the parties with the opportunity to reach some sort of 
agreement and avoid years of litigation, which they did in the form of a settlement agreement.  
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The NFL and the approved settlement class of former players reached a deal in August of 2013 
that called for the NFL to pay a total of $765 million for compensation, medical exams, and 
medical research.  A federal judge, however, declined this agreement in January 2014, arguing 
that the $765 million was inadequate.  The settlement was later granted final approval after the 
cap on awards was removed, meaning that the amount of actual awards to be distributed is open-
ended, although the settlement is estimated to cost the NFL approximately $1 billion.  The NFL 
denied any fault in the settlement (Associated Press 2016). 
The settlement became final and effective on January 7, 2017, with the claims process 
being opened on March 23, 2017.  The settlement established a compensation fund with a life of 
65 years.  The settlement is compromised of three benefits to be paid by the NFL: (i) baseline 
neuropsychological and neurological examinations (up to $75 million), (ii) monetary awards for 
diagnoses of death with CTE (prior to July 7, 2014), ALS, Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, and certain 
levels of other neurocognitive impairment (uncapped), and (iii) education programs to promote 
safety and injury prevention ($10 million).  Included in the settlement class were retired 
professional football players from the NFL, AFL, and NFL Europe League.  Representative 
claimants (i.e., family members) were also included for those retired players who are deceased or 
legally incompetent.  Current NFL players, however, were not included as members of the 
settlement class (“NFL Concussion Settlement”).   
In order to qualify for monetary compensation, a retired player need only have a 
qualifying diagnosis made by an approved qualified specialist.  It is not necessary to prove that 
playing professional football actually caused such disease.  Qualifying diagnoses include ALS, 
Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, Level 2 Neurocognitive Impairment, Level 1.5 Neurocognitive 
Impairment, or death with CTE.  The amount of money that a player is entitled to is dependent 
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on the type of qualifying diagnosis, the age at which the diagnosis occurred, the number of 
seasons played in professional football, diagnosis of a prior stroke or traumatic brain injury, and 
participation in the baseline assessment exam funded by the settlement.  The maximum awards 
range in value from $5 million for an individual with ALS to $1.5 million for an individual with 
Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment.  A player with multiple qualifying diagnoses is only 
entitled to a maximum of $5 million.  Award reductions based on age begin at age 45 and 
decrease the older the individual is when diagnosed.  Similarly, award reductions may be made 
based on the number of seasons played, beginning with less than five seasons.  The fewer 
seasons the individual played, the greater the reduction.18  No explanation was given in the 
settlement materials as to how these amounts were derived, so it is difficult to say whether these 
values are appropriate or not.  Actuaries hired by the NFL, though, estimated that 28% of all 
players would be found to have one of the qualifying diseases (Belson 2014).   
In theory, there are several reasons to believe that the compensation fund was a 
preferable outcome to extensive litigation.  For one, it eliminates questions of causation.  This 
would have likely been a highly contentious issue in court, involving costly expert witnesses and 
studies.  The fact that both the class of victims and the party contributing the compensation to the 
fund is clear makes the fund concept possible.  Detailing a clear class of injuries should also 
make the claims process straightforward and expedient.   
However, there have been several criticisms of how the fund has worked in practice.  
First, a large fraction of potential beneficiaries of the fund have yet to seek or receive funding.  
While there are 20,395 class members registered under the settlement, only 1,633 claim packages 
had been received as of February 5, 2018.  Furthermore, only 226 monetary awards had been 
                                                
18 Tables A–1, A–2, and A–3 in the Appendix demonstrate the different values for each qualifying 
diagnosis and how reductions from the maximum award value operate based on age and seasons played. 
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deemed payable by this point (“NFL Concussion Settlement”).  Some believe the list of 
qualifying diagnoses is too narrow.  No compensation is provided for other psychological and 
neurological conditions, including mood and behavioral disorders.  With respect to CTE, the 
only ones compensated for this are those who have died from the disease prior to the settlement 
date.  Those that die from CTE after the settlement date or who may later be diagnosed with the 
disease while living have no avenue for reimbursement.19  On a related note, individuals have 
felt that the offsets for age and seasons of experience are arbitrary and unfair.  There have also 
been complaints that the claims process is unduly burdensome and inefficient.  Former players 
have described the claims process as being filled with roadblocks and trapdoors.  Some have said 
that the league goes “through a series of denials until people give up” and that this is one reason 
that the number of claims awarded thus far has been so few (Rapp 2017).   
Finally, there have been various complaints about the attorneys involved.  Such 
complaints include the aggressive poaching of clients and suspicious deals with lenders and 
brokers for referral services.  Much has also been made of the high legal fees being demanded.  
This is a concern for players suffering from these serious diseases who need as much money as 
possible to pay for their medical expenses.  One estimate shows that lawyers are getting between 
15-40% of eventual awards (Draper 2017).  Such percentages may be reasonable under a typical 
contingency fee case in which a lawyer is investing a great deal of time and money into a case 
which may or may not result in success.  However, in the concussion settlement context, lawyers 
are providing more of an administrative service in the form of submitting the necessary 
paperwork to the claims system.   
 
                                                
19 The NFL has argued that many of the symptoms related to CTE are still covered and players could seek 
compensation this way. 
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 B.  Current Risk and Compensation Scheme 
 
For those players who play at least three seasons, the NFL provides health insurance for 
five years after the player retires and workers’ compensation past that.  The length of time that 
workers’ compensation benefits exist after retirement varies from state to state.  Some states also 
make special exceptions for professional athletes.  For instance, one proposed change to workers’ 
compensation in Illinois has been the source of recent controversy.  A bill was proposed to cut 
off the benefits to injured athletes at either age 35 or five years after the injury date.  This is a 
change from other employees, who receive benefits up to age 67.  Changes such as this could 
seriously hurt former NFL players suffering long-term injuries due to concussions (NFL Players 
Association 2017). 
 Even more problematic is that the NFL has encouraged states not to cover CTE as a 
workers’ compensation claim.  The league argues that workers’ compensation claims rely on a 
diagnosis, and because CTE cannot be diagnosed in living persons, it cannot be covered.  With 
recent scientific advancements, the time in which the NFL can no longer make such a claim is 
coming quickly.  In the meantime, this action has spurred 38 former players to opt out of the 
NFL settlement and pursue their own claims for workers’ compensation, asking the court to 
force the NFL to “recognize CTE in living players as an occupational disease and pay the players’ 
benefits” (Simpson 2016).  Even if the former players win their argument, one potential issue 
they may still face is that CTE may be deemed to be a cumulative injury, which some states 
exclude from workers’ compensation. 
 The NFL has made several changes in an effort to increase safety and reduce the risks of 
concussions, including rule changes, fines and penalties for certain dangerous plays, and changes 
in their concussion protocols.  In 2011, the league decided to move up the kickoff five yards 
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from the 30-yard line to the 35-yard line in order to increase the number of touchbacks and 
reduce the number of high impact collisions that are commonplace on kickoffs.  The NFL also 
banned the use of three-man wedges on kickoffs.  After implementation of these rules, the 
number of concussions on kickoffs dropped by 43% (Associated Press 2012).  In addition, other 
dangerous conduct on the field, such as horse-collar tackles, facemasking, late hits, spearing, and 
hits on defenseless players are penalized and fined to deter such behavior and increase the safety 
of the game. 
 Over time, the NFL has adopted and revised its concussion protocol.  In December 2009, 
the league created stricter return-to-play guidelines, which stated that a player with concussion 
symptoms should not return that same day.  Greater changes came in 2013 when the league 
introduced new concussion guidelines for sideline evaluation, education programs, baseline 
testing, and the creation of two additional and independent personnel to help with identifying and 
diagnosing concussions.  Under the new revisions, teams can be fined up to $150,000 for the first 
violation, at least $100,000 for a second violation, and may lose draft picks for failing to take 
players who have sustained concussions out of games (Belson 2016a; Flynn 2016). 
 Many argue that the NFL’s current system is still inadequate and that the league often 
times fails to adequately enforce and punish teams that have clearly violated the concussion 
protocol.  One issue is the overly high standard that must be met in order to stop play.  For a 
medical timeout to be called, there must be “clear visual evidence” that a player “displays 
obvious signs of disorientation or is clearly unstable” (Flynn 2016).  Rather than the old mantra 
“better safe than sorry,” this language seems to indicate that the league has the attitude of erring 
on the side of letting a player continue to play instead of erring on the side of caution.   
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There have been several examples that highlight the concussion protocol’s failures over 
the past few years.  In a 2015 game against the Ravens, then Rams quarterback Case Keenum, 
suffered a tough hit that resulted in his head slamming against the turf.  Keenum immediately 
grabbed his head in pain and required the help of his teammates to stand up.  The game was not 
stopped, and Keenum was not taken out of the game.  After the game, he was diagnosed with a 
concussion.  The Rams were not fined for the incident (Wagner-McGough 2015).  Tom Savage, 
quarterback of the Texans, was hit hard during a 2017 game against the 49ers.  After the hit, 
Savage laid motionless on his back with both of his arms raised stiffly in the air.  Although 
Savage was sent to the sideline to be evaluated, he later returned to the game.  After his return, 
he was seen to be coughing up blood and was removed from the game after throwing two 
interceptions.  Despite allowing Savage to return to the game, the Texans were not fined (Hurley 
2017).  Finally, in a 2017 playoff game against the Saints, Panthers quarterback Cam Newton 
took a big hit near the end of the close game.  Newton stayed on the ground for a long period of 
time before getting to his feet and trying to walk off the field; however, he fell before reaching 
the sideline.  The revised concussion policy states that, “Players who stumble or fall when trying 
to stand will require a concussion evaluation in the locker room.”  Despite this clear policy, 
Newton was not taken to the locker room.  Instead, he was evaluated in the medical tent on the 
sidelines and later returned to play during the Panther’s next offensive possession.  At this time, 
the NFL and NFLPA are investigating the Panthers to decide whether the team should be fined 
(Korman 2018; Person and Douglas 2018). 
 C.  Proposed Risk and Compensation Scheme 
 
 In professional football, there is a well-defined market.  Players are compensated for their 
talents and the risks of playing the game of football.  If assumptions of a perfect market hold, this 
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type of market forces system leads to optimal levels of risk and compensation.  However, the 
more and more deviation there is from the assumption of perfect markets, the less ideal a market 
forces approach becomes.  This was the case previously for the NFL.  In the past, professional 
football players were not adequately compensated, as they were not aware of the full extent of 
the risks associated with football.  The market suffered from a problem of imperfect information.  
This issue was highlighted during the litigation against the NFL, which revolved around the fact 
that the league had special knowledge of the risks of football and head injuries and kept this 
information from the players.  
 If existing market failures, such as asymmetric information, could be corrected, a market 
forces approach would be best for professional football.  There is reason to believe that players 
recognize that a tradeoff exists between compensation and risk and would prefer a market-based 
approach.  A large portion of professional football players come from a low socioeconomic 
background, with over half of all players claiming to have grown up in a below middle class 
household and nearly 90% of players stating they grew up in households at or below middle class 
(Klemko 2017).  It is no surprise, then, that many players have expressed the notion that the 
game of football was an escape from poverty for them and an opportunity to provide for their 
family.  This leads credence to the idea that the players themselves would prefer a market-based 
approach, in which they are given the autonomy to express their risk preferences, as opposed to a 
heavily regulated system.  A recent interview with Tony Dorsett, former Dallas Cowboys 
running back, illustrates such thinking.  After being told that it was likely he had CTE, he stated 
that he “would still do it all over again” despite knowing the risks and dangers of a career in 
football (Telis 2014). 
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 Moving forward, steps can be taken to ensure that asymmetric information is not a 
concern.  Under a market-based approach, unions may have a role to play in helping with 
informational inadequacies.  The NFLPA can play a significant role in assuring that players are 
privy to the same information as the league.  The most recent collective bargaining agreement 
was inked in 2011 and runs through the 2020 season (NFL and NFL Players Association 2011).  
When it comes time to reach the next agreement, the issue of concussions will no doubt be one 
of the major items the parties will seek to address.  If players have a more equitable knowledge 
of the risks, players will be able to express their risk preferences through the compensation they 
seek the same way that other workers do who work in dangerous occupations.  Therefore, the 
NFL and NFLPA should work together to jointly fund medical studies and gather data.  In doing 
so, both parties should agree that any information regarding concussions is shared fully between 
the league and the NFLPA, which can then distribute such information to the players. 
The next CBA should also be sure to address certain issues in order to ensure that the 
league and players have proper incentives with regards to risk.  Among the most important items 
that the players should demand is guaranteed contracts.  According to the NFLPA, guaranteed 
compensation comprised less than 60% of all payments to players in the 2016 season (Martel and 
Stapleton 2017).  When a team releases a player before the expiration of his contract, the player 
only receives his remaining guaranteed money, while the balance is lost.  This creates 
undesirable incentives for players wishing to remain on the team and earn the rest of their 
contract.  Players may fear being cut after suffering a concussion.  This is especially true if the 
concussion is not their first, as teams realize that the player is more likely to suffer future 
concussions and miss playing time.  Therefore, in the absence of guaranteed contracts, players 
have an incentive to hide symptoms.  Derek Anderson, current backup quarterback for the 
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Carolina Panthers, expressed how the current NFL contract system creates these incentives, 
stating “Guys play with [injuries] they’ve got no business playing with… [Y]our job security is 
not there to sit out” (Hanna and Kain 2010).  Without a change to the current contract system, 
players will continue to hide their symptoms to protect their paychecks. 
 The NFLPA should also urge that certain elements of the concussion protocols be 
revisited.  As previously illustrated, teams often go unpunished for breaching the league’s 
protocols.  More resources should be dedicated to ensure the protocols are followed in real time, 
and that if they are not, teams actually face punishment.  The amount of the fines should also be 
specifically tailored to align with the team’s incentives.  Rather than fining teams for the same 
amount of money regardless of the player injured during the protocol breach, the fines should be 
tied to the individual player’s salary.  Teams have a greater incentive to sidestep the concussion 
protocols and return players to the field who are more valuable to their team’s success.  Because 
a player’s salary usually reflects his value to the team, tying team fines to a player’s salary will 
be more effective than a flat fine. 
 Even if players were to be given complete and accurate information regarding 
concussions and harm to make determinations as to their ex ante compensation, there is no 
guarantee players will use such information optimally.  Misperceptions regarding risks are well 
documented.  For example, people tend to overestimate low probability risks and underestimate 
relatively high probability risks (DellaVigna 2009; Kahneman and Tversky 1984).  In regards to 
concussions in athletics, it may be the case that those involved in sports, such as football, 
misperceive the risks and harms associated with participation and repetitive head trauma.  In fact, 
such misperception almost certainly exists, as the science regarding the link to repetitive head 
trauma and long-term health effects is still relatively new and uncertain.  The link between 
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football and long-term health effects are probabilistic rather than certain.  Not every individual 
that has played football develops CTE and the exact interaction between exposure and harm is 
still greatly unknown.  This could limit the effectiveness of a market-based approach, which 
relies on compensating differentials that are based on perceived risks.  If these perceived risks 
are inaccurate, workers will demand an inefficient level of compensation for job-related risks 
The way in which risks are framed is known to affect how individuals make decisions 
(DellaVigna 2009; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 1984).  The results 
from the experiment in Chapter 3 of this dissertation support this.  In the experiment, individuals 
were presented with a multi-stage “win or lose it all” game in which they had to determine the 
number of rounds they wished to play.  Such a structure is analogous to the decisions that 
football players confront when deciding whether to continue their career and risk suffering long-
term health consequences.  Although most individuals are risk averse, about one-third of the 
participants engaged in risk-seeking behavior under the experiment’s structure.  Participants 
were more risk seeking when asked to make an upfront commitment (rather than a round-by-
round commitment) in which the potential risks were framed as happening in the unknown future.  
This may be akin to how players may think about the risks of CTE.  Participants were also more 
risk seeking when payments were increasing (rather than constant) with larger payments in later 
rounds.  Similarly, player contracts may increase over time with many incentive-based payments 
occurring on the back-end of their deals.  For these reasons, ex ante compensation through 
market forces may, by itself, be inadequate. 
Salary caps may also prevent market force compensation from being fully effective.  In 
2017, the salary cap was $167 million per team, which was a product of negotiations between the 
NFL and NFLPA (Pelissero 2017).  Even if a player and his team are somehow able to agree 
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upon the optimal ex ante compensation for potential concussion-related injuries, the team may be 
constrained from doing so because of its salary cap.  The salary cap rules in the NFL are much 
stricter than other professional sports leagues.  In other leagues, such as baseball, teams may 
willingly exceed the salary cap with the understanding that they will have to pay a luxury tax on 
the amount spent in excess of the cap.  This is not the case for NFL teams, which face fines, 
forfeiture of draft picks, and the possibility of contracts being voided as a result of exceeding the 
salary cap (Kaylor 2017). 
To help circumvent some of the problems that arise due to potential misperceptions with 
regards to risk and the salary cap, ex ante compensation that occurs through market forces could 
be supplemented with insurance.  Players could insist that an insurance system be put in place 
that is similar to workers’ compensation in which teams obtain insurance to pay for job-related 
injuries.  From the team’s perspective, this would involve a shift in costs.  In order to pay for the 
injuries suffered by past players, they would have to offer lower wages to current players.  In a 
competitive market, this would not be feasible because competitors would outbid them.  
However, the NFL has a virtual monopoly over professional football.  While other leagues such 
as the Canadian Football League (CFL) and the Arena Football League (AFL) exist, they are not 
true competitors of the NFL.  They are much less popular and cannot match the salaries NFL 
team are able offer.  Therefore, some sort of insurance scheme could be viable. 
The system should be uniform in that it should provide all players with the same benefits 
over the same period of time, regardless of where they played.  This would address the issue 
faced by players who formerly played in states that are now seeking to limit the duration of their 
workers’ compensation coverage.  The system should also take into consideration that many of 
the harms associated with football do not manifest until decades later.  The workers’ 
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compensation should cover injuries like this, such as CTE.  With this type of insurance in place, 
teams would have an incentive to reduce risks in order to keep their premiums lower.  
A few issues still exist that limit the effectiveness of insurance in this scenario. This 
system would not cause teams to fully internalize harm, as these policies generally only 
compensate for medical costs and lost wages.  Such compensation is inadequate for certain 
injuries that alter the post-injury utility of income, reducing the degree to which money enhances 
one’s well-being (Viscusi 1990; Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2011).  Since workers’ compensation is 
unable to account for the full costs of health-related injuries, a market forces approach is 
necessary so that players are able to take this into consideration when they accept their contracts.  
Another problem is that insurers may be unwilling to underwrite the types of policies 
contemplated.  This was a problem with respect to hazardous wastes in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Companies operating treatment, storage, and disposal facilities found it difficult to obtain 
pollution insurance, as providers either refused to offer policies for these types of risk or offered 
such policies at prohibitively costly rates (United States General Accounting Office 1994).  The 
great degree of uncertainty that currently exists with regards to the likelihood and degree of harm 
associated with playing football could present a similar problem.   
Further scientific research could make the task of providing insurance easier in the future; 
however, it is not necessary for the NFL to rely on a third party insurance provider.  The NFL 
could instead self-insure for these workers’ compensation claims, as it is certainly within the 
NFL’s ability to do so.  The NFL is the highest grossing sports league in the country.  It is 
projected that the league will earn approximately $14 billion for the 2017 season (Kaplan 2017).  
There is no anticipated slowdown in sight for the league.  In fact, Commissioner Roger Goodell 
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has expressed a goal of $25 billion in annual revenue by 2027 (Belzer 2016).  A company with 
revenues of this size is certainly capable of self-insuring its own workers’ compensation system. 
With the new CBA addressing concussion concerns, tort liability likely becomes an 
unavailable tool for incentivizing optimal levels of risk and compensation.  This is because 
concussion-related issues, which will clearly be covered by the new CBA, will now have to go 
through arbitration, and any litigation would be preempted by the CBA.  Furthermore, workers 
waive their right to bring lawsuits under workers’ compensation.  Players would gladly accept 
this tradeoff, as lawsuits are expensive and causation is difficult to prove for concussion-related 
injuries.  In addition, regulation is much less useful at the professional level than at other levels 
of football.  At the professional level, the players and the league, rather than a regulatory entity, 
are in the best position to have information regarding risks, safety costs, and harm.  Regulation is 
typically a great tool for generating information; instead, this issue can be addressed through 
establishing joint research agreements between the NFL and the NFLPA during the next CBA as 
previously discussed.  There is also the potential of political pushback if the government were to 
step in and regulate a private industry that does not cause externalities like other types of 
industries that are typically regulated.  Instead, the harm caused by concussions is confined to 
those within the industry (i.e., the football players) and does not impact third parties. 
 
IV.  College Football 
 
Similar to the professional level, a major class action was brought at the college level.  
The lawsuit resulted in a $75 million settlement agreement.  Unlike professional football, several 
barriers exist that prevent market forces from effectively managing risk and compensation at the 
college level.  Instead, in this section, I argue that regulation is the best course of action.  The 
current system of self-regulation by the NCAA should be replaced by a command and control 
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regulation administered at the federal level by the Department of Education.  As part of this 
regulation, schools should be required to provide insurance to their athletes and guarantee all 
athletic scholarships for four years.  Table 2 shows the pros and cons of each of the four potential 
systems with respect to football at the college level.  
 A.  Concussion Litigation and Settlements 
 
 The first lawsuit filed against the NCAA regarding concussion injuries was filed on 
September 2011.  In December 2013, this lawsuit and others were consolidated in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  While the suit ultimately became a 
class action, the original plaintiffs were made up mostly of former collegiate football players 
(Strauss 2016).  In essence, the plaintiffs claimed that the NCAA had failed its duty to protect its 
student-athletes.  The plaintiffs argued that while commonly accepted protocols had been set by 
organizations such as the National Athletic Trainers’ Association and the American College of 
Sports Medicine on the issues of baseline testing, treatment, or return-to-play, the NCAA failed 
to adopt them.  In fact, it was not until 2010 that the NCAA required schools to have a 
concussion management in place.  Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA did not 
bother to enforce this rule (Axon 2013). 
Internal NCAA emails provided a major blow to the association.  One exchange between 
the NCAA’s director of health and safety, David Klossner, and the NCAA’s managing director 
of government relations, Abe Frank, highlighted just how poor the NCAA was handling the 
concussion issue.  In 2010, when asked by Frank whether concussion recommendations at the 
youth level exceeded what was required at the college level, Klossner responded, “Well since we 
don’t currently require anything all steps are higher than ours” (Axon 2013).   
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Other emails demonstrated a casual attitude towards the punishment accompanying the 
breaching of the NCAA’s later developed concussion management plan.  The emails revealed 
that a school that failed to follow the plan would receive only a “secondary” violation.  The 
punishment for this type of violation was equivalent to the punishment faced by “a coach who 
inadvertently calls a recruit or accepts a Facebook friend request during no-contact periods.”  In 
other words, the penalty was next to nothing.  In addition, Klosser admitted that he was unaware 
of any schools that had been punished for failing to enforce the concussion rules (Axon 2013). 
In October 2014, the NCAA and the members of the class action suit reached a settlement.  
It was agreed that the NCAA would pay $75 million, with $70 million going towards a medical 
monitory fund and $5 million going towards concussion research.  As part of the agreement, the 
NCAA also agreed to revise its concussion policies.  While this initial settlement agreement was 
rejected in December 2014, a new settlement, containing no change in funding from the original 
settlement, was reached in April 2015.  This new settlement agreement was approved in January 
2016 (Berkowitz 2016; Keating 2017). 
As part of the settlement, former student-athletes waived their right to bring a class-wide 
claim against the NCAA and its member institutions related to concussion injuries with one 
exception—current or former student-athletes of a single sport at a single school can still bring 
class-wide claims.  In addition, former athletes maintained the ability to bring individual 
personal or bodily injury claims against the NCAA.  This was significant because former 
student-athletes did not receive any compensation for lost earnings.  Furthermore, the $70 
million medical monitoring service was designed to identify symptoms.  There was no intention 
that this money be used for treatment or other medical expenses.  Thus, more suits seeking these 
types of damages may develop over time (Berkowitz 2016; Sellers 2017). 
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Since the initial lawsuit and settlement with the NCAA, several other suits have been 
brought against the NCAA, its conferences, and its member institutions.  Among the conferences 
named in the lawsuits are the Big Ten, Southeastern, Pacific-12, and Western Athletic.  Some of 
the individual schools also involved in litigation include Penn State20 and Vanderbilt.  While 
players filing these claims are also from Auburn, Georgia, Oregon, and Utah, these schools were 
not named as defendants due to issues of sovereign immunity.  The damages sought in these 
cases include compensatory and punitive damages, payments for medical expenses, lost future 
earnings, lost time, and interest (Berkowitz 2016; Sellers 2017). 
 B.  Current Risk and Compensation Scheme 
 
The management of concussion risks at the college level currently operates through self-
regulation.  The NCAA promulgates certain minimum standards that it requires its member 
institutions to meet.  Individual schools and conferences are also free to develop their own sets of 
standards that exceed these baseline standards.  In 2015, the power five conferences21 did just 
this when they developed the Concussion Safety Protocol Committee to review and approve their 
schools’ concussion protocols. 
The biggest complaint with the NCAA’s protocols is that there is no structure in place to 
enforce and punish schools for violating the concussion protocol.  In fact, the NCAA has said 
that, “each school is responsible for the welfare of athletes and that risk can’t be completely 
removed from sports” (Solomon 2014a).  The Concussion Safety Protocol Committee suffers 
from this same issue, as the committee cannot penalize schools that violate the procedures 
established.  In 2014, the Big Ten announced that it would adopt new protocols for its conference 
that would include penalties for non-compliance.  The revisions also called for an independent 
                                                
20 While Penn State is a state-related university, it is not a member of the Pennsylvania System of Higher 
Education (Present 2011).   
21 The “power five” conferences consist of the ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12, and SEC. 
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athletic trainer to be in the replay booth in order to spot concussion symptoms on the field and 
contact officials if needed.  While this provision was implemented, the Big Ten has yet to 
establish a system for penalizing schools for noncompliance of the conference’s protocols 
(Solomon 2015b).  
The lack of enforcement is a major concern given the prevalence of non-compliance.  A 
2010 internal study of the NCAA found that 50% of responding schools failed to require a 
concussed player to see a physician.  The study also found that roughly 50% of schools said 
athletes had been allowed to return to a game in which they had suffered a concussion (Axon 
2013).  Another survey of college athletic trainers highlighted the pressures that exist to 
improperly return concussed players to the field.  The 2013 study conducted by the Chronicle of 
Higher Education found that almost half of the trainers cited pressure to return players before 
they were medically ready (Wolverton 2013).  This concern has prompted demands that the 
NCAA adopt the NFL’s policy of requiring that an independent medical professional be present 
alongside the team’s own trainers and doctors. 
 The NCAA requires that athletes have a primary health insurance policy.22  The schools, 
themselves, are not required to pay for the policy, although some do.  Many argue that the 
schools should be required to pay for the policy instead of leaving it up to the students, who are 
forbidden from being compensated.  Another problem is that once a student-athlete has 
completed school or is no longer on scholarship, schools are not required to provide them with 
medical coverage.  For latent harms, like those associated with concussions and CTE, this creates 
a major problem.  Furthermore, scholarships are not guaranteed over an athlete’s entire college 
career.  Instead, they can be renewed on a year-to-year basis.  This creates the possible issue of 
                                                
22 It should be noted that the NCAA has a catastrophic injury insurance program in place for its athletes.  
This policy has a $90,000 deductible, which must be met within two years of the injury. 
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an athlete losing his or her scholarship after becoming injured and being left to pay any future 
medical expenses out of his or her own pocket.  Some conferences have attempted to address 
these concerns.  In 2014, the Big Ten announced it would guarantee all athletic scholarships for 
four years and provide improved, consistent medical insurance for its student-athletes.  The Pac-
12 quickly followed suit, announcing that it would also guarantee four-year scholarships and that 
medical expenses for student-athletes injured during their college athletic careers would be 
covered for up to four years after leaving the institution (Sinha 2014).  While these policies were 
improvements to the current system, they may not go far enough to protect athletes and are far 
from the norm across the NCAA. 
 C.  Proposed Risk and Compensation Scheme 
 
Regulation is often justified as a policy tool when various types of market failures exist. 
These failures could include externalities, incomplete information, monopoly power, incomplete 
markets, or income distribution issues.  Regulation is justified because of the several market 
failures that exist at the college level.  Players have very little bargaining power at the college 
level.  Despite their efforts, courts have refused to consider football players to be employees of 
their respective universities and have prohibited them from unionizing. 23   This issue is 
exacerbated by the fact that the NCAA has a monopsony over the talent of collegiate athletes.  
The NFL requires that a player be three years removed from high school before entering the 
league.  Without any minor league football system, players are left with nowhere to turn but the 
NCAA.  Due to this imbalance, college players do not have sufficient leverage to demand 
information, compensation, or even that certain safety measures be put into place. 
Command and control federal regulation should be adopted at the college level to deal 
with the concussion issue.  Federal control over certain aspects in the NCAA and college 
                                                
23 Nw. Univ., 362 NLRB No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
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athletics is not new.  Title IX seeks to prevent sex discrimination in programs that receive federal 
funding.  As the NCAA’s member institutions receive an immense amount of federal funding, 
they must abide by Title IX.  This demonstrates the ability of Congress, through its spending 
power, to regulate the NCAA and implement concussion protocols, if it so chooses.  The 
NCAA’s repeated failures at self-regulating its members in the area of concussions indicates that 
federal regulation is needed to address this issue.  Studies have shown an egregious degree of 
non-compliance when it comes to concussion protocols at the college level, and college athletes 
do not have the power to effectuate the change that is necessary.  On the other hand, federal 
regulation has proven effective in the past at the college level, as evidenced by Title IX.  Federal 
regulation is also more appropriate than state regulation because college teams compete across 
state borders and collegiate conferences consist of schools spanning multiple states. 
I would recommend that the Department of Education (DoEd) be the agency in charge of 
this regulation.  The DoEd can draw on its experience with Title IX as to how to best regulate 
colleges and universities.  To gain better understanding of the health-related issues of 
concussions, the agency could consult with experts or seek cross-agency collaboration with an 
agency such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  This type of collaboration 
may not be common, but is not unprecedented.24  I would recommend that the concussion 
regulation work similarly to Title IX in that the receipt of federal funds should be conditional on 
compliance with the regulations. 
While tying federal funds to the regulations should help a great deal with compliance, 
monitoring and enforcement are common difficulties associated with command and control 
regulation.  Without any monitoring and enforcement system, regulated entities have no 
                                                
24 For example, in 2013, the Department of Justice, DoEd, and HHS sent a joint letter to health-related 
schools regarding the issue of Hepatitis B discrimination.  In this letter, these entities also note that they 
all jointly enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. (Department of Justice 2013). 
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incentive to comply with the concussion standards set.  In addition, both monitoring and 
enforcement add costs to the regulatory system.  One way to address these issues is to incentivize 
the NCAA to fulfill the role of monitoring.  The DoEd could threaten to take away the NCAA’s 
authority over its member institutions if compliance falls to a rate they find unacceptable.  The 
DoEd recently took a similar approach with regards to the American Bar Association (ABA).  In 
2016, the DoEd threatened to suspend the ABA’s accreditation power for new law schools 
because of its failure “to implement its student achievement standards and probationary sanctions, 
while also not meeting its audit process and analysis responsibilities regarding students’ debt 
levels” (Ward 2016).  While the ABA was ultimately not suspended, this example helps to 
illustrate an approach that the DoEd may choose to take with the NCAA. 
As part of regulating college athletes, insurance could be used as a supplemental policy 
tool.  Any imposed regulation should include that schools (or the NCAA) be required to provide 
its athletes with health insurance to cover immediate injuries.  Insurance premiums would work 
as an instrument to provide further incentive for schools (or the NCAA) to reduce risk.  While 
something akin to workers’ compensation—which could pay for even latent harms—may be 
preferable, such a program would face immense political and legal hurdles.  Time and time again, 
the NCAA has remained steadfast in its opinion that college athletes should not be compensated 
other than the scholarships and minor living stipends they are entitled to receive.  Whether one 
agrees with this opinion, or believes the NCAA’s mission to preserve the integrity of 
“amateurism” is genuine, is beyond the scope of this chapter.  It is enough to say that there is no 
reason to believe that a workers’ compensation system would be feasible given the current 
environment.  Instead, providing health insurance is a second-best alternative.  Finally, colleges 
should be required to honor scholarships for a full four years.  Players should not have to face the 
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possibility of losing their scholarships due to an injury.  Without guaranteed scholarships, 
players have an incentive to hide concussion symptoms and continue to risk suffering subsequent 
injuries. 
As noted above, market forces provide inadequate incentives at the college level.  The 
lack of bargaining power of college athletes, the NCAA’s monopsony over collegiate level 
athletic talent, and lack of markets for players not meeting the NFL draft age requirements are 
some of the market failures at the collegiate level.  Relying on tort liability to manage concussion 
risks at the college level is also not ideal.  Causation is also a hurdle because plaintiffs would 
have to show that their injuries did not happen during youth football.  Sovereign immunity is 
another major issue at the college level.  The overwhelming majority of universities are public 
institutions and would be immune from suit.  This would leave only the private universities, 
athletic conferences, and the NCAA as the possible liable parties.  This could be an issue if it is 
the schools themselves that have the most control over managing risk and implementing safety 
measures, as most schools are public institutions. 
 
V.  Youth Football 
 
At the youth level, suits have been brought against a wide range of parties.  Many have 
resulted in confidential settlements that do little to advance risk-management efforts.  The 
current approach to address concussions at the youth levels is through state youth concussion 
laws, which have been enacted by every state.  In this section, I argue that while this type of 
state-level regulation is the best available tool for youth football, the current schemes leave much 
to be desired.  I argue that states conduct regulation through notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
allowing them to incorporate information from relevant experts and decisions that are aligned 
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with meaningful benefit-cost analysis.  Table 3 provides the pros and cons of the four potential 
systems with respect to youth football.  
 A.  Concussion Litigation and Settlements 
 
 Similar to the college level, a wide range of parties has been subject to suit at the youth 
levels.  Among the defendants in concussion litigation at the youth levels are Pop Warner, USA 
Football, state athletic associations, and local school districts.  While similar claims and defenses 
have been made across these groups, noteworthy differences exist as well. 
Pop Warner is a non-profit organization providing youth football and cheer programs for 
children aged five to 16 years old.  Pop Warner is the largest youth football program in the world 
and in the past several years has faced a wave of litigation regarding concussion-related injuries.  
One lawsuit brought in California against Pop Warner involved a child, Donnovan Hill, who 
became paralyzed after making a goal line tackle during a regional Pop Warner championship 
game in 2011 (Farrey 2016a).  The tackle was made using a headfirst technique allegedly 
promoted by his coaches.  Hill was 13 years old at the time and was rendered a quadriplegic.  A 
settlement was reached in January 2016.  The terms of the settlement were confidential, though it 
was thought to be in excess of $1 million.  Hill died later that year (Farrey 2016b).  Another 
action brought against Pop Warner was filed in Wisconsin in February 2015 and involved the 
death of a former youth football player who began playing football in Pop Warner at the age of 
11.  During his sophomore year in college, the individual began exhibiting irrational behavior 
and decreased cognitive ability.  In 2012, at the age of 25, he committed suicide.  An autopsy of 
his brain revealed that he had CTE.  The case was ultimately settled for less than $2 million 
(Akinnibi 2016; Belson 2016b; Weisel and Kingdollar 2016). 
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Two mothers, Kimberly Archie and Jo Cornell, brought the most recent case against Pop 
Warner.25  Their sons participated in Pop Warner when they were young and were discovered to 
have CTE after they died.  They argued that Pop Warner failed to monitor games, practices, rules, 
equipment, and medical care so as to minimize the risks of brain injuries.  It was also alleged that 
Pop Warner did not ensure that its coaches were properly trained in concussion management, as 
promised (Belson 2016b).  This lawsuit also named USA Football as a responsible party.  The 
complaint alleged that USA football made misleading statements regarding the safety brought 
about by its Heads Up Football program.  Such statements included that those adopting “Heads 
Up have 87% lower injury rates” and “82% lower concussion rates.”  However, an investigation 
by The New York Times discovered that these numbers relied upon flawed research and that the 
program did not reduce the risk of injury by the numbers reported.  The suit is still ongoing at 
this time. 
One lawsuit making its way through the state of Pennsylvania involves claims against the 
Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (PIAA).26  The plaintiffs in this suit, three high 
school athletes (two football players and one softball player), have alleged that the PIAA was 
aware of the health risks associated with sub-concussive blows to the head and concussive results, 
and that the PIAA failed to timely and adequately impose safety regulations and protocols.  The 
plaintiffs also claimed that the PIAA was in a superior position to know of concussion-injury 
rates and long-term medical consequences.  The plaintiffs also pointed out that unlike 
professional athletes, who have the capital to pay for medical care, youth athletes range in age 
from 12 to 18 and do not have similar resources.  The PIAA has taken the position that they were 
                                                
25 Archie and Cornell v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-6603, 2016 WL 4614081 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 1, 2016).  
26 Hites v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., No. 8 C.D. 2017, 2017 WL 4507367 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Oct. 10, 2017). 
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under no duty, and that the claims are non-judiciable due to the effect of a state law covering 
youth concussions.  However, Pennsylvania’s youth concussion law expressly states that it is not 
intended to eliminate civil liability.  This same law also imposes obligations upon the 
Department of Health and Department of Education, and not the PIAA, to promulgate 
regulations related to concussions.  The plaintiffs have countered by pointing to language in the 
PIAA’s bylaws that portrays the association as assuming the role of a guardian of player safety. 
A different lawsuit was filed against the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) in 
November 2014 on behalf of Alex Pierscionek, a former South Elgin football player.27  The suit 
called for the IHSA to revise its policies regarding concussions to include further protections.  
These protections sought that schools be required to have medical professionals with an expertise 
in concussion management present at all football games and on call for all football practices.  
The suit also asked for the IHSA to enact new guidelines for screening players for brain injuries 
and develop a new education program for teachers about identifying concussions.  The lawsuit 
also requested that a medical monitoring program be established to allow ex-high school football 
players to be tested for cognitive issues related to concussions.  The IHSA argued that mandating 
such policies would be the end of high school football, as not every school could afford to 
provide these resources.  The judge presiding over the case found in favor of the association and 
held that it was up to the legislature, not the judiciary, to enact such policies.  The judge also 
appeared sympathetic to IHSA’s argument with regards to the cost of the demanded policies.  In 
his dismissal, Judge LeRoy Martin stated, “IHSA is simply a governmental entity charged with 
safeguarding student athletes” and “[imposing] broader liability on this defendant would 
certainly change the sport of football and potentially harm it or cause it to be abandoned” 
                                                
27 Pierscionek v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 2015 WL 6550826 (Ill. Cir. Ct.). 
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(Keilman and Rhodes 2015).  This reasoning has received heavy criticism from those who 
believed that Judge Martin inappropriately inserted his personal beliefs and feelings regarding 
the preservation of football when making this decision. 
Lawsuits have also been brought against specific school districts.  One case in Iowa 
brought by a Bedford High School football player, Kacey Strough, resulted in a nearly $1 million 
jury verdict.  Strough had a preexisting medical condition called cavernous malformation, which 
involves abnormal blood vessels in the brain.  In October 2012, Strough sustained a concussion 
during practice and complained of headaches and double vision.  The jurors found that the 
district and school nurse were negligent when they failed to notify coaches or his guardian of the 
possible brain injuries.  This resulted in Strough continuing to practice and play football until he 
was forced to undergo surgery in November 2012 to remove a blood clot near his brain stem.  
Strough then fell into a coma for a few days and is now permanently disabled, requiring the use 
of a wheelchair (Naughton 2015; Weisel and Kingdollar 2016). 
There have also been numerous other lawsuits against various school districts that have 
resulted in settlements.  While many settlements have remained confidential, there are at least 
three recent settlements that have been published.  One lawsuit against a California high school 
resulted in a $4.4 million settlement after it was alleged that a coach ignored evidence of a 17-
year-old football player’s headaches, and instead, allowed the player to return to play.  Another 
claim was settled for $2 million when a 16-year-old football player sustained a head injury 
during practice.  The player was allegedly practicing without a helmet, received a hurried 
evaluation, and was allowed to drive himself home after being left alone in a training room for 
30 minutes.  Finally, a $300,000 settlement was reached in a case in which a Montana high 
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school football player was allowed to prematurely return to practice after suffering a concussion 
(Weisel and Kingdollar 2016). 
 B.  Current Risk and Compensation Scheme 
 
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation regulating youth 
sports concussions.  Most of these state laws are modeled after the Washington state law, which 
in 2009 became the first state to pass this type of legislation.  The Washington law has three 
main features: (i) education of athletes, parents, and coaches; (ii) immediate removal from play 
of a concussed athlete; and (iii) medical clearance before allowing the athlete to return to play 
(WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.190). 
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I analyzed the impact of these laws on athletic 
participation and the reporting of concussions.  I found that these laws lead to less participation 
in high school football.  I also discovered that having a law in place leads to a statistically 
significant increase in the reporting of concussions.  Policymakers should feel optimistic about 
this result, as better reporting should, in theory, make the sport safer.   Despite the admirable 
attempts by states to deal with youth concussions through this legislation, these laws have 
received heavy criticism.   
One critique has been that these laws lack the enforcement mechanisms and penalties to 
effectively deter noncompliance (Amberg 2012; Brandwein 2013).  Adding to this problem is the 
fact that guidelines are typically written in language that is too broad, leaving room to comply 
with the legal standards without following the spirit of the law.  Moreover, the laws often include 
immunity provisions that protect even those who blatantly fail to meet the required standards that 
have been set.  Some also argue that these laws are too lax and should be made stricter 
(Brandwein 2013).  Critics have called for more extensive educational requirements, mandatory 
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baseline testing, and the requirement that medical professionals be present at all athletic events 
(Amberg 2012).  All of these policies certainly increase costs, but proponents argue these costs 
are well worth it.  Finally, others have complained that these laws have failed to stay current with 
present medical evidence (Harvey 2013). 
 Youth football organizations, like Pop Warner, that are not associated with schools often 
do not fall under the scope of these laws.  Instead, these organizations have developed their own 
set of rules and regulations in order to address the safety concerns of football.  For example, Pop 
Warner has eliminated kickoffs for their youngest divisions, has limited the amount of practice 
time allowed to be spent on contact to 25%, has required medical clearance for individuals 
suffering a suspected head injury, and has required Heads Up Football training for all coaches 
(“Pop Warner – Play Safer”). 
 C.  Proposed Risk and Compensation Scheme 
 
 Regulation is a useful tool when seeking to impact a large and diverse number of 
individuals.  At no level of football is the participant pool larger or more diverse than at the 
youth levels.  Regulation allows for policies to be as tailored as desired, which is important when 
the target of the risk-management system involves a diverse group of individuals.  Therefore, 
command and control regulation should be used as the primary tool for managing the risks of 
concussions at the youth levels. 
State-level legislation, which is the current system, is the appropriate course of action.  
The problem is that the current regulation has been executed poorly, and as a consequence, has 
failed to manage risks in a satisfactory manner.  Unlike the college level, state-level regulation is 
more appropriate than federal-level regulation.  One reason for this is that movement across state 
borders for football competition is far more rare at the youth levels.  In addition, states may have 
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different costs and benefits when it comes to football and concussions.  For example, state 
budgets, the ratio of rural to urban areas, and the value that individuals assign to the game of 
football may differ across states.  Such differences, no doubt, impact how concussion 
management policies should be crafted in order to maximize social welfare.   
At the youth levels, the state is in the best position to have obtained a full range of 
information.  Parents and students do not often have access to the full scope of information that 
is at the state’s disposal or simply do not take the effort to learn enough information regarding 
risks.  In addition, schools or local officials may only know information regarding risks and costs 
insofar as it applies to their specific area.  On the other hand, a state regulatory entity would have 
a better sense of the different needs and concerns across the various entities in that state.  
Regulation allows for the costs of gathering information to be spread over a large group of 
individuals and not to be incurred by every party involved.  In the youth football context, this 
means that youth athletes, parents, and schools do not have to directly spend resources to gather 
information.  This is another reason why regulation should not be more localized than the state 
level.  It would be possible to allow for regulation at the county level or at the athletic conference 
level; however, this would lead to much greater informational costs.  
States should conduct its regulation through notice and comment rulemaking so that it 
can receive comments from experts in the scientific community, schools, parents, and other 
stakeholders.  States should also be committed to revising their regulations often.  The 
biomedical science in the area of concussions continues to evolve, especially with respect to 
concussions at the youth levels.  Although more frequent updates to regulations would be more 
costly, the benefits likely outweigh the costs because concussion research is evolving rapidly.  
Furthermore, states should expand the coverage of their regulations to cover all youth football 
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organizations and not just those football programs that take place at schools.  This would ensure 
that organizations like Pop Warner have to meet certain standards rather than relying on self-
regulation.  States might also consider simultaneously drafting concussion regulation for all 
sports.  A sport like football, however, would be more likely to have different requirements than 
other sports. 
 The types of requirements that are ultimately implemented should reflect each state’s 
own careful benefit-cost analysis.  Provisions like baseline testing, education and training 
requirements, and approved clearance providers may differ from state to state or even within a 
single state.  Take, for example, the issue of what type of medical expert is needed and when he 
or she must be present.  A state may require that just a trainer be available at football games for 
schools in rural areas because of the low supply of doctors in these areas.  On the other hand, it 
may require that schools in urban areas require medical doctors to be available for both football 
practices and games.  It could also be the case that requirements should be completely reversed, 
as rural schools are located further from hospitals than schools in urban areas.  This hypothetical 
underlines the difficulty of predicting which requirements are optimal without engaging in a full 
benefit-cost analysis.   
 The ultimate goal of the state laws should be reducing youth concussions.  One problem 
with current state laws is that this goal is only addressed in an indirect manner.  Currently, state 
laws have focused mainly on detection by seeking to improve the ability of individuals to 
recognize concussion symptoms.  Improved detection allows for concussed athletes to be 
removed from play and limits the possibility of repeat concussions.  Even assuming that the laws 
accomplish this feat, detection only addresses the issue of repeat concussions.  No matter how 
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effective detection becomes, it can do nothing to prevent the first, initial concussion suffered by 
an athlete. 
Therefore, states may consider other policies aimed more directly at initial concussions.  
It is not beyond the realm of possibility to think that regulators may decide to eliminate football 
altogether in certain situations.  In fact, this is in line with current research.  A recent study 
conducted at Boston University found that “athletes who began playing tackle football before the 
age of 12 had more behavioral and cognitive problems later in life than those who started playing 
after they turned 12” (Belson 2017a).  States may decide to ban tackle football for children 12 
and younger, concluding that the costs outweigh the benefits.28  If states ultimately decide to ban 
tackle football in some instances, they need to consider the broader impact of such a decision.  
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, participation in youth sports provides a variety of 
benefits—physical, cognitive, social, etc.  Therefore, a state deciding to ban tackle football must 
initiate other programs that provide opportunities for youth to gain the same benefits they once 
derived from participating in tackle football. 
 Relying on market forces will lead to inadequate protection of youth athletes.  One reason 
is because there is an imperfect information problem.  Parents and students typically have less 
knowledge and access to information than schools or other youth organizations.  This is 
especially true with respect to the cost of risk reduction measures.  Another major issue is that 
young people are typically worse at evaluating risks and are easily influenced by other factors, 
like peer pressure.  Under a market-based system, there would also be little incentive for schools 
or other organizations to generate risk information or reduce risks, as schools and youth 
                                                
28 In fact, Illinois has decided to do just this.  On January 25, 2018, the state revealed a bill that would ban 
organized tackle football for Illinois children younger than 12 years old.  The bill is called the Dave 
Duerson Act to Prevent CTE, named after the former Chicago Bears defensive back, who was diagnosed 
with CTE after committing suicide at the age of 50 (Golen and Rousseau 2018). 
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organizations do not compensate participants for undergoing the risk of athletic activity.  Finally, 
some may be concerned with the ethics and morals of allowing market forces to control an issue 
as sensitive as subjecting our youth to long-term brain injuries.  
 Although several lawsuits at the youth levels have been successful, tort liability presents 
serious difficulties when it comes to managing concussion risks.  Unlike the college and 
professional levels, youth players do not have to worry as much about causation because there is 
no level below them in which the defendant can claim the harm occurred.  However, plaintiffs 
would still meet the tough task of showing that the harm was caused because the defendant fell 
below the appropriate standard of care and was not caused by the everyday, lawful participation 
in football.  Another big issue at the youth levels when it comes to tort liability is the ability of 
the wrongdoer to pay.  The amount of money at the youth football levels pales in comparison to 
that of other levels.  Unlike the professional and collegiate level, most coaches and schools do 
not have deep pockets.  In addition, the issues of sovereign immunity and damages caps still 
exist at the youth levels when claims are brought against public schools.  Finally, many of the 
prior lawsuits at the youth level have resulted in confidential settlements.  These settlements 
eliminate the potential for society to gain useful information from the litigation process. 
 As with other levels of football, insurance related to concussions may be difficult to 
implement at the youth levels due to insurers unwillingness to provide such insurance policies.  
The ability of an insurance provider to gain knowledge as to the risks and potential harms at the 
youth levels is also more difficult than for other levels because of the sheer number of 
participants, the incredible diversity of participants, and the uncertainty that still surrounds how 
blows to the head affect young people.  In addition, even if insurance was available, many 
schools would be unable to afford to provide it for all of their athletes.  Alternatively, parents 
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could be required to purchase insurance for their children as a prerequisite for participation.  This 
presents a problem for those coming from low-income families who would not be able to afford 
such a policy.  As stated earlier, the majority of NFL players come from low-income families.  In 
addition, these are likely the same kids in which extracurricular activities are most beneficial.   
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter proposes improvements to risk and compensation schemes related to 
traumatic brain injuries, suggesting that the optimal system differs for each level of football.  
While I do not claim that these proposed schemes will completely solve the concussion issue, 
they should lead to levels of risk and compensation that are closer to the optimal level than 
currently exist.   This chapter is the first to examine how different policies should be 
implemented at the professional, college, and youth levels.  This chapter adds to policy literature 
that examines the various pros and cons of different policy tools for managing risk, while 
providing an express application of these tools to an interesting subject.  In addition, this chapter 
adds to the increasing literature in the area of sports-related concussions. 
This chapter argues that a mixture of tools is necessary to properly incentivize optimal 
levels of risk and compensation.  In doing so, this chapter illustrates the flaw of relying solely on 
one method for managing risks.  Rather than depending on one method, it is important to 
consider how the different risk-management systems can overlap and coordinate with each other 
to ensure that potential weaknesses of one system are addressed by another.  In addition, this 
chapter demonstrates that policymakers cannot rely on a one-size-fits-all approach for managing 
the risks of even a seemingly similar issue.  While the ultimate goal is the same at each level of 
football—incentivizing optimal levels of risk and compensation—the appropriate means by 
which to achieve this goal differs immensely at each level. 
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At the professional football level, I argue that market forces along with insurance in the 
form of self-insured workers’ compensation is the appropriate combination of risk management 
systems.  The market forces approach at the professional level relies heavily upon the NFLPA to 
ensure that asymmetric information does not once again become a problem.  Workers’ 
compensation should supplement the market-based approach to account for issues that may arise 
because of risk misperceptions and the salary cap.  At the college level, a mixture of federal 
regulation and health insurance is best, as college players have little market power and workers’ 
compensation is not a feasible option because of the issue of amateurism.  Finally, I argue that 
state-based regulation is the most appropriate tool for youth football.  However, changes should 
be made to the current system so that meaningful benefit-cost analysis can occur.  Research 
concerning the risks and harms associated with football continue to develop.  As more is learned, 
each level of football will need to adapt and revise their policies in wake of new scientific 
information.   
 This chapter focused on the sport of football.  However, the framework provided could 
prove useful for other sports like hockey and soccer, which have relatively high rates of 
concussion-related injuries.  While each sport will have its own unique set of issues, the four 
potential systems to manage risk and compensation are the same.  Future research could examine 
which mixture of systems would work best to incentivize optimal levels of risk and 
compensation in other sports. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Pros and Cons of Systems for Professional Football 
 
System Factors In Favor Factors Against 
Market 
Forces 
• Allows players to express their 
risk preferences 
• Union has bargaining power to 
influence policies 
• Players may suffer cognitive biases 
with regards to risk 
• Salary caps limit ex ante 
compensation 
Tort 
Liability 
 • Hard to prove injury is not a result 
of playing football in college or 
younger 
• Suits will become pre-empted by 
new Collective Bargaining 
Agreement 
Regulation 
 • Regulating entity is not in a better 
position to gather information than 
the league and union 
Insurance 
• Provides compensation that 
could be difficult to receive 
with market forces alone 
• Incentivizes league to reduce 
risks 
• Does not fully compensate for 
health-related injuries 
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Table 2: Pros and Cons of Systems for College Football 
 
System Factors In Favor Factors Against 
Market 
Forces 
 • Players are not allowed to unionize 
and have little bargaining power 
Tort 
Liability 
 • Proving causation is difficult 
• Public schools have sovereign 
immunity 
Regulation 
• Several market failures exist at 
this level 
• Information costs can be 
spread across parties 
 
Insurance 
• Would incentivize schools to 
reduce risks 
• Workers' compensation not 
feasible because of amateurism 
issue 
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Table 3: Pros and Cons of Systems for Youth Football 
 
System Factors In Favor Factors Against 
Market 
Forces 
 • Parents and athletes have imperfect 
information 
• Youth (and their parents) are poor 
at evaluating risks and are subject 
to peer pressure 
Tort 
Liability 
 • Proving causation is difficult 
• Public schools have sovereign 
immunity 
Regulation 
• Large and diverse number of 
participants 
• Information costs can be 
spread across parties 
• Current schemes have been 
criticized as ineffective 
Insurance 
 • Insurers are unwilling to 
underwrite 
• Schools cannot afford to self-
insure 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A–1: NFL Settlement – Maximum Awards of Qualifying Diagnoses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “NFL Concussion Settlement.” https://www.nflconcussionsettlement.com/Documents/Long-
form_Notice.pdf (last accessed January 2018).   
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Table A–2: NFL Settlement – Maximum Award Adjustments for Age at Diagnosis 
 
 
 
Source: “NFL Concussion Settlement.” https://www.nflconcussionsettlement.com/Documents/Long-
form_Notice.pdf (last accessed January 2018).  
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Table A–3: NFL Settlement – Award Reductions Based on NFL Experience 
 
 
 
Source: “NFL Concussion Settlement.” https://www.nflconcussionsettlement.com/Documents/Long-
form_Notice.pdf (last accessed January 2018). 
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CHAPTER 3:  WHEN TO WALK AWAY? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF HOW COMMITMENT AND 
PAYMENT SCHEMES INFLUENCE RISK AVERSION 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
What would make someone quit their dream job and walk away from nearly $2 million?  
For former San Francisco 49er’s linebacker Chris Borland, the answer is the risk of a blow to the 
head that could permanently affect his health.  Borland was only twenty-four-years-old and 
coming off a stellar rookie season when he decided to retire in 2015.  Borland was set to earn 
close to $2 million from the remainder of his rookie contract.  This is a great deal of money 
(even without considering the money he might have earned in future contracts), but according to 
Borland, “From what I’ve researched and what I’ve experienced, I don’t think it’s worth the risk.”  
While past players have retired citing health-related concerns, Borland’s retirement is proactive, 
rather than reactive.  Unlike some players who retire after being injured, Borland is in fine health.  
However, Borland does not think it is worth the risk to wait and take a chance.  According to 
Borland, “I’m concerned if you wait [until] you have symptoms, it’s too late.  There are a lot of 
unknowns.  I can’t claim that ‘X’ will happen.  I just want to live a long healthy life, and I don’t 
want to have any neurological diseases or die younger than I would otherwise.” (Florio 2015). 
 Borland is far from the only National Football League (NFL) player to have retired early 
citing an uneasiness with the potential risks related to concussions.  A.J. Tarpley, a linebacker for 
the Buffalo Bills, retired after just one year in the NFL because of concussions.   The twenty-
three-year-old explained, “I suffered the third and fourth concussions of my career this past 
season, and I am walking away from the game I love to preserve my future health.” (Wilson 
2016).  Former lineman for the Baltimore Ravens John Urschel retired at the age of twenty-six 
(Belson 2017), just days after the release of a Boston University study, which found chronic 
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traumatic encephalopathy (better known as CTE) to be present in 110 of the 111 brains of former 
NFL players examined (Mez et al. 2017; Ward et al. 2017).  These examples illustrate that NFL 
players are cognizant of the risks of playing their sport and that the potential of suffering 
traumatic brain injuries is something they contemplate when deciding whether or not to continue 
their athletic careers. 
 The incentivized experiment in this chapter simulates the type of decisions that NFL 
players and other athletes in contact sports must confront—whether to continue their career at the 
risk of suffering a concussion, or in extreme cases, irreparable brain damage.  Experiment 
participants are presented with a multi-stage “win or lose it all” risk structure in which they must 
decide how many rounds of a lottery they wish to play before walking away.  With each win, 
participants earn more money towards their bank.  Just one loss, however, results in the 
participant losing everything.  This type of structure is analogous to one of the fears that exist 
amongst NFL players—one blow to the head could result in major, irreversible effects.  As one 
former player stated, the “next hit to my head could possibly kill me or be life-damaging.”29  
   In addition to the unique risk structure, the experiment seeks to investigate how different 
levels of commitment and different payment structures affect risk preferences.  Regarding 
commitment, a professional athlete may enter into a long-term deal with a team in which he or 
she agrees to play for multiple years and feels obligated to fulfill such contract.  In other cases, 
an athlete may only have a short-term contract or no contract at all.  For example, a high school 
athlete may feel no sense of obligation to play any longer than his or her sport’s current season.  
In these instances, amateurs are able to re-evaluate their decisions regarding the risk of their 
sport before each season.  Benefits received by athletes may either remain flat or increase over 
                                                
29 Adrian Coxson stated this while announcing his retirement from football.  This announcement came 
approximately a month after Coxson had to be taken off the practice field in an ambulance (Block 2016; 
Demovsky 2015). 
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time.  For example, amateur athletes can be thought of as facing flat payment schemes.  In most 
cases, a college athlete’s scholarship remains the same over time.  A high school athlete is not 
compensated in the traditional sense, but does gain value from athletic participation (health 
benefits, social benefits of belonging and camaraderie, etc.) that one would expect to remain 
relatively flat over time.30  On the other hand, in professional sports (and elsewhere) earnings 
typically increase over time with additional experience and skill.  
I find that, in a majority of this experiment’s scenarios, nearly one-third of participants 
play more rounds than is optimal or predicted under the assumption of risk-neutrality.  Such 
results actually understate the degree to which individuals play too long, as most people are risk-
averse, not risk-neutral.  These findings are concerning when considering the behavior of athletes, 
especially professional football players, who must decide each year whether they wish to 
continue their career and risk a life-altering injury.  Professional football players may act 
similarly to the experiment’s participants—not taking into account the risk that recurs year-after-
year and playing longer than they might otherwise.  Experiment participants play more rounds 
when faced with an upfront commitment and increasing payment structure.  Such results provide 
guidance for policymakers that may be in a position to manipulate such factors in an effort to 
discourage risk-seeking behavior in which athletes might engage. 
For amateur athletes, information may be the most feasible tool for encouraging risk 
aversion.  This is because these athletes are not paid for their participation in the traditional sense, 
so changing how payment schemes are structured is not applicable.  For these athletes, risk 
                                                
30 It could be argued that another type of “payment” that might exist for some at the youth level is the 
increased likelihood of receiving a college athletic scholarship.  In this sense, the value of their 
participation may increase as the athlete nears the end of his or her high school career when scholarship 
decisions are being made.  However, the percentage of high school athletes that go on to earn athletic 
scholarships is small.  A similar argument could be made with respect to a college athlete’s hope of being 
drafted into a professional sports league. 
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information related to the potential dangers of concussions should be provided at a more frequent 
basis if more risk-averse behavior is desired.  For those high school or younger, youth 
concussion laws have already been adopted and can be used as a tool for ensuring such 
information is distributed.  At these levels, the information should not only be distributed to the 
athlete, but also to their parents.  In many instances, parents make the ultimate decisions as to 
whether a youth athlete will be allowed to participate in a sport.   At the college level, the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), athletic conferences, and individual schools 
can all play a role in supplying the relevant risk information to their athletes. 
At the professional level, the league itself and the players’ union—for football, this 
would be the NFL and the NFL Players Association (NFLPA)—would be the parties responsible 
for offering risk information to players at a more frequent rate.  Unlike the situation involving 
younger athletes, the structure of payments can be manipulated for professional athletes in order 
to encourage more risk-averse behavior.  This would require that the leagues and player unions 
strike a deal requiring that contracts include more guaranteed upfront compensation and a lesser 
degree of payment on the back-end, which would otherwise encourage individuals to play longer 
than they may otherwise desire. 
Section II describes the details of the experiment and the subject population.  Section III 
provides an overview of relevant literature and explains how the experiment in this chapter fits 
into, and contributes to, this literature.  Section IV explains the hypotheses that were developed 
given the prior literature, while Section V discusses the basic results of the experiment and the 
accuracy of such hypotheses.  Section VI discusses the implications of the results, suggesting 
how certain aspects of payment and commitment duration could be manipulated to affect 
decisions related to risk.  Section VII concludes, summarizing the results and their implications.  
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II. Experimental Design 
 
Participants took part in the experiment31 in a lab on the Vanderbilt University campus 
using Qualtrics, a web-based survey software.  Participants consisted of students at Vanderbilt 
University who were recruited on-campus through the use of flyers.  Interested students were 
able to reserve a time to come into the lab and take the experiment.  Walk-ins were also welcome.  
The only requirement for participation was being 18 years of age or older.  Participants 
completed the experiment using computers that were set up in the lab. 
The experiment consists of four games.  In each game, participants face a lottery of 
known probability.  Participants are asked to imagine a box consisting of a mixture of winning 
and losing balls.  For each of the games, participants must ultimately choose how many rounds 
they wish to play the lottery (up to a maximum of 10 rounds per session) before walking away.  
Choosing to play a round results in a ball being drawn from the box.  Drawing a winning ball 
adds money to the participant’s bank.  Drawing a losing ball ends the game for that session and 
results in all of the money in the participant’s bank for the current session being forfeited.  
Choosing to walk away results in the participant earning the amount in their bank for that session, 
but forfeiting any potential earnings from later rounds. 
To illustrate, consider the following example.  Assume the participant has played three 
rounds of the game, having drawn winning balls in each of the first three rounds.  The participant 
now must decide whether or not to play the fourth round or to walk away with the $3.25 in their 
bank.  If the fourth round is played and a winning ball is drawn, the participant’s bank will be 
$4.25, and they will face the same decision of whether to play or walk away in the fifth round.  If 
the fourth round is played and a losing ball is drawn, the participant loses the $3.25 and earns 
nothing for that session.  Figure 1 illustrates what a participant is shown in such a scenario.   
                                                
31 This experiment went through Vanderbilt University IRB approval (study #170174). 
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To help participants gain a better understanding of Game 1, participants play four 
practice sessions before moving to the real sessions of the game.  After completing the practice 
sessions, participants also have the option of being shown the instructions again before moving 
on to the real game.  Despite the practice sessions, one could be concerned that participants may 
be suspicious of the authenticity of the drawings.  To dispel any belief of the games being fixed, 
it is explained to participants that a random number generator from an external website (linked to 
the probabilities in the experiment) is being used to determine whether a winning or losing ball is 
drawn.  
In Game 1, the winnings per round remain flat.  Participants start the game with $0.25 in 
their bank and have the opportunity to win an additional $1 in each round by drawing a winning 
ball.  In all of the games, four different lotteries are used—60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% chance of 
drawing a winning ball.  In the first game, participants play five sessions of each lottery for a 
total of 20 observations per person.  The order in which they play each lottery is determined at 
random. 
 Game 2 operates the same as Game 1, except with regards to the payment scheme.  
Instead of $1 being added to the participant’s bank each round (“flat payment scheme”), the 
amount added to the participant’s bank increases in each round (“increasing payment scheme”).  
In each round, the potential amount to be added to one’s bank increases by $0.25.  A winning 
draw in Round 1 adds $1.00 to the participant’s bank.  A winning draw in Round 2 adds an 
additional $1.25 to the participant’s bank.  A winning draw in Round 3 adds an additional $1.50 
to the participant’s bank, and so on and so forth.  As with the first game, participants play four 
practice sessions before moving to the real game, in which they play five sessions of each of the 
four lotteries.  Table 1 illustrates the two payment schemes that are used in the experiment.  Not 
  112 
only is the trajectory of payments different between the schemes, but the amount of money in the 
participant’s bank in each round also differs between the two schemes. 
 In Game 3 and Game 4, participants face the same lotteries and payment schemes as in 
Game 1 and Game 2, respectively.  Recall that in Games 1 and 2 decisions of whether to play or 
walk away are made step-by-step at each round (“No Commitment” decision).  That is, 
participants are able to evaluate whether they wish to play or walk away after each round.  For 
Games 3 and 4, participants are forced to decide upfront (“Upfront Commitment” decision) how 
many rounds they wish to play (0–10) before walking away. To refresh their memory, 
participants are shown a table of the applicable payment scheme for the game, showing the 
payoff associated with winning that corresponding round (i.e., the first two columns of each of 
the tables in Table 1).  Participants are also reminded that should they lose any round that is 
played, their entire bank for that session will be lost.  For Games 3 and 4, participants play each 
lottery only once for a total of four observations per participant for each game.  The structure of 
each of the games is shown in Table 2. 
In addition to an $8 show-up fee, participants earn additional money based upon the 
results of the games.  For each of the four games, one result was chosen at random to be added to 
the participant’s total winnings.  The stakes at hand were large, both in comparison to the pay for 
other experiments on campus and to work-study opportunities, a fact that led to confidence that 
participants took the games seriously.  Participants also receive a small payment based on the 
results of a Holt-Laury lottery choice game taken near the end of the survey.32  All payments 
were made in cash after the participant had concluded the experiment.  The average payment 
                                                
32 The lottery choice game referred to is drawn from Holt and Laury’s 2002 paper titled, “Risk Aversion 
and Incentive Effects.”  In their experiment, they asked participants to make ten choices between paired 
lotteries.  They were then able to calculate the range of the participant’s relative risk aversion based upon 
the number of “safe” and “risky” choices made. 
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made to participants was $18.89.  On average participants took approximately 18 minutes to 
complete the experiment. 
 
III. Relevant Literature 
My experiment is one of many that explore how individuals make decisions in the face of 
risk.  In the backdrop of all of the four games is risk aversion.  Risk aversion describes the 
behavior by which an individual prefers a lower-risk investment of lower return to a higher-risk 
investment of higher return.   Risk aversion has been well studied and shown to be exhibited in a 
wide variety of environments.  Risk aversion is a matter of degree, with different individuals 
having different risk premiums—the minimum amount of money by which the expected return 
on a risky option must exceed the known return on a risk-free option in order to induce the 
individual to choose the risky option as opposed to the risk-free option.  The more risk-averse the 
person, the greater his or her risk premium.  A risk-neutral individual would have a risk premium 
equal to zero, whereas a risk-seeking individual would actually have a negative risk premium on 
any lottery.   
For purposes of my experiment, choosing to play another round is the risky option and 
choosing to walk away is the risk-free option.  A risk-neutral individual is indifferent between 
playing another round or walking away when the expected value of playing is equal to his or her 
current bank, but will walk away once the expected value of playing becomes less than his or her 
current bank.  A risk-averse individual will walk away even when the expected value of playing 
another round exceeds the payment guaranteed from walking away.  The more risk-averse the 
individual, the fewer rounds he or she will choose to play.  The exact opposite holds for an 
individual that is risk seeking.  The more risk-seeking the individual, the more rounds he or she 
will play.  
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Like many experiments, mine seeks to examine how individuals deviate from what would 
be considered “optimal” behavior for an individual under the expected utility theory. Under the 
expected utility theory, individuals look solely at the expected utility of outcomes and are 
indifferent to their reference point, not caring how outcomes of gains and losses are framed. 
Kahneman and Tversky were one of the first to demonstrate that in several instances, individuals’ 
preferences systematically deviate from the expected utility theory.  In Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), a seminal paper in behavioral economics, the authors established prospect theory.  Rather 
than making decisions based solely on the expected utility of absolute outcomes, prospect theory 
asserts that individuals think in terms of expected utility relative to a reference point.  One 
central claim of prospect theory is that individuals are risk-averse in gains and risk seeking in 
losses.  The theory also suggests that individuals make risk decisions using certain heuristics and 
biases.  Among these biases are the “certainty effect” and “loss aversion.” 
In Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the authors presented a series of hypothetical choice 
problems to students and university faculty.  They found that individuals exhibited a significant 
degree of preference reversal when one of the outcomes was considered certain, rather than 
probable.  One explanation for such behavior is what the authors called the “certainty effect,” 
whereby people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes 
that are obtained with certainty.  Such effect, the authors explain, contributes to risk aversion in 
choices involving sure gains.  The authors found this certainty effect present for both monetary 
and non-monetary outcomes.  In my experiment, the walk away option presents an outcome that 
can be obtained with certainty.  Participants choosing to walk away are guaranteed to leave the 
session with the money currently in their bank.  Thus, it might be expected that participants will 
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underweight the play option, as the outcome is merely probable, as compared to the walk away 
option, in which the outcome can be obtained with certainty.  
Loss aversion, first demonstrated by Kahneman and Tversky (1984), refers to an 
individual’s tendency to prefer avoiding a loss to acquiring a gain of equivalent value.  In other 
words, “losses loom larger than gains”—a loss of $X is more undesirable than a gain of $X is 
desirable.  Framing is a fundamental element of loss aversion, as possible outcomes can be 
framed as gains or losses according to different reference points.  In their 1984 paper, the authors 
asked two groups to choose between a pair of lotteries.  Figure 2 shows the structure of the 
lotteries used in their experiment.  The pair of lotteries each of the groups faced was identical in 
expected value; however, the way in which the lotteries were framed was different.  The authors 
presented the lotteries to the first group of individuals in the form of a two-stage game in which 
there was a chance of the game ending in the first round.  Participants were asked which option 
they would prefer if they reached the second round.  One of the options was a sure gain, while 
the other involved a risky, but larger gain.  The authors presented the second group of individuals 
a pair of lotteries in the form of a one-stage game.  In the one-stage game scenario, there was no 
sure payout, but the expected values of each option equaled those shown to the first group of 
individuals.  The authors found that when framed as a two-stage game, more people chose the 
guaranteed gain.  When framed as a one-stage game, more people chose the exact opposite—the 
higher risk, higher gain option.  The authors argued that in the two-stage game, individuals 
ignore the first stage, weighting one option as certain, even though it is not.  Similarly, 
participants in my experiment may act differently when the game is framed as round-by-round 
decisions (Games 1 and 2) as compared to when the game is framed as one long-term, upfront 
decision (Games 3 and 4).  
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Another potential bias related to my experiment is the “endowment effect.”  Thaler 
(1980) coined the term “endowment effect” to describe the reluctance of people to part from 
assets that belong to their endowment.  The endowment effect was most famously demonstrated 
by an experiment conducted by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) using coffee mugs.  The 
authors found that randomly assigned owners of a coffee mug required significantly more money 
to sell the mug than randomly assigned buyers were willing to pay for the mug. The endowment 
effect can arguably be explained by reference-dependence and loss aversion.  Individuals first 
evaluate a potential change by categorizing such change as either a gain or a loss from their 
current reference point.  Once a person feels as if they own an item and establishes this as their 
reference point, foregoing the item feels like a loss.  In my experiment, individuals may view the 
money in their bank as part of their endowment.  Thus, for Games 1 and 2, participants may use 
their current bank as a reference point.  For games 3 and 4, the participants are forced to commit 
to their decisions upfront, making it impossible for them to use their bank as a reference point.  
Thus, the endowment effect may influence decisions made during Games 1 and 2, but should not 
have any influence on decisions for Games 3 and 4.  
Thaler et al. (1997) conducted an experiment designed to test the effect of myopia and 
loss aversion on risk taking, leading to a term they called “myopic loss aversion.”  The authors 
defined myopic loss aversion as “the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains 
and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently.”  The authors explained that those exhibiting 
myopic loss aversion are “more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their investments less 
often.”  To test for myopic loss aversion, the authors conducted an experiment, which simulated 
investment decisions over hypothetical funds.  One group of subjects was provided with frequent 
feedback, while the other group was not.  The authors concluded that the frequent feedback led 
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to mental accounting and a “narrow framing” that induced subjects to display severe risk 
aversion.33  Their experiment parallels mine in that for Games 1 and 2, individuals receive 
feedback after each round and must constantly decide whether to play or walk away in each 
round.  Whereas, for Games 3 and 4, there is no feedback at all and participants must commit to 
their decision for all rounds at the start of the game.  
Figner et al. (2009) explored how risk decisions differ when “hot” affective processes are 
prominent as compared to when “cold” deliberative processes govern.  The authors conducted an 
experiment where participants of different age groups played a game called the “Columbia Card 
Task.”  In this game, subjects made decisions as to how many cards to turn over, knowing the 
total number of winning and losing cards, the penalty for a losing card, and the reward for a 
winning card.  In the “hot” version of the game, participants turned cards over sequentially and 
received immediate feedback.  In the “cold” version, participants made a single-time decision 
and did not receive feedback until all the game rounds had been played.  The authors found that 
more cards were chosen in the “hot” version of the game.  An analogy can be drawn between the 
“hot” and “cold” versions of the Columbia Card Task and the No Commitment and Upfront 
Commitment versions in my experiment.  For Games 1 and 2 in my experiment, participants 
receive immediate feedback and make decisions as to whether to play or walk away in a 
sequential matter.  For Games 3 and 4 in my experiment, participants must commit to a decision 
at a single-time (the start of the game) and do not receive feedback for each round.  The biggest 
difference between the card task and my experiment is that participants risk the entirety of their 
reward in my experiment.  If an individual draws a losing ball in my experiment, they forfeit all 
                                                
33 An experiment conducted by Brookins et al. (2016) also showed that more frequent feedback tends to 
lead to less risk-taking. 
  118 
of their gains, whereas drawing a losing card in the Columbia Card Task resulted only in a partial 
reduction to that individual’s winnings.  
The experiment in this chapter adds to the experimental economics literature that 
examines risk aversion and how framing can impact decisions regarding risks.  In this 
experiment, the framing of two elements—payment schemes and commitment—are the focus of 
examination.  Payments are framed as either constant over time or increasing over time.  The 
decision-making process is also framed differently, with decisions being made on a round-by-
round basis in one scenario and with multi-round decisions being committed to upfront in the 
first round.  This experiment also advances the literature in this area by presenting a unique 
structure.  To my knowledge, this is the first experiment that involves a multi-stage game in 
which participants are placed in a “win or lose it all” scenario.  This experiment’s multi-stage 
format consisting of ten potential rounds is also distinctive.  Most other multi-stage experiments, 
like Kahneman and Tversky (1984), only consist of two rounds. 
 
IV. Hypotheses 
Through straightforward calculations, participants can evaluate the expected value of 
choosing to play another round and compare this to their current bank (i.e., the expected value of 
choosing to walk away).  To calculate the expected value of choosing to play a round, one need 
only multiply their chance of survival from playing (either 60%, 70%, 80%, or 90% depending 
on the lottery) by the value of what their bank would be in the next round.  Tables A–1 and A–2 
show the calculations for each round under each probability and payment scheme scenario.  
Given these calculations and the prior literature, I formed the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1:  The higher the probability of winning, the more rounds 
participants will play. 
 
Rounds Played 60% < Rounds Played 70% 
Rounds Played 70% < Rounds Played 80% 
Rounds Played 80% < Rounds Played 90% 
 
The higher an individual’s chance of drawing a winning ball, the more desirable it is to 
play rather than walk away.  Therefore, one would expect that for each game individuals would 
play more rounds when the chance of winning is higher.  This hypothesis can be tested for each 
game separately—avoiding the possibility of conflating the effect of the win percentage element 
with other factors, such as loss aversion or endowment, which may impact certain games 
differently. 
Hypothesis 2:  Risk-averse participants will play fewer rounds. 
 
 Rounds Played Holt-Laury Risk-Averse < Rounds Played Holt-Laury Risk-Neutral/Seeking 
        Rounds Played Non-Smokers < Rounds Played Smokers 
  Rounds Played Females < Rounds Played Males 
 
 The Holt-Laury lottery game included near the end of the experiment is a trusted and 
often-used device for measuring one’s relative degree of risk aversion.  Those displaying risk-
averse behavior in the Holt-Laury lottery game would be expected to also exhibit such behavior 
during the rest of the experiment.  This would translate into fewer rounds being played for those 
evaluated as risk-seeking under the Holt-Laury lottery game.  The experiment also asks 
participants about their smoking behavior.  Smokers are thought to have more tolerance for risk 
than the rest of the population.34  Therefore, we would expect smokers to play more rounds, and 
thus take on more risk, than non-smokers.  Studies have shown that, on average, females tend to 
                                                
34 For example, Hersch and Viscusi (1998) show that smokers are more risk-taking than their non-
smoking counterparts in a variety of domains, such as seatbelt use and job choice.  Viscusi and Hersch 
(2001) also show that smokers exhibit more risk-taking behavior when it comes to job safety.   
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be more risk-averse than males.35  Therefore, we would expect that females would play fewer 
rounds than males. 
Hypothesis 3:  Participants will play more rounds under the Upfront Commitment 
method than under the No Commitment method. 
 
Rounds Played Game 1 < Rounds Played Game 3 
Rounds Played Game 2 < Rounds Played Game 4 
 
 From an expected value perspective, no difference exists between the No Commitment 
and the Upfront Commitment methods.36  Nonetheless, previous literature has indicated that the 
risk preferences of individuals may differ due to the timing of these decisions.  Several papers 
have indicated that evaluating outcomes frequently leads to less risk taking.  Participants are able 
to evaluate potential outcomes after each round under the No Commitment method, whereas 
participants can only evaluate potential outcomes once at the beginning of the game under the 
Upfront Commitment method.  Therefore, it is expected that participants will exhibit higher 
degrees of risk aversion for Game 1 (Flat Payment, No Commitment) and Game 2 (Increasing 
Payment, No Commitment) than for Game 3 (Flat Payment, Upfront Commitment) and Game 4 
(Increasing Payment, No Commitment), respectively. 
Hypothesis 4:  It is unclear whether participants will play a more, less, or an equal 
number of rounds under the flat payment schemed as compared to under the 
increasing payment scheme. 
 
Rounds Played Game 1 ? Rounds Played Game 2 
Rounds Played Game 3 ? Rounds Played Game 4 
 
 Hypothesis 4 seeks to test how different payment schemes impact individuals’ decisions 
with regards to risk.  The effect of the payment schemes is theoretically ambiguous, as there are 
                                                
35 Byrnes et al. (1999) conducted a meta-analysis of 150 studies.  The authors discovered that a majority 
of the studies (about 60%) found males to take more risks than females.  
36  It is worth noting that the expected value computation is more straightforward under the No 
Commitment method because participants must only do one calculation in each round.  The Upfront 
Commitment method, on the other hand, requires participants to calculate compound probabilities in 
order to determine the chance of drawing a winning ball for multiple rounds in a row. 
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several conflating factors at play.  On the one hand, the payments are on a higher trajectory 
under the increasing payment scheme than under the flat payment scheme.  This leads to greater 
rewards under the increasing payment scheme, especially in the later rounds.  This should 
incentivize individuals to play more rounds under the increasing payment scheme.  On the other 
hand, the amount of money in one’s bank is also higher in each round under the increasing 
payment scheme.  With more to lose, loss aversion and the endowment effect is stronger under 
the increasing payment scheme, making the walk away option desirable.  It is not clear which of 
the effects will dominate. 
 
V. Results and Analysis 
 
A. Basic Findings 
 
Table 3 shows the number of rounds that would be played under the expected utility 
theory in which an individual is risk-neutral and makes decisions strictly based on what 
maximizes the expected value of the outcomes over the entire game.  If the expected value of 
playing is more than the money currently in the individual’s bank, the expected utility theory 
suggests that an individual should choose to play.  If instead their bank is greater, the participant 
should walk away.  For convenience, such risk-neutral strategy is herein referred to as choosing 
the “optimal” number of rounds to play.   
Table 4 shows the average number of rounds played for each of the scenarios in the 
experiment.  Column (1) shows the average number of rounds played by those who “survived,” 
while Column (2) presents the average number of rounds played by those who eventually 
“died.”37  These observations consist of individuals that drew a losing ball at some point.  So, if 
                                                
37 “Survived” means that the participant never drew a losing ball.  The participant either walked away 
before drawing a losing ball or happened to play and draw a winning ball in all 10 rounds.  If an 
individual chose to walk away in Round 4, that individual is considered to have played 3 rounds for that 
  122 
an individual drew a losing ball after choosing to play in Round 4, that individual is considered 
to have played 4 rounds.  Column (3) combines the results of Column (1) and Column (2) and 
includes observations regardless of whether a person eventually drew a losing ball or not.  Unlike 
the first two columns, Column (3) also includes the number of rounds participants choose to play 
for Games 3 and 4 under the Upfront Commitment decision method.  Table A–3 in the Appendix 
provides a more detailed look at the number of individuals choosing to play or to walk away in 
each round for Games 1 and 2. Figures A–1, A–2, A–3, and A–4 in the Appendix show the 
distribution of rounds chosen to play for each of the games.  
Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 show the number of rounds participants played on average 
compared to the number of rounds that would be played under the optimal strategy that assumes 
risk neutrality.  For Games 1 and 2 (No Commitment), individuals play fewer rounds than 
optimal on average.  The behavioral economics literature presents several possible explanations 
for such behavior.  Previous literature has shown that individuals do not make decisions based 
solely on an outcome’s expected value.  The certainty effect suggests that participants will give 
relatively too much weight to the walk away option, as it involves a guaranteed gain.  In Games 
1 and 2 (No Commitment), participants are faced with the walk away option in each round and 
may accord it too much weight.  In addition, individuals will watch their banks grow and 
consider this to be part of their endowment.  The endowment effect and loss aversion suggest 
that this will incentivize participants to walk away earlier and avoid the possibility of losing all 
the money in their bank.  Thus, the fact that individuals played fewer rounds than the risk-neutral, 
optimal number is in line with the literature. 
                                                                                                                                                       
observation.  “Died” means the participant drew a losing ball at some point during the session.  If an 
individual drew a losing ball after choosing to play in Round 4, that individual is considered to have 
played 4 rounds.   
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For Game 3 (Flat Payment, Upfront Commitment), participants actually play more 
rounds than optimal for the 60%, 70%, and 80% lotteries and fewer rounds than optimal for the 
90% lottery.  This is surprising because, other than for the 90% lottery, these outcomes indicate 
risk-seeking behavior and differ greatly from the results of Game 1 (Flat Payment, No 
Commitment).  One explanation is that participants are not subject to the same biases as in Game 
1 because, under the Upfront Commitment method, participants are only faced with the sure 
option once and cannot assess their endowment because the results of each round are not shown.  
In Game 4 (Increasing Payment, Upfront Commitment), there is not a statistically significant 
difference between the rounds played by participants and the optimal number of rounds for the 
60% lottery.  However, participants play fewer rounds than optimal for the other lotteries.38  
B. Evaluating the Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1:  The higher the probability of winning, the more rounds 
participants will play. 
 
 Result:  True. 
 
An increased probability of winning raises the relative attractiveness of playing.  As 
predicted, participants choose to play more rounds when the probability of drawing a winning 
ball is higher.  As demonstrated in Table 4 and most of the figures, participants play more rounds 
in the 70% probability sessions than in the 60% probability sessions, more rounds in the 80% 
than in the 70%, and more rounds in the 90% than in the 80%.  This holds true across all four 
games.  These differences are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, as shown in 
Table A–4.39  These probabilities were also included as dummy variables in the regressions 
                                                
38 For the 70% lottery, the difference is significant at the 90% confidence level.  For the 80% and 90% 
lotteries, the difference is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
39 Paired t-tests were used to test a majority of the hypotheses due to the fact that the results being tested 
involved responses from the same group of individuals.  However, standard t-tests were used in tests, 
such as Hypothesis 3, in which two independent groups of individuals were being examined. 
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shown in Tables 5 and 6.  Each of the probability variables is significant for all the specifications, 
indicating that as the probability of drawing a winning ball increases, the number of rounds 
participants choose to play also increases.   
Hypothesis 2:  Risk-averse participants will play fewer rounds. 
 
 Result:  Mixed Results. 
 
 Risk aversion makes any lottery less attractive than a sure gain of equal expected value.  
Here, the play option is the lottery and the walk away option is the sure gain.  It appears that, for 
the most part, those identified as risk-averse according to the Holt-Laury lottery choice game 
play fewer rounds than other participants.  This result is significant at the 90% confidence level 
for Games 1 and 2 (No Commitment) and at the 95% confidence level for Game 4 (Increasing 
Payment, Upfront Commitment).  Only in Game 3 (Flat Payment, Upfront Commitment), is the 
difference between the two groups not statistically significant.  Smokers appear to play more 
rounds than non-smokers, which supports the hypothesis.40  Surprisingly, males seem to play 
fewer rounds than females.  This was unexpected and runs counter to the hypothesis, as females 
are thought to be more risk-averse than males. 
Hypothesis 3:  Participants will play more rounds under the Upfront Commitment 
method than under the No Commitment method. 
 
 Result:  True. 
 
 Thaler et al. (1997) showed that individuals are more risk-averse when given the 
opportunity to frequently evaluate outcomes, such as under the No Commitment method.  As 
demonstrated in Figures 5 and 6, participants play significantly more rounds under the Upfront 
Commitment decision scenario than under the No Commitment decision scenario.  This result 
                                                
40 In the regressions, the results for smokers are statistically significant across most specifications, with 
the exception being when the standard errors are clustered for Games 1 and 2.  In the t-tests, the 
comparisons were statistically significant at the 90% confidence level for Game 1 and at the 95% 
confidence level for all the other games. 
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was consistent across all lottery probabilities.  The results were significant at the 95% confidence 
level for both the flat payment scheme and the increasing payment scheme.  
Hypothesis 4:  It is unclear whether participants will play more, less, or an equal 
number of rounds under the flat payment scheme as compared to under the 
increasing payment scheme. 
 
Result:  Participants played more rounds under the flat payment scheme than 
under the increasing payment scheme. 
 
 As stated previously, it is theoretically ambiguous as to how the different payment 
schemes should impact individuals’ decisions.  The increasing payment scheme variables in the 
regressions under each commitment type (Tables 5 and 6) indicate that individuals play fewer 
rounds under the increasing payment scheme than under the flat payment scheme.  This result is 
significant at the 99% confidence level for all specifications.  The t-tests point to similar 
conclusions.  These results suggest that loss aversion and endowment effects dominate and offset 
the appeal of higher trajectory winnings. 
 
VI. Discussion 
 
 A.  Major Takeaways 
On average, individuals appear to be risk-averse when faced with the type of lottery 
structure present in this experiment.  The results also indicate that risk preferences are 
sensitive—both to how payments are structured and to how often individuals are allowed to re-
evaluate decisions (i.e., the level of required commitment).  On average, individuals tend to be 
more risk-averse under an increasing payment structure with greater endowment and when 
forced to sequentially make decisions regarding risk.  In fact, the only time in which the average 
number of rounds played suggests risk-seeking behavior is under Game 3, in which subjects 
make an upfront commitment and face a flat payment scheme.   
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These findings suggest that loss aversion is a heavy influence on an individual’s 
decisions regarding risks.  Even when the expected values indicate that participants should be 
playing more rounds under the increasing payment scheme, they choose to walk away earlier.  
While payments are on a higher trajectory under the increasing payment scheme, the amount of 
money in one’s bank is also higher in each round under the increasing payment scheme than 
under the flat payments scheme.  With more to lose, loss aversion and the endowment effect may 
influence an individuals’ decisions and have them walk away earlier.  Under the No 
Commitment method, individuals are given information about their bank in each round.  
Therefore, participants are shown what they might lose and may feel a level of dread about 
losing this money that they would not feel under the Upfront Commitment scenario where they 
are not informed of their results round-by-round.   
Until now, the results have been discussed in terms of mean rounds chosen to play.  Yet, 
it is important to know what portion individuals are exhibiting risk-averse or risk-seeking 
behavior.  The results in this experiment can be analyzed by looking at the proportion of 
individuals who either choose to play “too many” or “too few” rounds.  The terms “too many” 
and “too few” are used not in the normative sense, but instead refer to whether a participant plays 
more or less rounds, respectively, than the expected value maximizing strategy.  For instance, a 
participant walking away after playing three or more rounds in Game 1 for the 60% probability 
would be considered to have played too many.  If the participant in this scenario had walked 
away without playing at all or only playing one round, he or she would be considered to have 
played too few. 
 Table 7 presents a breakdown of the proportion of participants that play too few, too 
many, or the optimal number of rounds for each of the games and for each probability.  Figures 
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11–14 show pie charts of the information contained in Table 7.  These tables and figures tell a 
similar story as the results focusing on averages.  In almost all cases, the majority of individuals 
play too few rounds.  In no situation does the percentage of participants playing the optimal 
number of rounds reach more than 36%.  However, what is most striking about these results is 
that a significant portion of individuals play too many rounds—indicating risk-seeking behavior 
and something that may not have been predicted when looking solely at the averages.  Under the 
flat payment scheme, close to one-third of individuals play too many rounds when the chance to 
win is 60%, 70%, or 80%.  These results are surprising, as we tend to believe that most 
individuals are risk-averse.  In fact, the Holt-Laury task indicated that 77.5% of the individuals in 
this experiment were risk-averse, 13.5% were risk-neutral, and only 9.0% were risk seeking.  Yet, 
a much larger percentage played too many rounds.  This may indicate that individuals are 
making mistakes when it comes to their decisions, and that the type of risk structure presented in 
this experiment causes them to take on more risk than they may otherwise desire. 
 B.  Application to Concussions in Athletics 
 The results from this experiment can be of value to those wishing to influence how 
individuals make decisions with respect to risk.  In some settings, it may be desirable to 
discourage risk-averse behavior.  On the other hand, risk-seeking behavior may be more of a 
concern.  One such area in which this may be the case is in the context of athletics and the risk of 
traumatic brain injury.  Society would likely be more concerned if individuals are exhibiting 
risk-seeking behavior in the context of traumatic brain injuries than if they are exhibiting risk-
averse behavior. 
At the youth and college levels, not much can be done regarding the type of payment 
scheme athletes face.  These amateur athletes can be thought of as facing flat payment schemes.  
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For most at the youth level, the “payment” received is the enjoyment athletes receive from 
playing their sport and the friendships that accompany being part of a team.  Currently, the 
NCAA forbids athletes from receiving compensation outside of scholarships, of which only a 
small fraction of athletes receive.41  To analogize to the experiment, this would be as if 
participants had very little in their bank for the first few rounds, with larger payments being 
made in later rounds.  Under this context, loss aversion would not have a significant effect, as 
there is not much at stake to lose.  Athletes who may otherwise choose to walk away due to 
concerns of sustaining a traumatic brain injury may instead decide to continue playing in hopes 
of obtaining a big payday later as a professional. 
The frequency at which youth and college athletes receive information about risk and the 
extent of commitment required from these athletes are perhaps easier aspects to influence for 
policymakers.  For instance, framing the risk of injury over a more narrow timeframe (like the 
No Commitment method) will lead to more risk-averse behavior than if framed over a longer 
period of time (like the Upfront Commitment method).  This can be done by framing the risks of 
injury as the chance of something occurring in one particular season rather than as something 
that may happen over the entirety of a career.   
At the youth level, state youth concussion laws can be used as a tool to deliver this type 
of information to athletes and parents.  Every state and the District of Columbia currently have 
some sort of legislation dedicated to the youth concussion issue that cover middle school and 
high school athletes.  Therefore, the state-level regulators should insure that information is given 
to athletes and parents on a frequent basis.  For example, states could require that athletes pass 
some sort of concussion education that explains the associated risks as a prerequisite to 
                                                
41  Only six sports (football, men’s and women’s basketball, women’s gymnastics, volleyball, and 
women’s tennis) offer full-ride scholarships.  A handful of other sports offer partial scholarships 
(O’Shaughnessy 2012). 
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participation.  State regulators could also require that athletes and their parents be provided with 
updated risk information before the beginning of every sports season.42  At the youth level, it 
may be more important that parents, rather than the athletes themselves, receive this information.  
This is because parents have substantial control over whether or not their child participates in a 
sport.  In some cases, parents or guardians must sign permissions slips allowing their children to 
participate.  Participation in athletics at the youth level may also include things such as 
registrations, purchasing equipment, transportation to practices and games—all of which can be 
heavily dependent on the actions of parents or guardians.  For those youth outside the scope of 
these state laws (i.e., children below middle school age), the sports organizations in which these 
children participate—like Pop Warner Football—should provide risk information on a frequent 
basis.  At the college level, the NCAA, athletic conferences, or individual schools could all 
require that information be provided to college athletes in the same manner as described above 
for youth athletes.43  
Future concussion research may create other opportunities for providing a more frequent 
and salient type of information for athletes.  Research is currently underway that could make it 
possible to diagnosis CTE in living individuals (Barrio et al. 2015; Clark 2017).  Previously, it 
was only possible to diagnose CTE post-mortem through an autopsy.  The ability to diagnose 
CTE while an individual is alive would provide the opportunity for policymakers to provide 
recurring feedback to athletes as to the existence of CTE.  Athletes and their parents would also 
then be able to re-assess their decision as to whether to continue playing after each test. 
                                                
42 There are still nine jurisdictions that do not require that an information sheet regarding traumatic brain 
injuries be distributed to student-athletes or their guardians at least annually (Harvey 2017). 
43 Although the NCAA has mandated its member institutions to educate their athletes with regards to the 
signs and symptoms of concussions since April 2010, this educational requirement does not extend to the 
risks or long-term consequences of concussions (2014-15 NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook).  
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Researchers have also made progress in identifying potential biomarkers for CTE (Cherry 
et al. 2017).  This ability could allow individuals to test their susceptibility to the disease and 
would be another way in which institutions could provide more pertinent risk feedback.  This 
work, however, is still in its infancy and it is yet to be determined if, or when, a reliable method 
for determining individual susceptibility to CTE will become a reality.  One type of biomarker 
testing has already been put in place at the college level.  In 2010, the NCAA implemented a 
mandatory screening program for sickle cell anemia, requiring that all Division I student-athletes 
be tested for the sickle cell trait.  This policy was developed in response to a legal settlement 
with the family of a Rice University football player who died after overexertion during a football 
practice (Tarini, Brooks, and Bundy 2012).  The testing is meant to identify those with the sickle 
cell trait, which may make them more susceptible to complications due to overexertion, so that 
those players may be properly supervised.  One can imagine a similar system being put in place 
for CTE.  This would allow for more frequent and individualized feedback regarding the risks of 
the disease, which may lead to more risk-averse behavior. 
A greater percentage of individuals play too many rounds under the Upfront Commitment 
method as compared to under the No Commitment method.  Such risk-seeking behavior can be 
dissuaded by avoiding situations in which athletes must commit to play for a certain length of 
time.  College athletes on scholarship may feel an obligation to play all four years regardless of 
their injury history and risk of future injury.  This feeling of obligation and commitment is 
exacerbated by the fact that, in many cases, schools are not legally required to cover an athlete’s 
medical cost if no longer on scholarship.  If a college athlete suffers an injury and is not healthy 
enough to play, they could lose their scholarship at the end of the academic year and end up 
having to pay out-of-pocket for medical treatment.  Certain major conferences have already 
  131 
addressed this issue by requiring member institutions to pay for medical expenses incurred from 
athletic injuries for a certain period after a student leaves or graduates.44  Similarly, the state of 
California passed a bill45 in 2012 requiring certain universities to pay for the cost of ongoing 
medical treatment for at least two years after a student has graduated or left the university (Dodd 
2012).  Policies like these need to be the norm rather than the exception.  Athletes should never 
have to choose between the benefits of their athletic scholarship and their health.  Therefore, the 
NCAA should require schools to guarantee their athletic scholarships for four years and pay for 
medical expenses related to athletic injuries during those four years and possibly beyond. 
 Unlike in the case of amateur athletics, much can be done in terms of how payments are 
structured for professional athletes.  The results of the experiment suggest that long-term 
contracts would lead to more risk-seeking behavior than year-to-year or other short-term 
contracts.  One possible solution is to simply place a cap on the length of player contracts.  While 
requiring these types of contracts could reduce risk-seeking behavior, forbidding long-term 
contracts might be quite an unpopular decision for both players and teams, who value continuity 
and certainty.  Another possibility is restructuring the nature of player compensation.   
The professional sports league with the biggest potential for improvement is the NFL.  
Contracts in the NFL are notoriously bad compared to other sports’ leagues in terms of providing 
guaranteed benefits.46  According to the NFLPA, guaranteed compensation comprised less than 
60% of all payments to players in the 2016 season (Martel and Stapleton 2017).  If NFL 
                                                
44 In 2014, the Big Ten Conference announced it would guarantee all athletic scholarships and provide 
improved, consistent medical insurance for its student-athletes (Big Ten Conference 2014).  The Pac-12 
Conference quickly followed suit, announcing that medical expenses for student-athletes injured during 
their college athletic careers would be covered for up to four years after leaving the institution (Pac-12 
Conference 2014). 
45 SB-1525 Postsecondary education: Student Athlete Bill of Rights (Cal. 2012). 
46 The structure of contracts in the MLB, NBA, and NHL are such that they are either fully guaranteed or 
may be bought out for a certain percentage (Therber 2016). 
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contracts were structured such that a larger share of the player’s salary came in the form of a 
signing bonus (or other guaranteed money), players would have less of an incentive to risk their 
health.  When a team releases a player before the expiration of his contract, the player only 
receives his remaining guaranteed money.  Due to this structure, players may feel pressure to 
hide their concussions out of fear of being cut and losing a large portion of their compensation.   
Larger signing bonuses also create a sort of endowment effect, which leads to more risk aversion.  
These issues would have to be addressed through negotiations between the NFL and 
NFLPA and would certainly be extremely contentious.  The next opportunity for such 
negotiations will be in 2020 when the next collective bargaining agreement is set to occur.  
When the time comes, the NFLPA should fight for guaranteed contracts and demand more 
compensation to occur at the front end of multi-year contracts.  Of course, these arguments all 
assume a goal of having the players exhibit less risk-seeking behavior when it comes to their 
health.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented an experiment with a unique structure.  It is the only experiment to 
my knowledge that involves a multi-stage game in which participants are placed in a “win or lose 
it all” scenario.  This type of scenario mirrors that faced by athletes, who must decide whether to 
prolong their careers or walk away from their sport.  Continuing one’s athletic career appeals to 
one’s desire for further financial and social rewards.  However, it is also comes with the risk of 
sustaining a lifelong injury or disease, such as CTE.  
In order to make the experiment more straightforward and feasible, losing draws were 
treated as immediate bad effects.  However, this simplifying assumption may not match 
situations that occur in the real world.  In reality, it often takes several decades for the symptoms 
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of diseases like CTE to manifest.  This presents one of the limits of this experiment.  However, 
immediate feedback regarding this disease may soon be possible.  Research is underway to 
develop reliable techniques for in vivo diagnosis of CTE (Barrio et al. 2015; Clark 2017).  The 
ability to diagnose CTE in living individuals would provide the opportunity for immediate 
feedback and would be more representative of the experiment in this chapter. 
The findings of this experiment demonstrate that even though, on average, individuals 
exhibit a strong aversion to risk, a significant portion still demonstrate risk-seeking behavior.  
This should concern those who find risk-seeking behavior to be undesirable in particular settings, 
such as when an athlete’s life-long health is at stake.  Fortunately, the results from this 
experiment provide useful incites as to how policymakers can promote less risk-seeking behavior. 
Individuals tend to exhibit a considerable degree of risk aversion when asked to re-assess 
their risk choices after being given the opportunity to frequently reflect upon how much they 
have earned and are putting at risk.  This suggests that legislators and others with regulatory 
power over athletics should encourage risk information be provided more frequently if they wish 
to encourage risk-averse behavior.  On the other hand, risk-averse behavior is less pronounced 
when participants are asked to make an upfront commitment with regard to risk.  This holds true 
regardless of the type of payment structure.  This result suggests individuals will exhibit greater 
risk aversion over time if faced with a series of short-term contracts than if faced with one, long-
term contract.  Participants were more risk-averse under the increasing payment structure, which 
contained a greater endowment.  At the professional level, in which athletes are compensated, 
payment structures could be manipulated to encourage more risk aversion.  Players or their 
unions could bargain to demand a greater percentage of their compensation occur upfront, with 
less payment happening on the back-end.  
  134 
References 
 
2014-15 NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook. “Guideline 21: Sport-Related Concussion.” Revised 
July 2014. https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/SMH_Guideline_21_20160217.pdf 
(last accessed January 2018). 
 
Baugh, Christine M. and Emily Kroshus. 2016. “Concussion management in US college football: 
progress and pitfalls.” Concussion 1(1): 1–20. 
 
Barrio, Jorge R., Gary W. Small, Koon-Pong Wong, Sung-Cheng Huang, Jie Liu, David A. 
Merrill, Christopher C. Giza et al. 2015. “In vivo characterization of chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy using [F-18] FDDNP PET brain imaging.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 112(16: E2039-E2047. Available at http://www.pnas.org/content/ 
112/16/E2039.full. 
 
Belson, Ken. 2017. “For Ravens’ John Urschel, Playing in the N.F.L. No Longer Adds Up.”  
New York Times.  July 27.  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/sports/football/john-
urschel-baltimore-ravens-retires-nfl-cte-study.html (last accessed October 2017). 
 
Big Ten Conference. 2014. “Big Ten Statement.” BigTen.org, October 1. http://www.bigten.org/ 
genrel/100114aaa.html (last accessed October 2017). 
 
Block, Justin.  2016. “We Shouldn’t Be Surprised When NFL Players Retire Early Anymore.”  
Huffington Post, April 8. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dbrickashaw-ferguson-
nfl-early-retirement-no-surprise_us_5707c4d5e4b0c4e26a2273fa (last accessed October 
2017). 
 
Brookins, Philip, Jennifer Brown, and Dmitry Ryvkin. 2016. Peer Information and Risk-taking 
under Competitive and Non-competitive Pay Schemes. No. w22486. National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
 
Byrnes, James P., David C. Miller, and William D. Schafer. 1999. “Gender Differences in Risk 
Taking: A Meta-Analysis.” Psychological Bulletin 125(3): 367–83. 
 
Carmichael, Emma. 2011. “How A Bad NCAA Rule Could Make Football’s Concussion Crisis 
Even Worse.” Deadspin, February 28. https://deadspin.com/5769622/another-college-
player-quits-because-of-concussions-scholarship-rules-ensure-that-things-will-get-worse 
(last accessed October 2017). 
 
Cherry J.D., Stein T.D., Tripodis Y., Alvarez V.E., Huber B.R., Au R., et al. 2017. 
“CCL11 is increased in the CNS in chronic traumatic encephalopathy but not in 
Alzheimer’s disease.” PLOS One, 12(9): e0185541. Available at https://doi.org/10.1371/ 
journal.pone.0185541. 
 
  135 
Clark, Kevin. 2017. “Boston University’s CTE Breakthrough Could Forever Chance Football.” 
The Ringer, September 26. https://www.theringer.com/nfl/2017/9/26/16372088/boston-
university-cte-test-for-the-living-football-impact (last accessed January 2018). 
  
“College Athletic Scholarship Limits.” ScholarshipStats.com. http://www.scholarshipstats.com/ 
ncaalimits.html (last accessed October 2017). 
 
De Graaf, Mia and Ariel Zilber. 2017. “Ex-NFL player confirmed as first ever LIVING person 
identified with CTE, study claims.” Dailymail.com, November 16. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5089351/Ex-NFL-player-diagnosed-CTE-
alive.html (last accessed January 2018). 
 
Demovsky, Rob. 2015. “Adrian Coxcon, cut by Packers, says next hit could ‘kill me or be life-
damaging’.”  ESPN, September 7.  http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/13602937/ 
former-green-bay-packers-player-adrian-coxson-retiring-says-next-hit-kill-me (last 
accessed October 2017). 
 
Dixon, Chelsea L. 2015. “When Student-Athletes Get Injured, Who Pays?” Noodle, October 7. 
https://www.noodle.com/articles/when-student-athletes-get-injured-who-pays134 (last 
accessed October 2017). 
 
Dodd, Dennis. 2012. “California passes Student-Athlete Bill of Rights.” CBSSports.com, 
October 9. https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/california-passes-student-
athlete-bill-of-rights/ (last accessed October 2017). 
 
Figner, Bernd, Rachael J. Mackinlay, Friedrich Wilkening, and Elke U. Weber. 2009. “Affective 
and Deliberative Processes in Risky Choice: Age differences in Risk Taking in the 
Columbia Card Task.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition 35(3): 709–30. 
 
Florio, Mike. 2015. “Chris Borland retires after one season.”  Pro Football Talk, March 16.  
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/03/16/chris-borland-retires-after-one-season/ 
(last accessed October 2017). 
 
Gibbs, Lindsay. 2016. “2 More NFL Players Retire Early As Evidence Linking Football And 
CTE Mounts.”  Think Progress, April 8. https://thinkprogress.org/2-more-nfl-players-
retire-early-as-evidence-linking-football-and-cte-mounts-f170cbe5f4f1/ (last accessed 
October 2017). 
 
Harvey, Hosea H. “Youth Sports Traumatic Brain Injury Laws.” The Policy Surveillance 
Program: A LawAtlas Project. http://lawatlas.org/datasets/sc-reboot (last accessed 
November 2017) (updated through July 1, 2017). 
 
Hersch, Joni, and W. Kip Viscusi. 1998. “Smoking and Other Risky Behaviors.” Journal of Drug 
Issues 28(3): 645–61. 
 
  136 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk.” Econometrica 47(3): 263–91. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1984. “Choices, Values, and Frames.” American 
Psychologist 39(4): 341–50. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1990. “Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem.” Journal of Political Economy 98(6): 1325–
48. 
 
Martel, Brett and Arnie Stapleton. 2017. “Will NFL contracts ever fully guarantee? Players can 
hope.” USA Today, September 16. https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/09/ 
16/will-nfl-contracts-ever-fully-guarantee-players-can-hope/105676754/ (last accessed 
January 2018). 
 
Mez, Jesse, Daniel H. Daneshvar, Patrick T. Kiernan, et al. 2017. “Clinicopathological 
Evaluation of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in Players of American Football.” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 318(4): 360–70. 
 
O’Shaughnessy, Lynn. 2012. “8 things you should know about sports scholarships.” 
CBSNews.com, September 20. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/8-things-you-should-
know-about-sports-scholarships/ (last accessed October 2017). 
 
Pac-12 Conference. 2014. “Pac-12 universities adopt sweeping reforms for student-athletes, 
guaranteeing scholarships, improving health care, and more.” Pac-12.com, October 27. 
http://pac-12.com/article/2014/10/27/pac-12-universities-adopt-sweeping-reforms-
student-athletes-guaranteeing (last accessed October 2017). 
 
Tarini, Beth A., Margaret A. Brooks, and David G. Bundy. 2012. “A Policy Impact Analysis of 
the Mandatory NCAA Sickle Cell Trait Screening Program.” Health Services Research 
47(1): 446–61. 
 
Thaler, Richard. 1980. “Toward A Positive Theory of Consumer Choice.” Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 1: 39–60. 
 
Thaler, Richard H., Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and Alan Schwartz. 1997. “The Effect of 
Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test.” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 112(2): 647–61. 
 
Therber, Frank. 2016. “The Anatomy Of An NFL Player Contract.” Forbes.com, March 8. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/franktherber/2016/03/08/the-anatomy-of-an-nfl-player-
contract/#215897c53faa (last accessed October 2017). 
 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1985. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice.” In Environmental Impact assessment, technology assessment, and risk analysis, 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg: 107–29. 
  137 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1991. “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4): 1039–61. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, and Joni Hersch. “Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers.” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 83(2): 269–80. 
 
Ward, Joe, Josh Williams, and Sam Manchester. 2017. “111 N.F.L. Brains.  All But One Had 
C.T.E.”  New York Times, July 25. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/25/ 
sports/football/nfl-cte.html (last accessed October 2017). 
 
Walsh, Meghan. 2013. “I Trusted ‘Em: When NCAA Schools Abandon Their Injured Athletes.”  
The Atlantic, May 1. https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/05/i-
trusted-em-when-ncaa-schools-abandon-their-injured-athletes/275407/ (last accessed 
October 2017). 
 
Wilson, Ryan. 2016. “Only 23, another NFL player is retiring early because of concussions.”  
CBS Sports.  April 7.  https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/only-23-another-nfl-player-is-
retiring-early-because-of-concussions/ (last accessed October 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  138 
Tables 
 
Table 1:  Payment Schemes 
 
Flat Payment Scheme  Increasing Payment Scheme 
Round Award for Win Bank  Round 
Award for 
Win Bank 
1 $1.00 $0.25  1 $1.00 $0.75 
2 $1.00 $1.25  2 $1.25 $1.75 
3 $1.00 $2.25  3 $1.50 $3.00 
4 $1.00 $3.25  4 $1.75 $4.50 
5 $1.00 $4.25  5 $2.00 $6.25 
6 $1.00 $5.25  6 $2.25 $8.25 
7 $1.00 $6.25  7 $2.50 $10.50 
8 $1.00 $7.25  8 $2.75 $13.00 
9 $1.00 $8.25  9 $3.00 $15.75 
10 $1.00 $9.25  10 $3.25 $18.75 
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Table 2:  Game Structures 
 
Game Payment Scheme Nature of Decision 
1 Flat No Commitment 
2 Increasing No Commitment 
3 Flat Upfront Commitment 
4 Increasing Upfront Commitment 
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Table 3:  “Optimal” Number of Rounds for Risk-Neutral Individual to Play 
 
   Payment Scheme 
   Flat Increasing 
C
ha
nc
e 
of
 W
in
 60% 2 2 
70% 3 3 
80% 4 6 
90% 9 10 
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Table 4: Average Number of Rounds Played 
 
Chance 
of Win Game 
Payment 
Scheme 
Commitment 
Level 
(1) (2) (3) 
Rounds 
Played 
(Survived) 
Obs. 
Rounds 
Played 
(Died) 
Obs. 
Rounds 
Played 
(All) 
Obs. 
60% 1 Flat None 1.735 155 1.380 400 1.479 555 
60% 2 Increasing None 1.439 205 1.329 350 1.369 555 
60% 3 Flat Upfront - - - - 2.297 111 
60% 4 Increasing Upfront - - - - 2.054 111 
70% 1 Flat None 2.527 186 1.959 369 2.150 555 
70% 2 Increasing None 2.308 224 1.725 331 1.960 555 
70% 3 Flat Upfront - - - - 3.306 111 
70% 4 Increasing Upfront - - - - 2.820 111 
80% 1 Flat None 3.673 217 2.379 338 2.885 555 
80% 2 Increasing None 3.117 222 2.066 333 2.486 555 
80% 3 Flat Upfront - - - - 4.378 111 
80% 4 Increasing Upfront - - - - 3.783 111 
90% 1 Flat None 5.222 297 3.388 258 4.369 555 
90% 2 Increasing None 4.530 317 2.937 238 3.847 555 
90% 3 Flat Upfront - - - - 5.892 111 
90% 4 Increasing Upfront - - - - 5.243 111 
Note:  For Games 1 and 2 under the “No Commitment” decision method, there are a total of 555 observations.  This is 
because each of the 111 participants played each probability five times.  There are only 111 total observations for Games 
3 and 4 because each participant only played these games one time for each probability. 
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Table 5: Rounds Played for Games 1 and 2 (No Commitment) 
 
  If Never Lost Regardless of Loss 
  OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
Probability = 70 0.829 0.426 0.631 0.367 
 (0.105)*** (0.053)*** (0.062)*** (0.033)*** 
 [0.075]*** [0.039]*** [0.045]*** [0.025]*** 
Probability = 80 1.798 0.764 1.261 0.634 
 (0.104)*** (0.050)*** (0.062)*** (0.031)*** 
 [0.114]*** [0.046]*** [0.067]*** [0.029]*** 
Probability = 90 3.267 1.124 2.684 1.059 
 (0.097)*** (0.046)*** (0.062)*** (0.029)*** 
 [0.158]*** [0.048]*** [0.113]*** [0.032]*** 
Increasing 
Payment Scheme − 0.472 − 0.142 − 0.305 − 0.119 
 (0.069)*** (0.026)*** (0.044)*** (0.019)*** 
 [0.083]*** [0.025]*** [0.053]*** [0.021]*** 
Male − 0.255 − 0.080 − 0.094 − 0.037 
 (0.070)*** (0.027)*** (0.045)** (0.020)* 
 [0.199] [0.062] [0.105] [0.041] 
Smoker 0.512 0.151 0.171 0.066 
 (0.119)*** (0.043)*** (0.073)** (0.031)** 
 [0.366] [0.101] [0.161] [0.061] 
Constant 1.908 0.549 1.602 0.421 
 (0.093)*** (0.046)*** (0.053)*** (0.028)*** 
 [0.123]*** [0.052]*** [0.066]*** [0.031]*** 
Observations 1,823 1,823 4,440 4,400 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of rounds chosen to play.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Rounds Played for Games 3 and 4 (Upfront Commitment) 
 
  OLS Poisson 
Probability = 70 0.887 0.342 
 (0.144)*** (0.060)*** 
 [0.058]*** [0.025]*** 
Probability = 80 1.905 0.629 
 (0.144)*** (0.056)*** 
 [0.094]*** [0.033]*** 
Probability = 90 3.392 0.940 
 (0.144)*** (0.054)*** 
 [0.146]*** [0.041]*** 
Increasing 
Payment Scheme − 0.493 − 0.133 
 (0.102)*** (0.035)*** 
 [0.093]*** [0.024]*** 
Male − 0.385 − 0.105 
 (0.106)*** (0.037)*** 
 [0.240] [0.066] 
Smoker 0.906 0.231 
 (0.170)*** (0.054)*** 
 [0.475]* [0.112]** 
Constant 2.502 0.862 
 (0.123)*** (0.051)*** 
 [0.161]*** [0.055]*** 
Observations 888 888 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of rounds chosen 
to play.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Clustered 
standard errors are in brackets.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,        
* p<0.1 
 
  144 
 
Table 7: Rounds Played - Too Few, Optimal, or Too Many 
                 
Game 1: No Commitment and Flat Payment Scheme 
Length 60 70 80 90 
Too Few 37.50% 69 / 184 44.44% 100 / 225 44.94% 111 / 247 91.64% 274 / 299 
Optimal 32.61% 60 / 184 23.56% 53 / 225 19.03% 47 / 247 5.02% 15 / 299 
Too Many 29.89% 55 / 184 32.00% 72 / 225 36.03% 89 / 247 3.34% 10 / 299 
                                  
Game 2: No Commitment and Increasing Payment Scheme 
Length 60 70 80 90 
Too Few 53.60% 119 / 222 58.26% 141 / 242 95.98% 215 / 224 97.16% 308 / 317 
Optimal 29.28% 65 / 222 26.45% 64 / 242 1.79% 4 / 224 2.84% 9 / 317 
Too Many 17.12% 38 / 222 15.29% 37 / 242 2.23% 5 / 224 N/A N/A 
                                  
Game 3: Upfront Commitment and Flat Payment Scheme 
Length 60 70 80 90 
Too Few 27.03% 30 / 111 32.43% 36 / 111 35.14% 39 / 111 88.29% 98 / 111 
Optimal 36.04% 40 / 111 33.33% 37 / 111 27.93% 31 / 111 3.60% 4 / 111 
Too Many 36.94% 41 / 111 34.23% 38 / 111 36.94% 41 / 111 8.11% 9 / 111 
                                  
Game 4: Upfront Commitment and Increasing Payment Scheme 
Length 60 70 80 90 
Too Few 37.84% 42 / 111 46.85% 52 / 111 89.19% 99 / 111 97.30% 108 / 111 
Optimal 28.83% 32 / 111 24.32% 27 / 111 5.41% 6 / 111 2.70% 3 / 111 
Too Many 33.33% 37 / 111 28.83% 32 / 111 5.41% 6 / 111 N/A N/A 
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Figure 1:  Example Screenshot of Experiment 
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Figure 2:  Kahneman and Tversky (1984) Game 
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Figure 3:  Game 1 vs. Game 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Game 3 vs. Game 4 
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Figure 5:  Game 1 vs. Game 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Game 2 vs. Game 4 
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Figure 11 
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Figure 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 
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Appendix 
 
Table A–1: “Optimal” Decisions 
 
  Flat Payment Scheme     Increasing Payment Scheme 
                  
C
ha
nc
e 
of
 W
in
 =
 6
0%
 
Round 
Walk 
Away 
Money 
Money 
In Next 
Round 
Chance 
of Win 
Expected 
Value of 
Play 
Play or 
Walk 
Away?    
Round 
Walk 
Away 
Money 
Money 
In Next 
Round 
Chance 
of Win 
Expected 
Value of 
Play 
Play or 
Walk 
Away? 
1 0.25 1.25 60% 0.75 Play    1 0.75 1.75 60% 1.05 Play 
2 1.25 2.25 60% 1.35 Play    2 1.75 3 60% 1.8 Play 
3 2.25 3.25 60% 1.95 Walk Away    3 3 4.5 60% 2.7 Walk Away 
4 3.25 4.25 60% 2.55 Walk Away    4 4.5 6.25 60% 3.75 Walk Away 
5 4.25 5.25 60% 3.15 Walk Away    5 6.25 8.25 60% 4.95 Walk Away 
6 5.25 6.25 60% 3.75 Walk Away    6 8.25 10.5 60% 6.3 Walk Away 
7 6.25 7.25 60% 4.35 Walk Away    7 10.5 13 60% 7.8 Walk Away 
8 7.25 8.25 60% 4.95 Walk Away    8 13 15.75 60% 9.45 Walk Away 
9 8.25 9.25 60% 5.55 Walk Away    9 15.75 18.75 60% 11.25 Walk Away 
10 9.25 10.25 60% 6.15 Walk Away    10 18.75 22 60% 13.2 Walk Away 
Number of rounds that maximize expected value = 2     Number of rounds that maximize expected value = 2 
C
ha
nc
e 
of
 W
in
 =
 7
0%
 
Round 
Walk 
Away 
Money 
Money 
In Next 
Round 
Chance 
of Win 
Expected 
Value of 
Play 
Play or 
Walk 
Away? 
  
  
Round 
Walk 
Away 
Money 
Money 
In Next 
Round 
Chance 
of Win 
Expected 
Value of 
Play 
Play or 
Walk 
Away? 
1 0.25 1.25 70% 0.875 Play    1 0.75 1.75 70% 1.225 Play 
2 1.25 2.25 70% 1.575 Play    2 1.75 3 70% 2.1 Play 
3 2.25 3.25 70% 2.275 Play    3 3 4.5 70% 3.15 Play 
4 3.25 4.25 70% 2.975 Walk Away    4 4.5 6.25 70% 4.375 Walk Away 
5 4.25 5.25 70% 3.675 Walk Away    5 6.25 8.25 70% 5.775 Walk Away 
6 5.25 6.25 70% 4.375 Walk Away    6 8.25 10.5 70% 7.35 Walk Away 
7 6.25 7.25 70% 5.075 Walk Away    7 10.5 13 70% 9.1 Walk Away 
8 7.25 8.25 70% 5.775 Walk Away    8 13 15.75 70% 11.025 Walk Away 
9 8.25 9.25 70% 6.475 Walk Away    9 15.75 18.75 70% 13.125 Walk Away 
10 9.25 10.25 70% 7.175 Walk Away    10 18.75 22 70% 15.4 Walk Away 
Number of rounds that maximize expected value = 3     Number of rounds that maximize expected value = 3 
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  Flat Payment Scheme     Increasing Payment Scheme 
C
ha
nc
e 
of
 W
in
 =
 8
0%
 
Round 
Walk 
Away 
Money 
Money 
In Next 
Round 
Chance 
of Win 
Expected 
Value of 
Play 
Play or 
Walk 
Away? 
  
  
Round 
Walk 
Away 
Money 
Money 
In Next 
Round 
Chance 
of Win 
Expected 
Value of 
Play 
Play or 
Walk 
Away? 
1 0.25 1.25 80% 1 Play    1 0.75 1.75 80% 1.4 Play 
2 1.25 2.25 80% 1.8 Play    2 1.75 3 80% 2.4 Play 
3 2.25 3.25 80% 2.6 Play    3 3 4.5 80% 3.6 Play 
4 3.25 4.25 80% 3.4 Play    4 4.5 6.25 80% 5 Play 
5 4.25 5.25 80% 4.2 Walk Away    5 6.25 8.25 80% 6.6 Play 
6 5.25 6.25 80% 5 Walk Away    6 8.25 10.5 80% 8.4 Play 
7 6.25 7.25 80% 5.8 Walk Away    7 10.5 13 80% 10.4 Walk Away 
8 7.25 8.25 80% 6.6 Walk Away    8 13 15.75 80% 12.6 Walk Away 
9 8.25 9.25 80% 7.4 Walk Away    9 15.75 18.75 80% 15 Walk Away 
10 9.25 10.25 80% 8.2 Walk Away    10 18.75 22 80% 17.6 Walk Away 
Number of rounds that maximize expected value = 4     Number of rounds that maximize expected value = 6 
C
ha
nc
e 
of
 W
in
 =
 9
0%
 
Round 
Walk 
Away 
Money 
Money 
In Next 
Round 
Chance 
of Win 
Expected 
Value of 
Play 
Play or 
Walk 
Away?    
Round 
Walk 
Away 
Money 
Money 
In Next 
Round 
Chance 
of Win 
Expected 
Value of 
Play 
Play or 
Walk 
Away? 
1 0.25 1.25 90% 1.125 Play    1 0.75 1.75 90% 1.575 Play 
2 1.25 2.25 90% 2.025 Play    2 1.75 3 90% 2.7 Play 
3 2.25 3.25 90% 2.925 Play    3 3 4.5 90% 4.05 Play 
4 3.25 4.25 90% 3.825 Play    4 4.5 6.25 90% 5.625 Play 
5 4.25 5.25 90% 4.725 Play    5 6.25 8.25 90% 7.425 Play 
6 5.25 6.25 90% 5.625 Play    6 8.25 10.5 90% 9.45 Play 
7 6.25 7.25 90% 6.525 Play    7 10.5 13 90% 11.7 Play 
8 7.25 8.25 90% 7.425 Play    8 13 15.75 90% 14.175 Play 
9 8.25 9.25 90% 8.325 Play    9 15.75 18.75 90% 16.875 Play 
10 9.25 10.25 90% 9.225 Walk Away    10 18.75 22 90% 19.8 Play 
Number of rounds that maximize expected value = 9     Number of rounds that maximize expected value = 10 
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Table A–2: Expected Values for Each Round Played 
Flat Payment Scheme 
Rounds 
Played Bank 
60 70 80 90 
Chance 
of Being 
Alive 
Expected 
Value 
Chance 
of Being 
Alive 
Expected 
Value 
Chance 
of Being 
Alive 
Expected 
Value 
Chance 
of Being 
Alive 
Expected 
Value 
0 0.25 100.00% 0.250 100.00% 0.250 100.00% 0.250 100.00% 0.250 
1 1.25 60.00% 0.750 70.00% 0.875 80.00% 1.000 90.00% 1.125 
2 2.25 36.00% 0.810 49.00% 1.103 64.00% 1.440 81.00% 1.823 
3 3.25 21.60% 0.702 34.30% 1.115 51.20% 1.664 72.90% 2.369 
4 4.25 12.96% 0.551 24.01% 1.020 40.96% 1.741 65.61% 2.788 
5 5.25 7.78% 0.408 16.81% 0.882 32.77% 1.720 59.05% 3.100 
6 6.25 4.67% 0.292 11.76% 0.735 26.21% 1.638 53.14% 3.322 
7 7.25 2.80% 0.203 8.24% 0.597 20.97% 1.520 47.83% 3.468 
8 8.25 1.68% 0.139 5.76% 0.476 16.78% 1.384 43.05% 3.551 
9 9.25 1.01% 0.093 4.04% 0.373 13.42% 1.242 38.74% 3.584 
10 10.25 0.60% 0.062 2.82% 0.290 10.74% 1.101 34.87% 3.574 
                    
Increasing Payment Scheme 
Rounds 
Played Bank 
60 70 80 90 
Chance 
of Being 
Alive 
Expected 
Value 
Chance 
of Being 
Alive 
Expected 
Value 
Chance 
of Being 
Alive 
Expected 
Value 
Chance 
of Being 
Alive 
Expected 
Value 
0 0.75 100.00% 0.750 100.00% 0.750 100.00% 0.750 100.00% 0.750 
1 1.75 60.00% 1.050 70.00% 1.225 80.00% 1.400 90.00% 1.575 
2 3 36.00% 1.080 49.00% 1.470 64.00% 1.920 81.00% 2.430 
3 4.5 21.60% 0.972 34.30% 1.544 51.20% 2.304 72.90% 3.281 
4 6.25 12.96% 0.810 24.01% 1.501 40.96% 2.560 65.61% 4.101 
5 8.25 7.78% 0.642 16.81% 1.387 32.77% 2.703 59.05% 4.872 
6 10.5 4.67% 0.490 11.76% 1.235 26.21% 2.753 53.14% 5.580 
7 13 2.80% 0.364 8.24% 1.071 20.97% 2.726 47.83% 6.218 
8 15.75 1.68% 0.265 5.76% 0.908 16.78% 2.642 43.05% 6.780 
9 18.75 1.01% 0.189 4.04% 0.757 13.42% 2.517 38.74% 7.264 
10 22 0.60% 0.133 2.82% 0.621 10.74% 2.362 34.87% 7.671 
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Table A–3: Percentage of Individuals Choosing to Play 
Game 1: Flat Payment Scheme 
Round 60% 70% 80% 90% 
1 98.74% 548 / 555 99.46% 552 / 555 99.64% 553 / 555 100.00% 555 / 555 
2 76.43% 201 / 263 92.73% 357 / 385 97.48% 426 / 437 98.02% 495 / 505 
3 47.83% 55 / 115 72.18% 179 / 248 91.99% 310 / 337 97.74% 432 / 442 
4 39.39% 13 / 33 57.60% 72 / 125 70.17% 167 / 238 92.65% 353 / 381 
5 28.57% 2 / 7 54.35% 25 / 46 65.44% 89 / 136 79.75% 252 / 316 
6 100.00% 1 / 1 31.25% 5 / 16 42.03% 29 / 69 67.86% 152 / 224 
7 100.00% 1 / 1 75.00% 3 / 4 52.17% 12 / 23 69.57% 96 / 138 
8 0.00% 0 / 1 N/A 0 / 0 72.73% 8 / 11 62.96% 51 / 81 
9 N/A 0 / 0 N/A 0 / 0 57.14% 4 / 7 61.70% 29 / 47 
10 N/A 0 / 0 N/A 0 / 0 100.00% 3 / 3 40.00% 10 / 25 
Game 2: Increasing Payment Scheme 
Round 60% 70% 80% 90% 
1 96.58% 536 / 555 99.82% 554 / 555 99.64% 553 / 555 99.64% 553 / 555 
2 64.16% 179 / 279 89.01% 340 / 382 97.05% 395 / 407 96.73% 473 / 489 
3 36.89% 38 / 103 59.00% 141 / 239 82.52% 255 / 309 96.96% 414 / 427 
4 26.92% 7 / 26 36.63% 37 / 101 58.67% 115 / 196 81.16% 293 / 361 
5 0.00% 0 / 2 50.00% 12 / 24 48.89% 44 / 90 74.52% 193 / 259 
6 N/A 0 / 0 57.14% 4 / 7 37.50% 12 / 32 64.57% 113 / 175 
7 N/A 0 / 0 0.00% 0 / 4 55.56% 5 / 9 53.33% 56 / 105 
8 N/A 0 / 0 N/A 0 / 0 25.00% 1 / 4 42.22% 19 / 45 
9 N/A 0 / 0 N/A 0 / 0 N/A 0 / 0 75.00% 12 / 16 
10 N/A 0 / 0 N/A 0 / 0 N/A 0 / 0 81.82% 9 / 11 
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Table A–4: T-Tests for Differences in Mean Rounds Played 
 
Relevant 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis in T-Test 
Factor(s) Held 
Constant p value 
Difference 
Significant at 95% 
confidence level? 
Supports 
Hypothesis? 
1 60% < 70% Game 1 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 70% < 80% Game 1 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 80% < 90% Game 1 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 60% < 70% Game 2 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 70% < 80% Game 2 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 80% < 90% Game 2 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 60% < 70% Game 3 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 70% < 80% Game 3 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 80% < 90% Game 3 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 60% < 70% Game 4 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 70% < 80% Game 4 0.0000 Yes Yes 
1 80% < 90% Game 4 0.0000 Yes Yes 
2 H-L Risk-averse < H-L Risk-neutral/Seeking Game 1 0.0797 No Mostly 
2 H-L Risk-averse < H-L Risk-neutral/Seeking Game 2 0.0578 No Mostly 
2 H-L Risk-averse < H-L Risk-neutral/Seeking Game 3 0.1384 No No 
2 H-L Risk-averse < H-L Risk-neutral/Seeking Game 4 0.0213 Yes Yes 
2 Non-Smokers < Smokers Game 1 0.0860 No Mostly 
2 Non-Smokers < Smokers Game 2 0.0090 Yes Yes 
2 Non-Smokers < Smokers Game 3 0.0007 Yes Yes 
2 Non-Smokers < Smokers Game 4 0.0501 Yes Yes 
2 Females < Males Game 1 0.9970 No No 
2 Females < Males Game 2 0.8328 No No 
2 Females < Males Game 3 0.8239 No No 
2 Females < Males Game 4 0.9474 No No 
3 Game 1 < Game 3 60% 0.0069 Yes Yes 
3 Game 1 < Game 3 70% 0.0001 Yes Yes 
3 Game 1 < Game 3 80% 0.0015 Yes Yes 
3 Game 1 < Game 3 90% 0.0009 Yes Yes 
3 Game 2 < Game 4 60% 0.0037 Yes Yes 
3 Game 2 < Game 4 70% 0.0009 Yes Yes 
3 Game 2 < Game 4 80% 0.0034 Yes Yes 
3 Game 2 < Game 4 90% 0.0012 Yes Yes 
4 Game 1 < Game 2 60% 0.9994 No N/A 
4 Game 1 < Game 2 70% 0.9882 No N/A 
4 Game 1 < Game 2 80% 0.9999 No N/A 
4 Game 1 < Game 2 90% 1.0000 No N/A 
4 Game 1 ≠ Game 2 60% 0.0013 Yes N/A 
4 Game 1 ≠ Game 2 70% 0.0237 Yes N/A 
4 Game 1 ≠ Game 2 80% 0.0002 Yes N/A 
4 Game 1 ≠ Game 2 90% 0.0000 Yes N/A 
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4 Game 1 > Game 2 60% 0.0006 Yes N/A 
4 Game 1 > Game 2 70% 0.0118 Yes N/A 
4 Game 1 > Game 2 80% 0.0001 Yes N/A 
4 Game 1 > Game 2 90% 0.0000 Yes N/A 
4 Game 3 < Game 4 60% 0.9967 No N/A 
4 Game 3 < Game 4 70% 1.0000 No N/A 
4 Game 3 < Game 4 80% 1.0000 No N/A 
4 Game 3 < Game 4 90% 1.0000 No N/A 
4 Game 3 ≠ Game 4 60% 0.0067 Yes N/A 
4 Game 3 ≠ Game 4 70% 0.0000 Yes N/A 
4 Game 3 ≠ Game 4 80% 0.0000 Yes N/A 
4 Game 3 ≠ Game 4 90% 0.0000 Yes N/A 
4 Game 3 > Game 4 60% 0.0033 Yes N/A 
4 Game 3 > Game 4 70% 0.0000 Yes N/A 
4 Game 3 > Game 4 80% 0.0000 Yes N/A 
4 Game 3 > Game 4 90% 0.0000 Yes N/A 
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Figure A–3 
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